


AD630946

1



CLEARINGHOUSE FOR FEDERAL SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION			
Hardcopy	Microfilm		
\$6.00	\$1.25	219	42
ARCHIVE COPY			

PROCESSING COPY  
*Code 1*

1. TITLE	
2. AUTHOR	
3. PERIODICITY	
4. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY	
5. DTIC	6. AVAIL. AND OR SOURCE

10

SID 65-1021-2

FACTORS OPERATIVE IN A POST-ARMS  
CONTROL SITUATION  
VOLUME II  
Technical Report

14 August 1965

Contract AF 49(638)-1411



DISTRIBUTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS UNLIMITED.

**NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC.**  
**SPACE and INFORMATION SYSTEMS DIVISION**

This document presents results of work sponsored by the Directorate of Plans, DCS/PAO, Headquarters USAF, under Contract AF 49(638)-1411. These results do not necessarily represent the official opinion or policy of the U.S. Air Force.



## FOREWORD

The results of a study of the Factors Operative in a Post-Arms Control Situation under Air Force Contract Number AF 49(638)-1411 are presented in this final Summary Report (SID 65-1021-1). The final Technical Report is submitted under separate cover (SID 65-1021-2).

Work under this contract was performed by the Operations Analysis Department, Research and Engineering Division, Space and Information Systems Division, North American Aviation, Inc., under the direction of R. E. Brown, Principal Investigator. Major contributors to the study were: C. O. Beum, R. N. Clark, D. S. Irwin, L. Kashdan, J. E. Pournelle, and S. S. Ramsey.



## TECHNICAL REPORT INDEX/ABSTRACT

ACCESSION NUMBER		DOCUMENT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
TITLE OF DOCUMENT FACTORS OPERATIVE IN A POST-ARMS CONTROL SITUATION, VOLUME I, SUMMARY REPORT AND VOLUME II, TECHNICAL REPORT			LIBRARY USE ONLY
AUTHOR(S) R.E. BROWN			
CODE	ORIGINATING AGENCY AND OTHER SOURCES OPERATIONS ANALYSIS DEPT. RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING DIV. SPACE AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS DIV.	DOCUMENT NUMBER SID 65-1021-1 AND SID 65-1021-2	
PUBLICATION DATE 14 AUG 1965		CONTRACT NUMBER AF 49(638)-1411	
DESCRIPTIVE TERMS			
ARMS CONTROL DISARMAMENT MILITARY IMPLICATIONS STRATEGIC STALEMATE NATIONAL SECURITY FORCE PLANNING		GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT PRE-CRISIS MOBILIZATION BASE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING STRATEGIC DEFENSE MILITARY PRINCIPLES FOR EXAMINING ARMS CONTROL	

## ABSTRACT

Arms control is seen to be different from disarmament. The objectives of arms control are not necessarily different from those of the military, and some arms control measures may be desirable strategic options which tend to increase the national security.

Various arms control and disarmament proposals are examined, and the effects of each on military capability to preserve the national security and protect vital national interests are analyzed.

The following proposals are examined:

U. S. and USSR proposals for GCD Military Missions and Observation Posts  
 The Johnson "Five-Point Program" including the Verified Freeze  
 Closure of Overseas Bases  
 Nuclear Free Zones

Implications of these and other arms control proposals on the Zuckert-Page Ten Military Policy goals and the following national security problem areas are analyzed:

Deterrence of Attack on the U. S. by Major Powers  
 Deterrence of Attack on the U. S. by Minor Powers  
 Security of Interests in Latin America  
 Subversion and Economic Warfare  
 Open or Clandestine Rearmament



## CONTENTS

Section	Page
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
I POSITION PAPERS . . . . .	3
THE CURRENT STRATEGIC DOCTRINES OF THE UNITED STATES . . . . .	3
MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN INVESTIGATING ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS . . . . .	37
STABILITY UNDER DISARMAMENT CONDITIONS . . . . .	43
FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN THE STUDY OF GENERAL & COMPLETE DISARMAMENT (GCD) . . . . .	47
SUBVERSION, ECONOMIC WARFARE AND CHALLENGES TO THE U.S. POSITION IN WORLD MARKETS . . . . .	75
II ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL DOCUMENTATION . . . . .	93
SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT . . . . .	93
Summary of the Soviet GCD Proposal . . . . .	93
Text of the Soviet GCD Proposal . . . . .	101
U.S. PROPOSAL FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT . . . . .	131
Summary of the U.S. GCD Proposal . . . . .	131
Text of the U.S. GCD Proposal . . . . .	140
U.S. FIVE-POINT PROGRAM . . . . .	179
Text of President Johnson's Message . . . . .	179
Elaboration of the Points . . . . .	181
NUCLEAR FREE ZONE PROPOSALS . . . . .	191
Summaries of the Proposals . . . . .	191
Texts of and Statements on the Nuclear Free Zone Proposals . . . . .	193
OBSERVATION POSTS . . . . .	201
EXCHANGE OF MILITARY MISSIONS . . . . .	207
III CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS (ARMS CONTROL, DIPLOMATIC , POLITICAL, MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGICAL)—1945-1964 . . . . .	211
IV BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	223



## ILLUSTRATIONS

Section		Page
1	Early Years of the Hypothetical Scenario . . . . .	52
2	Hypothetical Scenario Events Conducive to GCD . . . . .	61

## TABLES

Table		Page
1	Comparison of 1962 U.S. and U.S.S.R. GCD Proposals and Hypothetical Composite Treaties . . . . .	68
2	Major Process Characteristics—Subversion of Economic Warfare . . . . .	76
3	Economic Credits and Grants Extended by U.S.S.R. to Underdeveloped Countries—January 1954 to June 1962 (Million U.S. Dollars) . . . . .	81
4	The Communist Bloc and the West in the World Economy . . . . .	83
5	United States Exports and Imports (Billions of Dollars) . . . . .	85
6	Indexes of Industrial Production, Imports, and Exports—Europe and the United States (1950 and 1961) . . . . .	86
7	Imports and Exports by Country of Origin and Destination (Millions of Dollars). . . . .	89



## INTRODUCTION

This is Volume II of the North American Aviation Space and Information Systems Division's two volume final report on the study of "Factors Operative in a Post Arms Control Situation." The principal work of the study, with the findings and conclusions of the study team, is presented in Volume I. Unlike Volume II, Volume I is a self-contained report which may be read without reference to other material.

## REPORT ORGANIZATION

Section I of this volume contains a series of position papers on subjects relevant to the study. With the exception of the paper on General and Comprehensive Disarmament, each of these papers may be read independently of the balance of the report. The GCD presentation in this section is a further expansion of the analysis of disarmament measures.

Section II of this report contains documentary material relevant to the proposals examined in the study. Drafts of proposals, and explanatory or clarifying statements by various public officials are presented without editorial comment. It is believed that this compilation of material will be of value for future studies of these arms control proposals.

As part of the background material for this study, a detailed Chronology of Events relating to arms control, was prepared for the years 1945 - 1964 and is presented in Section III.

Section IV contains the study bibliography. In addition to the documents listed in this section, the study team made use of numerous materials and articles in the popular literature, including Time Magazine; Fortune; The New York Times; The Los Angeles Times; U.S. News and World Report; and many others.



## I. POSITION PAPERS

### THE CURRENT STRATEGY DOCTRINES OF THE UNITED STATES

#### PREFACE

This paper is not intended to be an exhaustive study of the grand strategy of the United States. The author has attempted rather, to summarize the logic that has generated the McNamara Controlled Response Doctrine and its successor doctrines and to demonstrate in very general terms the major implications of these doctrinal developments.

The new strategic doctrines, although widely discussed, have not always been appreciated for what they are. The new era in strategic thinking has generated some surprising conclusions and requires some major changes in United States military organization. New criteria have been developed for deciding the size and nature of the U. S. weapons establishment. Study of the new doctrines, therefore, is of primary importance for predicting defense requirements.

As a study of the new doctrines and their implications, this paper is quite brief. It is intended only as an introduction to the subject. An exhaustive inquiry would run to several volumes, and preparation of such a study would require time and personnel not presently available. As a brief introduction, however, the paper will have served its purpose if it indicates to the reader the kinds of problems and the nature of the decision criteria generated by Controlled Response, Assured Destruction, and Damage Limiting.



## THE CURRENT STRATEGIC DOCTRINES OF THE UNITED STATES

### INTRODUCTION

There are two possible methods of dealing with an enemy threat: (1) the threat may be met by defense, which is to say that an enemy attack will be defeated; or (2) it may be deterred, which is to say that a threat of such magnitude as to discourage the enemy from launching his attack will be made. Obviously, these methods may be combined; it is equally obvious that they interact one with another.

For example, if a nation possesses a perfect defensive establishment, it is unlikely that a rational enemy will attack. If the attack cannot succeed, there is no point in making it. In this case, a defense establishment has acted as a deterrent. This type of deterrent fails, however, if (1) the enemy is irrational and attacks from sheer desperation or stupidity; (2) the enemy is ignorant of all factors in the defense establishment, and does not know that a perfect defense exists. Unfortunately, increasing the deterrent effect of the establishment by informing the enemy of its existence and its method of operation may well compromise the establishment's defensive capability. A surprise system or "secret weapon" may have enormous defensive capability, but no deterrent value at all. A possible third reason for the failure of a defense establishment to deter an attack is miscalculation: the enemy may know the factors, but be unable to correlate them; or he may miscalculate the intentions of the possessor. As a second example of the interaction of the concepts, a deterrent offense establishment may have defensive value. A good strategic weapons establishment capable of destroying all or much of an enemy's strategic offensive capability will be employed in general, as a deterrent; but such a counterforce capability will, of course, be useful in defense if deterrence fails.

The interaction of deterrence and defense may not always be in a manner which is desirable. The European allies of the United States have pointed out that possession of a good ground defense establishment in Europe may well add to the defense of Europe, but destroy the deterrent effect of the U. S. threat to retaliate against Russia for an attack on our allies. The construction of an expensive conventional army in Europe certainly suggests that its possessor is willing to use it; and if that be the case, what is the point of a thermonuclear response as well? This argument will recur throughout this paper.



In general, therefore, it can be said that defense begins where deterrence fails; that a defense capability may, but does not necessarily, add to the effectiveness of a deterrent threat; and that the weapons requirements of deterrence and defense interact but are not identical.<sup>1</sup>

#### UNITED STATES STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES - DETERRENCE

As previously indicated, the deterrence mission is not the same as the defense mission; there are separate requirements for the fulfillment of each and in some cases, these requirements are contradictory. This analysis considers the deterrence and defense mission requirements separately. This part of the discussion is devoted to deterrence.

Deterrence is a complex subject in the present era, but its fundamental assumption is quite simple. Baldly put, a deterrence posture is one of threatening an enemy, real or potential, with unacceptable damage if he commits (or refrains from committing) some action which the threatener will not allow (or requires). Examples of deterrence in normal life include the crimes of blackmail and extortion; the training of dogs and small children; and the whole system of criminal law.

In order for deterrence to succeed, the following conditions must be met:

1. The enemy must be sufficiently rational to perceive the threat, understand its meaning, and be in control of the action to be deterred. It may not be possible to deter madmen, fools, very small infants, or Chiefs of State who do not control their own Armed Forces.
2. The threat must be one of unacceptable damage. This means that the deterrer must appreciate the value scale of the deterred sufficiently to understand what is and what is not unacceptable damage. The threat of a fine of \$100,000 may not be sufficient to deter a ruthless industrialist from engaging in unfair competition practices if by so doing he can ruin his only competitor and attain a monopoly position in a lucrative field. The threat of vast destruction may not deter a warlord from attacking his neighbor if he feels that after the war he can achieve a better position than he had before the war. Killing the subjects of a dictator may not be sufficient to deter him if he will remain in control of his country. A deterrence

---

<sup>1</sup>In recent times, it has become fashionable to refer to deterrent capabilities as Assured Destruction systems, and to refer to counterforce as strategic defense capabilities as Damage Limiting systems. There is much that can be said for such a change in terminology, but in this paper the older words will be used.



threat, in other words, must be made in the terms of the deterred, not in the value scale of the deterrer. The deterrer must know that his threatened action will cost the enemy more, in the enemy's estimation, than the deterred action would gain. He does not need to know the precise value scale of the opponent, but he must know the rank order of the two actions.

3. The enemy must believe that the deterrer has the capability to carry out the threat. No actual capability is required but an astute enemy will use the means he possesses to determine whether the means exist. Conversely, a capability unknown to the enemy cannot affect a deterrence situation.<sup>1</sup> It is not necessary that the enemy know the precise means by which the threat will be carried out, nor is it necessary that the enemy be absolutely convinced that the means will perform the threat. There must, however, be sufficient uncertainty in his calculations that he will act as if he believes that the deterrer is capable of performing the threatened action. In general, less reliable means require threats of a greater magnitude of damage.
4. The deterred must believe that the deterrer has the will to carry out the threat; that he, in fact, is speaking seriously when he makes the threat; and that he is willing to suffer the consequences, if any, of performing the threatened action, either because he does not know what these consequences are, or because he understands and accepts them.

In the case of thermonuclear war, the consequences of carrying out a threat of all-out warfare are so severe that it is not necessarily rational to fulfill the threat. In order for deterrence to succeed in this case, the deterred must believe that the deterrer is either so irrational that he will, in fact, "push the button," or that the deterrer has so committed his forces that, if the action occurs, the war will begin without regard to the second thoughts of the deterrer.

If these conditions are met, deterrence will succeed. In the real world, there is often sufficient uncertainty about capabilities and intentions as to make deterrence successful when, in fact, the conditions are not met exactly; but there must be an approximation of them, or a threatening posture will not work. The conditions of deterrence will be referred to at various points, and are, therefore, summarized here.

---

<sup>1</sup>As opposed to a defense strategy, where a surprise weapon may be invaluable.



1. The deterred must be relatively rational, and the action to be deterred must be under his control.
2. The deterrer must threaten damage unacceptable to the deterred, according to the calculations of the deterred.
3. The deterred must believe the deterrer possesses the means to carry out the threatened action.
4. The deterred must believe the deterrer possesses the will to carry out the threatened action, and that he will continue to possess the will and means to do so if the prescribed action takes place.

It has become customary to divide the U. S. deterrent posture into three parts, according to the action to be deterred. These parts are discussed separately in the following text.

#### TYPE I DETERRENCE

The original meaning of the Type I Deterrence was deterrence of a massive attack on the United States itself. The threat was massive retaliation—a countervalue response directed against the enemy's cities. Before the Kennedy Administration, the nature of U. S. strategic weapons and the state of strategic thinking acted to make this strategy attractive.

Under this strategy, a thermonuclear war would begin with a massive strike against the U. S. proper. As soon as it was definitely determined that such an attack was underway (either by Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) or by actual impact of weapons on U. S. territory) all surviving strategic offensive weapons systems would act to strike at their previously assigned targets. There would not, in the first phase, be any attempt to retarget, nor would there be much sophistication in the control of the war by higher command. Aircraft which returned from their strike missions, and surviving missiles which for any reason had not taken part in the first phase, would be reassigned to finish the total destruction of the enemy. This was known in the technical language of the time as the "spasm" approach to thermonuclear war.

There was considerable debate in the 1957-1960 era about the numbers of strategic offensive weapons that would be required for Type I Deterrence. The advocates of "minimum deterrence" held that no more were needed than would be necessary to assure the United States of being able to accomplish the destruction of the enemy after receiving the first wave of a surprise attack. This quite possibly meant that the U. S. defense establishment would actually



be smaller than that of the potential enemy. There are, of course, very powerful political and psychological reasons for not accepting this situation, but the advocates of minimum deterrence were convinced that the economic gain realized by buying only the number of weapons needed for this type of deterrence would more than balance any such disadvantages.

#### Summary of the Minimum Deterrence Theory

1. A rational enemy is assumed.
2. The threat is automatic total destruction of any nation that attacks the United States with thermonuclear war.
3. The means requires a weapons establishment in which sufficient missiles for (2) above would survive the first wave of an enemy's surprise attack. The exact numbers of weapons are not calculable, but it is assumed that the United States could accept a position of "inferiority" vis-a-vis the enemy's strategic offensive weapons. A good ballistic missile early warning system is probably required, as well as a system for determining that an attack is taking place. BMEWS is required because "minimum deterrence" does not envision a system that can "ride out" the attack; retaliation begins when it is certain that the enemy has attacked. Originally, it was believed that the retaliatory strike would be launched upon receipt from BMEWS that enemy missiles were approaching the United States. One of the first acts of the Kennedy Administration was to remove the ambiguity from this situation and state clearly that the strike would not be launched until detonation of one or more weapons on U.S. soil. BMEWS will presumably continue to be useful in order to increase the warning time, allow the countdown on Atlas and Titan to begin, and get more of the Strategic Bomber fleet into the air.<sup>1</sup>
4. The will to strike is made essentially automatic, and, therefore, quite credible. There can be no opportunity for nuclear blackmail on the part of an enemy after an attack has begun, because the retaliatory strike will be launched within minutes of the beginning of the war, and the targets so chosen as to utterly destroy the enemy.

The minimum deterrent position was severely criticized by many analysts as being extremely dangerous. "Spoofing" of the BMEWS and Aircraft Early

---

<sup>1</sup>Civil Defense measures obviously profit from any increases in warning times.



Warning Systems by false attacks would be very dangerous for the enemy, but, if undertaken successfully once, it would possibly seriously degrade the utility of both the system and the threat by forcing U. S. decision-makers to contemplate the enormity of their actions not once, but many times. Accidental launch by the enemy of a single missile might precipitate the war, and there would be little or no time for discussion between the enemy and the United States in order to determine whether an attack was actually intended. Consequently, a country faced with the fact that one of its missiles has been launched accidentally would be severely tempted to launch everything else available in order to mitigate the effects of the certain counter-strike.

#### Type I Deterrence in the "Minuteman Era"

The Minuteman and Polaris—missiles distinguished by their survivability, at least in the early phases of a war—opened new possibilities for U. S. deterrent strategy. Deterrence of an attack on the United States no longer had to be based primarily on getting every missile and airplane on its way before it could be destroyed. From these considerations, McNamara evolved the Controlled Response Doctrine, which includes not only Type I Deterrence, but other considerations as well.

Sophisticated strategic doctrines, such as the Controlled Response Doctrine and the later Damage Limiting Strategy, are totally dependent on the possession of survivable strategic offensive weapons. As technology advances, Minuteman and Polaris may no longer fulfill this requirement. In the interests of brevity and avoidance of security restrictions, however, these weapons systems will continue to be discussed as if they were survivable. The reader should keep in mind that later generation survivable weapons may actually have to be substituted for them, and that this discussion is predicated on the assumption of survivability.

#### TYPE II DETERRENCE

Type II Deterrence is deterrence of an enemy attack on U. S. allies. It was epitomized by the statement of then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that attacks of any kind on certain of our allies would be met with "massive retaliation at a time and place of our own choosing." Type II deterrents threaten to push the button if the enemy does certain things short of actually attacking the deterrer with thermonuclear weapons.

In theory, the United States today has a posture of this sort with respect to the NATO countries. The NATO forces in Europe are inadequate to halt a massive Soviet invasion in the field. The theoretical justification for these forces is that they make it impossible to attack NATO with an effort short of a massive invasion, and this thereby makes it easier for Washington



decision-makers to decide to launch a "retaliatory" strike. Some European leaders, particularly DeGaulle of France, question whether the United States will risk the almost certain destruction of a large number of U. S. cities in the defense of Europe. DeGaulle and General Gallois are strongly advocating national deterrent forces of their own for Type I Deterrence.<sup>1</sup>

Type II Deterrence depends in large part on possession of a Credible First Strike Capability - that is, a weapons establishment which can so thoroughly devastate the enemy's strategic weapons that what remains will be incapable of working unacceptable destruction on the striking nation. One of the factors upsetting the Europeans is Secretary McNamara's statement to Congress in January 1963, in which he said that the United States will not attempt to build a First Strike Force. This was interpreted to mean that the United States had either (1) given up the concept of Type II Deterrence, (2) had decided that the massive destruction which the Soviet Union could work on the United States after our best attack was acceptable in order to save Europe, or (3) did not understand the situation.

Whether due to the uneasiness of the Europeans, Congressional pressures, or some other factor, by 1964 McNamara had drastically revised his statements. Although he still ruled out a "Full First Strike capability" as being not technically feasible, renewed emphasis was given to war fighting capability, and the concept of Damage Limiting forces was introduced. The primary Damage Limiting forces were to be Minuteman missiles, which were then considered the best counterforce weapons (for strikes against enemy missile sites, at any event) in the U. S. arsenal. Although his remarks were confined to the possibility of U. S. second strikes only, it was clear to both the NATO allies and WTO enemies that these same forces would also strengthen the U. S. first strike capability.

Emphasis was given to the capability to "destroy the warmaking capability (of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the Communist satellites) so as to limit to the extent practicable, damage to this country and to our Allies."

This renewed emphasis on United States willingness to consider fighting a thermonuclear war had the effect of reassuring some of the NATO Allies. The French, however, did not respond, and continued to question the adequacy of the U. S. guarantee. DeGaulle went so far as to state that there could never be a firm alliance in the thermonuclear era. By 1965, the policies of the U. S. government had undergone another subtle change. Whereas before there was no explicit statement that the United States might

---

<sup>1</sup>Shortly after the Cuban crisis of 1962, DeGaulle expanded his efforts to create a French National Type I Deterrent. The timing of this move may be significant.



not be willing to use strategic weapons directly against the Soviet Union in the event of an attack on Europe, the 1965 statement defined general war as "one in which the U. S. or its allies had been attacked by an aggressor in such a manner as to require the use of U.S. strategic nuclear forces in retaliation."

This obviously implied that there could be attacks on allies or on the United States herself which would not be answered with strategic nuclear forces. The same implication was made in the discussion of tactical nuclear weapons to be provided to NATO.<sup>1</sup> McNamara stated, "I do want to remind you that we have already provided our European NATO partners with a tactical nuclear capability, although the warheads themselves are retained under United States control."

There was, however, surprisingly little indication of what circumstances would be required to secure the release of these weapons to the NATO forces. Most of the discussion of NATO centered around the necessity for coordination of the French national deterrent with the rest of the NATO forces, and particularly with SAC. There was also discussion of the creation of a NATO deterrent force. Although the "surface ship" Multi-Lateral Force was almost moribund, suggestions for a force that would serve the same purpose were solicited.

Consequently, the status of the U. S. Type II Deterrent remains unclear. On the one hand, the Department of Defense has requested additional Damage Limiting systems, and has begun investment in Civil Defense. There has also been a release of cost and effectiveness estimates for a Strategic Defense force. Such a force would certainly have the effect of increasing the effectiveness of a U.S. first strike. Thus, the means for Type II Deterrence are being strengthened. On the other hand, concern with the creation of a European deterrent and of tactical nuclear capabilities in Europe appeared to demonstrate a lessening of the resolve of the United States. There was an apparent attempt to "decouple" an attack on Europe from the beginning of a strategic exchange involving both the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviets, of course, were uninterested; the French continued deployment of their force de frappe; the response of the remainder of NATO remains to be seen.

#### Summary of Type II Deterrence

1. The enemy is assumed to be rational and sufficiently in control of his forces to prevent an attack on our allies.

---

<sup>1</sup>Obviously, tactical nuclear weapons imply that tactical nuclear warfare in Europe will be permitted. Although this strengthens the defense posture, it weakens the credibility of deterrence.



2. It is assumed that the virtual destruction of the Soviet Union, her satellites, and allies, constitutes unacceptable damage to the Soviet leadership. The threat of massive destruction of Soviet territory is still technically inevitable after a massive Soviet attack on our NATO allies. In actual practice, the United States has shifted towards a posture of defense of Europe against all but the most massive attacks by the Soviet Union. Tactical nuclear weapons are to be used to halt the aggressor in the field, rather than using strategic weapons against his homeland; however, if the attack begins with a massive thermonuclear strike against the tactical NATO forces, the United States is committed to retaliation against Russia. The Europeans are understandably reluctant to admit that another war, nuclear or conventional, can or should be fought on European territory. France has served notice that her force de frappe will "tear off an arm" of any aggressor against the French homeland. Other Europeans seem convinced that deterrence will not fail, probably due to the uncertainties which would accompany any attack on them.
3. The means for carrying out the threat are presently the U. S. Strategic Air Command. In future, a NATO force is envisioned, but the timetable for establishment of such a force has yet to be drawn up. SAC is assumed to be adequate for any given level of destruction against the Soviet homeland, but not necessarily for disabling the Soviet weapons or force establishment. Although a first strike by the United States against the Soviet Union would undoubtedly include a massive counterforce strike as well as a countervalue attack, it is not at all certain that the counterforce attack would be sufficient to prevent widespread destruction of the United States itself. The U. S. apparently assumes that the Soviet Union has a minimum deterrent posture, with both the means and the will to carry it out.
4. The will to carry out the threat is a less certain matter, due to the inadequacy of the means, as well as the lack of a U. S. Civil Defense establishment. The government has repeatedly stated that the U. S. has both the means and will. Recent developments in Civil Defense, and procurement of Damage Limiting systems, tend to support these statements.

#### TYPE III DETERRENCE (LIMITED STRATEGIC WAR)

Type III Deterrence is a much more vague concept than either of the others. It blends readily into the Controlled Response Doctrine and its development probably had much to do with the generation of that strategy.



As originally conceived, Type III Deterrence consisted of threatening limited thermonuclear damage to the homeland of an aggressor, in response either to an attack on an ally or to a less than all-out attack on the homeland of the deterrer. It also explicitly accepts the fact that the enemy would probably respond with a limited strategic strike of his own, which the deterrer is willing to accept without further retaliation; provided that the action which precipitated the crisis in the first place is withdrawn. This is best illustrated by an example.

Assume that the Soviet Union attacks a NATO ally with conventional or tactical nuclear forces and the ground forces in the field are unable to defeat him. The United States would then attack (with or without warning to allow evacuation of population) one enemy city, after informing the Soviet Union of its intention and of the fact that no massive attack is yet under way. The Soviet Union might be expected to attack a city of equal value in the United States, while simultaneously halting its original action. In effect, both sides have lost something of value, and the ally is saved. Attacks on installations other than cities are also contemplated. Such targets might be gaseous diffusion plants, dams, or other objects of value. They probably would not include strategic offensive targets unless the enemy had a sufficient number of these so as not to feel unduly threatened by the loss of a small part of his establishment. Although a bizarre form of warfare, the concept is not as farfetched as it sounds. Its principal advantage is that immediate resort to all-out war is avoided. Such avoidance is obviously in the interest of both parties.<sup>1</sup>

#### Summary of Type III Deterrence

1. The rationality of the enemy is assumed. This assumption is strained to very near the breaking point by this type of strategy: it assumes that the enemy and, in turn, the U.S., is rational enough and in sufficient control of his strategic forces to allow a limited strike against his homeland, without responding with an all-out attack of his own. It assumes that the enemy does not have an automatic Type I Deterrent, and particularly, that he does not possess a minimum deterrent establishment. The Soviet Union has rather violently rejected the entire concept of Limited Strategic War and Type III Deterrence. (They could be expected to do this whether they meant it or not. Type III Deterrence, if accepted by both sides, would essentially end any threat of military aggression against any nation credibly falling under the U.S. strategic umbrella.)

---

<sup>1</sup>Whether this particular method of limiting escalation is best is another question.



2. The threat is variable with the action deterred. A major attack on Europe, for instance, could be expected to be worth a strike against a much larger establishment that would a raid on Finmark.<sup>1</sup> The threat is deliberately left unspecified. (There are some advantages to publishing a list of actions to be deterred, their "price," and what the deterrers would accept as a reasonable equivalent establishment of his own. This final part of the list is probably politically impossible in the United States, but the first two parts are not.) The deterred is given to understand, in any event, that the deterrer will choose an establishment worth more than the gains he would receive from successful completion of the action to be deterred. The retaliatory strike might also be divided into time phases, with the enemy invited to reconsider between each phase.

A major part of the threat is the fact that it is obvious that in a Type III Deterrence situation, escalation is very easy. Thus, toward the end of the Type III Deterrence threat list, III merges with II; but with this difference, it is probably more credible that a Type III situation will precipitate general war than the mere threat made in Type II strategy.

3. The means for carrying out the threat vary with the kind of Limited Strategic War contemplated, its duration, and whether or not attacks on strategic weapons are acceptable. At a minimum, Type III requires only a reasonably well protected strategic offense capability which can survive the enemy's limited retaliation; strategic weapons of sufficient yield and accuracy to carry out the limited first strike threatened; and an "invulnerable" offensive weapons system which can, by threatening the enemy's value system, act to keep the war limited.
4. The major defect of Type III Deterrence is the fact that the deterrer must be assumed to be utterly rational, with no built in emotional responses, yet he must also be assumed to be willing to start the war. It is obvious that the kind of weapons establishments, the stability of the government in power, and its expected control in a crisis situation will enter into any calculation of the credibility of the threat.

#### Other Steps on the Escalation Ladder

The implications of Type III Deterrence have been exhaustively investigated, and many gradations of threat and response have been identified. The

---

<sup>1</sup>The Finnish Border Country, or "marches", of Norway.



best introductory survey of these investigations is found in a paper by Dr. Herman Kahn.<sup>1</sup>

One of the most important concepts in the "new" escalation ladder is crisis management through "escalation dominance." This implies sufficient forces to allow a credible threat of escalation to a new rung of the ladder if the enemy will not terminate the war. Ideally, the inferiority of the enemy relative to the crisis manager should increase at each step of the escalation ladder. At the lower levels, this situation does in fact obtain, and the U.S. enjoys escalation dominance. This concept is more fully developed in a later section of this paper.

#### UNITED STATES STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES - DEFENSE

As opposed to deterrence, defense is oriented toward the reduction of one's own prospective costs and risks in the event that deterrence fails. "Deterrence works on the enemy's intentions; the deterrent value of military forces is their effect in reducing the likelihood of enemy military moves. Defense reduces the enemy's capability to damage or deprive us; the defense value of military forces is their effect in mitigating the adverse consequences for us of possible enemy moves, whether such consequences are counted as loss of territory or war damage. The concept of defense value is, therefore, broader than the mere capacity to hold territory, which might be called 'denial capability'." <sup>2</sup>

Defense weapons include the ground army and tactical air forces; air defense; Civil Defense; AICBM systems; and possibly those portions of SAC which have as targets the enemy's strategic offensive weapons. It is obvious, of course, that with few exceptions, these systems are capable of performing a deterrent mission; but that is generally not their primary purpose. It should also be obvious that possession of a really good defense capability makes deterrence much easier, because it makes deterrent threats more credible. In the extreme case, however, it is not necessary to have any defense capability if a sufficiently large deterrent threat is available, or if the objective to be fought for is sufficiently valueless. Switzerland, for example, can be said to have no defense capability whatever. It has been obvious to most nations, and particularly to the Swiss, that the country cannot be defended against a determined attack from any of her larger neighbors. However, the Swiss military establishment has been such as to make an

---

<sup>1</sup>In National Security, David Abshire and Richard Allen, editors, published in New York by Frederick Praeger for The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1963. Kahn's paper has also been separately reprinted by The Hudson Institute, and now appears in his new book, On Escalation.

<sup>2</sup>Snyder, Glenn H., Deterrence and Defense. Princeton University Press (1961) p. 3.



attack quite costly; at the same time, an invasion would render the country nearly worthless. Thus, although Switzerland possessed no offensive capability at all but only a defense establishment, the defense system was organized so as to make use of its full deterrent value.

Such ambiguous cases as Switzerland may confuse the distinction between deterrence and defense, but perhaps serve to increase understanding of the interaction between the two postures. The opposite case to the Swiss would be the French force de frappe: DeGaulle claims no capability for defense of France, but intends to have a force which would make conquest of France so costly in terms of destruction of an enemy's homeland or invading forces that no one would risk it. As his force will, at least at first, depend on aircraft which will be particularly vulnerable to surprise attack, he must have a pure deterrence situation with a very fast reacting force. If he had some defensive capability, he might be able to adopt a more flexible strategy.

#### Preventative and Pre-emptive War

Preventative and pre-emptive war could logically be discussed under the heading of either Type I or Type II Deterrence or they could stand as separate subjects. The subjects are included here because pre-emptive war has been called "defense by offense."

Preventative war is no longer seriously advocated by anyone of power and influence, although there are indications that if the threat of public opprobrium were removed, there might again be adherents to the position. The original argument for this position was roughly as follows: "The United States holds the preponderance of strategic power, while the Soviet Union is developing strategic weapons rapidly. The conflict is inevitable, and time is on the side of the Soviets; therefore, we might as well get it over with while we can, and achieve the advantages of surprise, since the enemy will strike without warning as soon as he achieves the means."

Pre-emptive war is defined as making the first strike as soon as it is obvious that the international situation has so deteriorated that war will begin within a short time - after receipt of an unacceptable enemy ultimatum, for instance. Advocates of pre-emptive strikes do not necessarily adhere to the Type II Deterrence position. There is some argument for pre-emptive war even though it is recognized that after receiving the first blow, the enemy would still possess the means to work unacceptable damage on the United States. The theory is that their reduced strategic offensive potential will be unable to damage us as badly (less unacceptable) as would their original establishment, and that, therefore, the first strike advantage, although not



decisive, is worth achieving. The argument further states that when war seems inevitable to one side, it will also appear to be so to the other, and therefore, the incentive to strike first will be high on both sides. If we do not make a pre-emptive strike, its advocates say, the Soviets will, if only because they cannot be sure that we will not do so.

The incentive for making a pre-emptive strike, therefore, is not gain, but a desire to forestall losses - it is a kind of defensive move, defense by offense, and it is fully realized that it can only be partially successful. McNamara's Doctrine of Controlled Response, insofar as it contemplates counterforce strikes as part of the U. S. response, is generated in part by this logic. The argument in favor of a pre-emptive strike is deceptively simple, and at first glance, seems convincing. It rests, at bottom, on the assumption that there is a substantial if not decisive first strike advantage. Given this, and the assumption that the enemy is rational, it follows that he will attempt to achieve this advantage and that he will assume that the United States will also make this attempt.

"Getting in the first blow" is supposed to achieve the advantages of surprise, while the defender must retaliate with a disorganized and decimated force against a fully alerted military and civil defense system. The damage he will be able to inflict, therefore, must be very much less than that which he could achieve had he made the first strike himself.

It must be noted that this first strike advantage is not the same as that considered when discussing requirements for a Type II Deterrent. It does not stem from the possession of an adequate First Strike Capability. It is merely the minimization of damage after it is seen that war is inevitable.

There are several factors that must be considered in calculating this assumed first strike advantage. These factors include the weapons establishments and inventories of both sides, and their asymmetry; the vulnerability of the weapons; the reaction time of the weapons; the delivered accuracy of the weapons; and the location of the weapons, with respect to valuable "bonus" installations. In addition, the warning systems each side possesses must be considered, as must Civil Defense capabilities.

To take a trivial example, there is obviously no first strike advantage if both sides possess the same number of weapons; they are located far from population centers or other valuable bonus targets; both sides have excellent warning systems; and it requires five weapons fired to achieve a high probability of destroying a single enemy weapon. Under these circumstances, the side which strikes first uses up all his weapons, but leaves the opponent with four-fifths of his own, while he has done no damage whatever to the recovery potential of his enemy. By striking first, he has disarmed himself and left himself vulnerable to his opponent's demands.



On the other hand, if both sides possess a nearly equal number of weapons, and one weapon will destroy five of the enemy's with a high probability, the first strike advantage is overwhelming; in fact, both sides possess an adequate first strike capability.

Between these two extremes can be found any number of combinations which may or may not result in a real first strike advantage. Furthermore, the advantage is not always symmetrical; there may be a very real first strike advantage for a side which possesses an overwhelming strategic weapons establishment when the other has only a small inventory. For example, if one side possessed less than a hundred weapons, of which perhaps nine-tenths were in known positions and the other side possessed over a thousand weapons, while five weapons fired would have a very high probability of destroying an enemy missile; then the side with the large weapons establishment has a very great first strike advantage and that with the smaller inventory may have an incentive to fire early and assure the maximum destruction of his enemy. However, if the smaller side believes that the few missiles which would remain after his enemy's pre-emptive move would still be able to damage his enemy to an unacceptable extent, he has no real incentive to begin the war at all. In fact, under those conditions, his best strategy might be one of Type I Deterrence, followed by as conciliatory a foreign policy as he could manage. The larger side does not, under these circumstances, possess an adequate first strike capability but does have a definite first strike advantage. The smaller has neither.

Discussions of preventative war and pre-emptive war usually include discussions of stability. Stability is the result of many factors. Conditions for its achievement include the possession by both sides of more than a "minimum deterrent" under circumstances in which neither side has a significant first strike advantage, or, if one side does have a first strike advantage, it is not inclined to use it. (Both sides must recognize this reluctance.) Under these circumstances, there is more or less stability, depending, among other things, on the possibility of breakthroughs disturbing the balance (e. g., if both sides had only submarine borne forces, achievement of a really effective Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) system would make the situation highly unstable); the excess each side possesses over a minimum deterrent capability; the attacker to target ratio (the ratio between the number of missiles which must be expended and the number which would be destroyed by that expenditure); and the stability of the value system of each side. (If there suddenly arose a tempting possibility for aggression which was so valuable that achieving it made acceptable what had once been unacceptable damage, for example, stability would drastically decrease.)

There is considerable controversy between the military and the administration in the United States over the value of stability. Stability is generally conceded to be one goal of the administration, while the military, or some elements of it, claim that the civilian policymakers are willing to sacrifice a



real military advantage to the United States in order to achieve it. The arguments marshalled by the various groups involved in the debate are quite complex and very long and usually are based on classified information about specific weapons systems and inventories. Although there has been some debate over the basic issue as to whether the goal of the United States should be stability (called by its detractors stalemate) or superiority (which, its detractors say, would increase the risk of war), in general, there has been surprisingly little debate, considering that some of the basic decisions about the U.S. weapons inventory cannot be made without settling the matter.

#### Pre-emptive War, the Exchange Ratio, and Response Time

It will be seen from the preceding text that the two principal factors in calculations of first strike advantage are the defender's response time, and the attacker's exchange ratio. The defender's response time is, of course, the time required for the defending side to launch its weapons. This time is not merely physical time; doctrine is also involved. Against a purely missile force that is committed to not being launched until actual detonation of enemy weapons, the response time can be ignored in calculations of first strike advantage by any side that can put together a carefully coordinated simultaneous detonation attack. Against a defender who will launch on early warning; however, the attacker must consider whether or not it is worth the effort; his attacking missiles may be wasted, and simply pass the enemy missiles in flight.

Against a nation committed to retaliate only after active detonation of enemy weapons, the attacker's exchange ratio is critically important. This is the ratio of attacking systems which must be expended in order to kill a defending system with some degree of confidence. In the early days of manned bombers, before early warning systems, this ratio was quite small, far less than unity. One attacking bomber could destroy dozens of enemy bombers on the ground. The immediate effect of hardened missiles was to alter the exchange ratio until it was greater than unity. Depending on yield, accuracy, kill mechanism, and hardness of the defending systems, the exchange ratio might reasonably be as high as ten; that is, ten attacking missiles must be used to assure the kill of one defending missile. However, the development of multiple warheads for missile systems again opens the theoretical possibility of exchange ratios smaller than unity. The same would be true of a breakthrough in ASW techniques.

The data required for actual calculation of the exchange ratio are, of course, highly classified; however, it is obvious that technical developments, some of them quite unexpected, can drastically alter this important variable. Furthermore, it is not a symmetrical situation. The exchange ratio for the aggressor may be far more favorable than for the defender. It is an obvious



deduction, for example, that the development of multiple warheads will be far more favorable to a side that has invested heavily in large payload systems than to the possessor of more numerous but smaller systems.

### Defense of the United States

It is generally conceded that perfect defense of the U.S. proper is impossible. Secretary McNamara stated this openly in his 1963 and 1964 budget messages to Congress. Neither a first strike capability that would destroy the Soviet Union's retaliatory capacity, nor a combination AIBM - Civil Defense establishment is considered adequate to do more than reduce the effects of a Soviet attack. Whether a significant first strike advantage exists at present was not indicated in McNamara's 1963 statement, but his 1964 acceptance of a "damage limiting" capability implies that there must be advantages in getting in the first counterforce blow.

With regard to defense by offense, the doctrinal considerations of the United States ("this nation will never strike first") have prevented much more than cursory analyses of the requirements for a weapons establishment that might accomplish the task of preventing the enemy from retaining sufficient capability to destroy us. The argument that possession of a first strike capability is provocative and increases the risk of surprise attack has become generally prevalent. This argument arrives logically at the conclusion that the world situation is more stable if both sides possess essentially invulnerable deterrent forces, which cannot be destroyed by a surprise attack, because then the incentive for surprise attack is made vanishingly small.<sup>1</sup> However, there is one important factor ignored in this conclusion; i. e., it is sufficient that only one side possess such invulnerable weapons, if that side is committed to not making the first strike. The advocates of the "stable balance of terror" recognize this, but state that it is not possible to make anyone believe that such a superior weapons establishment will not be used. Obviously, full acceptance of this "balance of terror" thesis may, in actuality, well be the abandonment of all pretense at Type II deterrence. The Europeans are very much concerned that the United States may have made such an acceptance.<sup>2</sup> There is another condition of stability which has

---

<sup>1</sup>McNamara has indicated that he believes the situation will be more stable when the Soviet Union has hardened missiles; but more recently he has tended to ignore this, although he has never repudiated his earlier views. See particularly the Saturday Evening Post articles on McNamara in early 1963.

<sup>2</sup>Whatever sincere interest the Europeans may have in the "Multilateral Force" is probably prompted by the concern that the MLF might be a useful trigger to SAC, and make the U.S. nuclear umbrella more credible. However, there are serious objections to this argument raised by some highly placed analysts. See, in particular, the paper by Wohlstetter in The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons, R. N. Rosecrance, editor (1964).



received little attention; i. e., the possession by one side of an invulnerable first strike capability. However, the advent of the missile-carrying submarine and the hardened solid-fuel missile ("invulnerable" second strike capability) has made achievement of an effective first strike system technically very difficult. For this reason, the "delicate balance of terror" thesis has won considerable support, even from men who formerly advocated preventative war. If new developments in missile technology and ICBM defense render "invulnerable" second strike weapons either vulnerable or ineffective, many arguments about stability would become academic.

### Defensive Systems and Stability

It is often argued that development and deployment of strategic defense systems is destabilizing. The argument states that just as first strike systems threaten the existence of the enemy's Assured Destruction capability, strategic defense systems threaten its effectiveness. The enemy is then tempted to strike as soon as possible, because if he has doubts as to the penetration capability of his unimpaired force, he must be even less certain that his degraded forces will be able to do unacceptable damage to the enemy. This argument is so thoroughly accepted in some places that it is no longer discussed. For example, in his amplification of the Johnson Five Point Arms Control Program, Mr. Foster of ACDA simply stated that there should be a freeze on strategic defenses "because these systems are destabilizing." He did not offer any arguments in support of this thesis.

Before discussing this theory, it should be noted that there is a real difference between general strategic defenses, and the defense of weapons. It is not contended that hard point defense of weapons is destabilizing; in fact, it is universally recognized that such systems, by increasing the exchar ratio, actually lower the probabilities of success of a first strike, and thus exert a stabilizing influence. Consequently, the discussion below applies only to systems designed to protect property and lives.

In discussing the subject of stability and strategic defense, it is necessary to point out that the "extreme view" is not universally held. The "extreme view" here refers to the theory that any measure which tends to mitigate or limit the ability of enemy systems to destroy U. S. lives and property is automatically destabilizing. Thus, it has been seriously contended that U. S. construction of fallout shelters is an act of aggression against the Soviet Union. This view is not held by the Department of Defense, and seems to have less influence than it did in recent years.

It is easy to dispose of the "extreme view" of defense. If there is to be any possibility of confining thermonuclear war to a military exchange, it is obvious that fallout shelters and other civil defense measures are necessary.



There is no point in exercising restraint in one's attack if even the most restrained attack will inevitably kill a very large number of civilians. As soon as the theoretical possibility of Damage Limiting is accepted, the "extreme view" fails.

It is not easy to deal with the view that active city defenses are destabilizing. Insofar as such systems are predictably effective, the argument is valid. By decreasing the damage that a nation would sustain, these systems make thermonuclear war less destructive, and inevitably decrease the reluctance of decision-makers to engage in it. However, there is a difference between a decrease in reluctance and an actual preference. One is obviously less reluctant to lose an arm than to lose both arms and an eye, but neither event is desirable. The same is true with thermonuclear war with or without defenses.

No one contends that any defense will be 100 percent efficient. In fact, some of the very people who state unequivocally that defenses are destabilizing also state that they are impossible; that no matter what level of defense is constructed, the enemy will always be able to build penetrating systems, and furthermore build them at lower cost than the defenses required. McNamara (who has not publicly stated his views on defenses and stability) was quite explicit in his 1965 budget message:

"Against the forces we expect the Soviets to have during the next decade, it would be virtually impossible for us to be able to provide anything approaching perfect protection for our population no matter how large the general war forces we were to provide, including the hypothetical possibility of striking first. ... The Soviets have it within their technical and economic capacity to prevent us from achieving a posture that would keep our immediate fatalities below the level. They can do this, for example, by offsetting any increases in our defenses by increases in their missile forces. In other words, if we were to try to assure survival of a very high percent of our population and if the Soviets viewed it as a threat to their Assured Destruction capability, the extra cost to them would appear to be substantially less than the extra cost to us."

Consequently, it is difficult to understand how defenses can be both unworkable and destabilizing in the usual sense of destabilizing. The very fact that there are enormous uncertainties in the calculations of defensive effectiveness prevents any real confidence in them. It is unlikely that any nation will trust its survival to an antiballistic missile system, particularly as the Treaty of Moscow precludes any actual test of the system.

Recognizing this, some analysts have subtly changed the meaning of stability. It no longer refers to a reciprocal fear of surprise attack, but rather to the incentives nations have to engage in an arms race. Deployment of defenses, according to this view, virtually compels the enemy to develop new offensive forces, and thus "triggers another round in the arms race."



This is a position that is difficult to refute; however, other factors should be considered in the assessment.

It may or may not be true that defenses are not possible. The acid test of this proposition would occur in a real thermonuclear war, and no one has any desire to find the answer that way. It is true that defensive systems are very costly and that the sophisticated offensive systems which become requirements in the face of defenses are only slightly less so; but the net effect of this "new round in the arms race" is to limit the number of great powers to two. No nation other than the United States and the Soviet Union can afford both strategic defenses and the kind of offensive systems which have a good chance of penetrating them. The net effect is to limit severely the capability of any power, other than the Soviet Union, to damage the United States. Whether this situation is more desirable than the more complicated Nth country environment is outside the scope of this paper, but the reader is obviously aware that much can be said for it.

Furthermore, defensive systems are obviously a form of economic warfare. The opposing side, facing a deployed defensive system, has only two options: spend money, or accept inferiority. He may have to spend less than the United States, but it is still a relatively large amount of money. The desirability of this can be determined only by a comparison of the resources both nations would have to expend, and the relative worth of those resources to the two countries.

It is noted in passing that the U.S. facilities for production of strategic weapons are not being fully utilized in the present situation and the nation is not at full employment; therefore, the actual economic cost of such systems is quite small compared to the cost to a country that operates at full utilization of its industries.

There is no firm conclusion to be drawn in this area. The stabilizing or destabilizing effect of strategic defenses is an open and legitimate question. The author has betrayed his preference for development of defenses in the preceding paragraphs; but he hopes that he has not slighted the opposition arguments too badly.

#### Defense of Europe

The United States is difficult, if not impossible, to defend from ballistic missile attack. Europe is very much more so because of the short warning time and because the Soviet Union is known to possess a very large number of IRBM's which presumably are targeted for European cities. Defense of Europe from this sort of attack is apparently not possible; such attacks must be deterred.



Defense against conventional attack is more controversial. Many European analysts, particularly Liddell Hart, believe that it is possible to defend Europe from any Soviet attack except an all-out nuclear strike. They state that Europe's population and resources<sup>1</sup> exceed those of the Soviet Union; the satellite armies may not be reliable enough to be entrusted with a major role in an attack on Europe; and NATO forces, having only a defensive task, can hold the forward lines with forces much smaller than those the Soviet Union must employ to attack.<sup>2</sup>

However, most European statesmen seem convinced that (1) defense is not possible, or (2) whether possible or not, another war on European soil is not acceptable, and any attack on Europe must be deterred, not defended against. This is the rationale of DeGaulle's force de frappe; his national nuclear deterrent will be launched when any attack is made on France, without regard to the size or nature of the attack, realizing full well that the retaliatory strike will annihilate France. DeGaulle has stated that although France would die, the nation attacking her would be severely damaged. He also, presumably, hopes to trigger the U.S. strategic forces. This trigger effect is presumably one important reason for U.S. opposition to French acquisition of a national nuclear force.<sup>3</sup>

The United States advocates a very strong defensive establishment in NATO, one which would be capable of resisting in the field any attack other than an all-out nuclear strike. Although the United States has committed a large portion of the U.S. Army (5 divisions, out of a total strength of 16 divisions) to Europe, and has had some success in promoting a German Army for European defense, the compromise goal of 30 NATO divisions remains to be achieved. (The initial requirement was stated to be 50 divisions.) Of a total of 22 theoretical divisions in NATO, only the U.S. components are above 60-percent strength. Successful defense of Europe by conventional means, seems far away, and the major deterrent threat seems to be uncertainty about what SAC would do if Europe were attacked in strength.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, increasing reliance is placed on tactical nuclear weapons. It is hoped that the presence of these weapons will have a powerful deterrent effect, not only by their defensive capability but by the obvious increases in the risk of escalation implied by their use.

---

<sup>1</sup>NATO Without the United States.

<sup>2</sup>See particularly B. H. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defense. There is evidence indicating that the professional military men of Europe have accepted most of Liddell Hart's analysis.

<sup>3</sup>Another important reason is that a damaged USSR might try to even up the post-war world by hitting the U.S. (and perhaps China).

<sup>4</sup>The Europeans report that the Soviet Union has little confidence in the satellite armies, and fear that local war in Europe may lead to total revolt of the satellite empire. This, if true, is obviously a powerful deterrent factor.



The current Controlled Response Doctrine does not explicitly deal with Europe. Some of its formulators have been explicit advocates of the Type III Deterrence strategy and McNamara has made numerous statements suggesting that he believes in the possibility of Limited Strategic War. It is, therefore, possible that in the future the Department of Defense will explicitly adopt this threat as a part of European defense. It is difficult to see what else, other than possession by all European nations of independent Type I Deterrent forces, would suffice for preventing the Soviets from overrunning Europe, if they intended to do so. Although the United States might feel compelled to launch a strike against the Soviets if Europe were invaded in spite of the impossibility of defending the U.S. or of destroying the Soviet retaliatory capability would make a threat to do so very nearly incredible. It is not sufficient for a deterrent to be committed to carry out his threat, he must convince the deterred that he intends to do so.

#### Defense of the "Gray Areas"

It is generally conceded that strategic offensive weapons play no direct part in the defense of such areas as Southeast Asia, Iran, etc., which do not fall under our (real or presumed) Type II Deterrent umbrella. Defense of these areas is made with conventional forces, with the strategic forces serving to keep the wars limited. Deterring attack on these minor allies or neutrals is generally done with the threat to defend in place - to deny the territory to the enemy and make his attack so costly, if it comes, as to render it not worth continuing.

The Johnson Administration, like the Kennedy Administration before it, has been much concerned with creating a large United States conventional weapons capability so that this country will not be faced with, in Mr. Kennedy's words, "a choice between surrender and a thermonuclear holocaust." This concern with conventional capabilities has an indirect effect on the strategic inventory in several ways. The most obvious effect is that money spent for conventional weapons will not be appropriated for SAC or the Navy equivalent. As important, if less obvious, is that creation of such a capability will mean that the strategic forces will not be as likely to be involved in the defense (by deterrence) of many areas of the world. If these areas can be defended in place, it will not be necessary to make Type II or Type III threats to prevent the enemy from taking them. Consequently, there will be less probability of a Limited Strategic War, and less requirement for weapons and support equipment which such a war would use.

On the other hand, deterrence in some of the gray areas may still be possible, if the deterred is a nation that does not possess nuclear weapons and is not protected by a thermonuclear power. There is some evidence to indicate that China will find herself in such a position in the near future. Whether the Chinese leadership is sufficiently rational to be deterred is another matter and open to question.



For some time to come, China's weapons and nuclear production facilities will remain highly vulnerable to a pre-emptive or preventative strike. The development of hard reliable delivery systems seems far away. Consequently, China may be expected to make maximum psychological use of the bomb, but is unlikely to use it against a first class power.

The problem of a Soviet guarantee to China is unsolved. The Soviets presumably would find considerable pressure to guarantee China against an unprovoked nuclear attack, but their incentives for providing an umbrella for Chinese recklessness are spectacularly low. The only possible "gain" for the Soviets in protecting Chinese adventurism would be an increase in Chinese, not Russian power; while any attempt to provide such an umbrella exposes Russia to the dangers of a general war.

#### CURRENT ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY

After the 1960 presidential election campaign, with its allegations of a missile gap and other criticisms of the U.S. weapons establishment, a thorough re-examination of the military policies of the United States was demanded and conducted. Although the missile gap proved to be nonexistent, the results of the renewed attention directed at strategies and policies have been farreaching. McNamara's Controlled Response Doctrine is much more than a targeting philosophy. Its implementation has required reorganization of SAC and its chain of command; renewed attention to the problems of command and control; and a number of changes in the characteristics of the weapons themselves. The totality of the new requirements generated by this doctrine is probably not appreciated by anyone at present, and new implications are realized every few months.

Simultaneously, the study of thermonuclear warfare and its problems has caused renewed attention to be given to arms control and disarmament schemes as the only permanent solution to the problem of survival in the modern era. Many policymakers are convinced that the arms race cannot continue for long without some accident or incident causing a war of unprecedented dimensions. As weapons capabilities increase, the probability of survival of the participants as national entities decreases rapidly. With sufficient increases in weapons technology, there will, some analysts believe, come a time when the probability of survival of any inhabitants of warring nations (and possibly of anyone else) is nearly zero. This belief has been the prime reason for the preference of many decision-makers for stability rather than superiority, and it is also a major reason for the attractiveness of arms control and disarmament as an end to the arms race. In theory, Arms Control and Disarmament is not separable from the Controlled Response Doctrine, being one long-term option within a general strategic plan. In practice, however, ACDA operates independent of both the



State and Defense Departments, even though McNamara and his assistants insist that arms control is not an alternative to national security but rather one means of attaining that goal. It may be expected in the future that contingency planning for weapon systems will more and more include discussions of both the effects of the weapons on international stability, and the effects of arms control on the weapons. Weapon systems designers and manufacturers are already urged to include such studies in their preliminary and later analyses of proposed weapons. As time passes, it is reasonable to expect a better integration of arms control planning into national strategy.

There has also been a recognition that arms control is both theoretically and practically different from disarmament. Arms control objectives have some similarities to military objectives; disarmament has as an objective the elimination of the military as a factor in national security. "Adaptability to realistic arms control" was one of the criteria for weapons system selection enumerated by Secretary of the Air Force Zuckert in his announcement of the "Zuckert-Page Ten Points." These criteria will be discussed in a later section of this paper.

### Controlled Response

Shortly after McNamara's appointment as Secretary of Defense, one of his civilian assistants was given a briefing by a Strategic Air Command general. The general described a war plan, in which, shortly after confirmation that an attack on the United States had begun, the value system of the Soviet Union was utterly destroyed. "General," the aide is reported to have commented, "you don't have a war plan. All you have is a sort of horrible spasm." This, according to modern strategy analysts, is "basing strategy on a willingness to commit suicide."<sup>1</sup>

The general's plan was quite possibly the best that could be achieved with the weapons establishment available in 1960. At that time, the strategic offensive power of the United States was primarily based on manned bombers at some forty-two SAC bases. In addition, there were the intermediate-range aircraft overseas; a small number of IRBM's, also on overseas bases; and the carrier fleet. All of these weapons were soft. There could be no question of receiving an enemy's attack, assessing its damage, and choosing an appropriate response. The United States was committed to a Type I Deterrent Strategy, and, to a lesser extent, to a Type II Deterrent for the protection of NATO.

---

<sup>1</sup>The value of more sophisticated war plans is not universally accepted. There remains a body of relatively influential persons who believe that the best means of dealing with an enemy is the traditional U.S. means - total war. Many of these people are of the group who opposed keeping the Korean War limited. Their battle cry is "There is no substitute for victory."



The "Minuteman era" and Polaris make additional strategies possible. These have been repeatedly studied, and have emerged in the Doctrine of Controlled Response.

#### Definition

The formal definition of this doctrine is easily stated: The retention by civilian authorities of the ability to select from a wide range of possibilities what appears to be the most appropriate response to the particular enemy action experienced. In response to a nuclear attack on the United States, the President, his authorized Deputy, or Constitutional Successor, should be able to order a retaliation ranging from massive destruction of the enemy's value system to the destruction of a single point target.

#### Options

Preserving "options" is said to be the major passion of McNamara's life. By preserving these options, he hopes to be able to change the enemy's incentive structure to a marked degree. If there can be no possibility of escaping the U.S. retaliatory blow, then an enemy will seek to minimize the damage done to his own country. This can be accomplished by avoiding U.S. cities in his strike, and, therefore, providing no incentive for the U.S. to strike at values rather than weapons. One defense official put it this way:

"Before McNamara, the President really had only two buttons to push: Go and No Go. If he pushed the Go button, the military took over with the spasmodic response. McNamara wants to give the President a whole series of buttons on his nuclear console, from strictly limited tactical nuclear war at one end, through several shadings to Armageddon at the other. He wants to give the President a non-nuclear console as well. And he wants to make sure that the civilian leaders, not the military, do the button-pushing from beginning to end. Bob McNamara seeks his options as Parsifal sought the Holy Grail."

#### Discussion

The Controlled Response Doctrine generates numerous requirements for weapons and control equipment. If the President or some other civil authority must remain in control throughout the process, it is obvious that this civil authority must survive the initial strike; must be in command of and in communication with a suitable military planning staff; and that this planning staff must be able to send orders to the weapons themselves and receive status reports. In addition, there is a tacit requirement for assessment of damage to the enemy. It may also be seen that some form of Civil Defense will be required. There is no point in preserving options if the population has been killed by fallout from an enemy pure-counterforce attack.



Under those circumstances, the enemy has gained nothing from attacking weapons only; nor has the United States profited from the possession of weapons which survive the initial strike.

The survivability of weapons is the largest single requirement generated by Controlled Response; in fact, it is obvious that no such doctrine can be contemplated until the Department of Defense has a very high degree of confidence that an initial strike cannot destroy the retaliatory capability of the United States. In actual fact, there are several types of weapons which must survive:

1. A sufficient countervalue system must survive to ensure that the enemy has some incentive to keep the war limited. In the ultimate case, it might be desirable to ensure that not only an adequate deterrent survives, but a total deterrent - one capable of eliminating the enemy from the earth.
2. In addition to the countervalue deterrent system, additional forces must survive if there is to be any alternative to a spasm response. These forces are in addition because, if a significant portion of the countervalue reserve is used up, there is no longer any incentive to keep the war limited.
3. McNamara has repeatedly stressed the option of a counterforce attack - one which strikes at the enemy's weapons rather than his cities or property. The requirements for these weapons are not the same as those for the countervalue reserve. Counterforce weapons must, in general, be highly accurate, small in yield (although in some cases, very large yields may be required), and clean.

One major implication of the Controlled Response Doctrine can immediately be inferred: the United States must be prepared to fight thermonuclear wars of a limited nature which extend over long durations. The Controlled Response Doctrine gives the initial choice as to the character of a war to the enemy. By making the first strike, he chooses not only the time and place at which the war will begin, but its essential nature: whether the attacks will be restricted to military targets or extend to civil property and citizens as well. He chooses, initially, the intensity of the war.

#### Holding Options Gives the Enemy Options

Whatever choice the enemy makes, the United States must be prepared to respond in kind, yet keep sufficient flexible power in reserve to be able to limit damage to the United States, and also to terminate the war on terms



acceptable to us. The possession of such power will, in all probability, serve to prevent the war from occurring in the first place, but if there is a particular kind of limited thermonuclear war (or limited war of any character) which will yield to the enemy an advantageous result, then a rational enemy will quite possibly choose to begin it. If it cannot be fought on the level chosen by the enemy, the United States will be faced with only two choices: (1) expansion or escalation of the war, or (2) surrender. If escalation is mutually disastrous, the choice will not be an easy one to make. Under those circumstances, the enemy, calculating before he decides on a limited strike, will be deterred only by the U.S. threat to do what is essentially irrational - to escalate the war. The Controlled Response Doctrine, if properly implemented by the purchase of a weapons establishment sufficient to carry it out, will avoid that dilemma. The enemy will then know that no matter what level of war he seeks to begin, he will lose at that level. It will then not be rational to attempt any attack at all.

The doctrine imposes rather severe requirements on the United States weapons establishment. The weapons must be able, for successful implementation of the doctrine, to withstand repeated thermonuclear attacks. Their command and status-reporting links must survive in a hostile environment. The civil population must be able to survive under these circumstances. All of these systems must be able to operate successfully for long durations.


#### Criteria for Weapons Selection

On January 8, 1963, Eugene M. Zuckert, Secretary of the Air Force, delivered an address to the Harvard Business School of Washington, D.C. In this speech, he first made public the so-called Zuckert-Page Ten Points for appraising current and proposed weapons systems. These criteria were apparently studied by Major General Jerry Page for the Director's Summary of Project FORECAST, and have since been declassified.

The importance of these criteria is that they make explicit a change in strategic thought. There is no longer any question that the era of the "spasm response" is gone. Consequently, even if the Zuckert-Page Ten Points were abandoned for a new list, they would still deserve study for the insights they give into current strategic planning.

The Zuckert-Page Ten Points are as follows:

1. Adaptability to Realistic Arms Control: The Secretary stated that "arms control is now a military requirement in itself. . . . it is a necessary part of the defense package. . . . forces must be stabilizing in effect and not provocative either through vulnerability or other characteristics. These forces must have built-in assurance against accidental unauthorized or premature employment."



2. Crisis Management: "This covers the ability to keep even an intense and long-lasting international crisis from exploding into war, or a low intensity conflict from escalating into higher dimensions of war."
3. Deterrence: "Deterrence of war, general or otherwise, is our primary national objective. The importance of the deterrent capability at any level of intensity is directly proportional to the damage to be expected at that level."
4. Flexibility of Response Through the Entire Spectrum of Conflict: This point often has been misinterpreted. The most common interpretation now is that it refers to a preference for a weapon system that is useful at all levels of conflict, over weapons that confine their effects to a single level.
5. Controlled Response: As McNamara used the term, controlled response referred to a vast constellation of doctrinal considerations. When the other Zuckert-Page points are subtracted out, what remains is command and control of weapons. It would have, therefore, probably been preferable if Zuckert had used the term "weapons control."
6. Multiple Options: This referred to a capability "built into the forces in terms of alternate target plans, ability to retarget, multiple delivery systems, selectivity of both strike characteristics and targets, and versatility of employment in both strategic and tactical missions."
7. Survivability:<sup>1</sup> Mr. Zuckert emphasized that weapons survivability must not only be sure, but evident to the enemy.
8. Damage Limitation: This "calls for the ability to limit the collateral damage generated by either side. It involves accuracy of targeting and promptly responding defensive systems which can neutralize weapons at safe distances. It includes passive defense measures, and the ability to assess accurately the degree of damage inflicted on the enemy."
9. Negotiating Thresholds: This "reflects determination to stop war at the lowest point of intensity on favorable terms, a clear understanding of what those terms should be, acknowledgment that

<sup>1</sup>At the highest levels of thermonuclear exchange, the possession of a survivable force capable of a counter-value attack is referred to as an assured destruction capability.



destruction of an enemy is not an objective, and recognition of the fact that unrestrained warfare is necessarily unfavorable to both sides."

10. War Termination Capability: This "implies forces still able to fight after being hurt. . . the ability to counter escalation with increased power at each higher level of intensity<sup>1</sup> . . . full control of forces at all times, the intelligence capability to assure timely initiative."

In examining the Ten Points, it will be seen that they are not independent of each other. It will also be seen that doctrine and weapons characteristics are blended together into a strategic brew. The doctrines depend on possession of weapons with certain characteristics; possession of such weapons opens up new options, and generates new doctrines. Thermonuclear war has created no experts: there is no one with experience in fighting such a conflict. The doctrines and strategies of the United States continue to change, reflecting advances in technology, weapons development, and new understanding of their implications.

#### Damage Limiting and Assured Destruction

Although closely related to Deterrence and Defense, the concepts of Damage Limiting and Assured Destruction are not quite the same. The major difference from the old terminology is that a more rigid distinction is seen between them. McNamara stated in his 1965 budget message that "once high confidence of an Assured Destruction capability has been provided, any further increases in the strategic offensive forces must be justified on the basis of its contribution to the Damage Limiting objective."

In addition, the usual reference is in the context of an exchange between the superpowers. It should be obvious that the United States already possesses an absolute Assured Destruction capability, and extensive if not perfect Damage Limiting capabilities against any power other than the Soviet Union. It is not automatic that this continues; if Damage Limiting forces are not procured, it is possible that eventually some other nation would be able to deter the United States.

The march of technology continues. What was an Assured Destruction capability in 1955 is of value only as a Damage Limiting system in 1965, and not even very useful at that except in a first strike. The future of technology cannot be known, but it is unlikely that either deterrent or defense forces can remain static. In order to hold options, one must possess increasingly

---

<sup>1</sup>This is often referred to as escalation dominance.



effective weapons. As interest in arms control grows, this effectiveness must be less and less dependent on secrecy and surprise, and more and more evident to the enemy.

## REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NEW DEFENSE DOCTRINES

### Operational Weapons Concepts

1. At the lower end of the conflict spectrum, the Controlled Response Doctrine strongly implies a requirement for conventional and tactical nuclear weapons systems capable of defeating enemy actions in the field. Detailed discussion of these types of systems are outside the scope of this paper.
2. The major weapons requirement under a Controlled Response Doctrine is survivability. Weapons must be able to "ride out" an enemy attack of any magnitude, and survive until civilian authorities have had sufficient time to assess the nature of the attack and choose an appropriate response.
  - a. A countervalue system must survive under all circumstances in order to deter the enemy from making the most malevolent attack he has available. These weapons must survive not only the initial enemy attack, but all succeeding phases of the war.
  - b. In order for the President to have options, additional weapons must survive the initial attack. When there are no weapons other than the countervalue deterrent indicated in (a), there will be no further options other than all-out response or surrender.
  - c. If the President is to have the option of a pure counterforce attack which does not harm the enemy's population centers, weapons of appropriate yield and accuracy must survive. Their accuracy must not be degraded and there must be confidence in this accuracy on the part of the President and his staff.
3. The Controlled Response Doctrine obviously implies a requirement for a flexible weapons establishment. If the President is to have the option of destroying very small, superhardened targets, weapons capable of accomplishing this result must exist. Although the required numbers of these weapons cannot be established from unclassified sources, several general classes can be identified.



- a. The Total or Ultimate Deterrent System: The basic requirement for this strategic reserve system is an ability to inflict such damage that the United States can completely be assured of deterring the enemy. As the value scale of potential enemies is not known, this implies that the United States must be able to threaten very extensive destruction in order to have this assurance. For example, the Soviet Union lost at least 15 million and perhaps 30 million citizens in World War II but was able to effect rapid recovery. Furthermore, there can be no valid estimate of the damage ideological leaders are willing to have inflicted on their subjects in order to advance the cause. Under these circumstances, it appears reasonable to some analysts, and to many military planners, that the United States must have the ability to bring about the total collapse of the industrial system of any potential enemy.
- b. Destruction of an Enemy Field Army: If an enemy is to be deterred from overrunning U.S. allies, it may not be sufficient, particularly in the case of an ideological enemy, to threaten the destruction of his homeland. Weapons capable of halting his attack will be required.
- c. The Controlled Response Weapons: As indicated, in order for the President to have options, he must possess weapons in addition to the countervalue reserve. The requirements for these weapons vary widely according to the mission in which they might be employed. However, in order to avoid the enemy's citizens and property, these weapons must be relatively accurate, clean, and reasonably limited in yield.
- d. Counterforce Weapons: In addition to the preceding, a small number of very accurate weapons capable of destroying hard targets will be required. In some cases, very large yields may also be necessary. The large yield weapons, if they are to be used in Controlled Response attacks, must be highly accurate and there must be great confidence in this accuracy. The number of such weapons required can only be estimated by reference to the number of targets requiring them. In addition, however, possession of a very large number of such weapons might constitute a Credible First Strike Capability. The effects of possession of such an establishment on international stability and on the "balance of terror" must be carefully considered. There is considerable evidence to suggest that such considerations play a major part in U.S. weapons procurement decisions.



## MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN INVESTIGATING ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS

Although the U.S. has a numerical superiority over the USSR in strategic intercontinental missiles and long-range bombers, the destructive power and targeting capabilities of the two opposing strategic forces result in a virtual strategic standoff, or mutual strategic deterrent situation. Currently, the U.S. has a greater number of long-range nuclear missiles, but individual Soviet missiles have greater payload capacities. At the present time, the United States holds a margin of advantage in additional deterrent power in highly mobile bases, i.e., fleet ballistic missile (FBM) submarines with long cruising radii. The FBM submarines can operate for sustained periods close to the Eurasian perimeter. The missile ranges of the U.S. nuclear FBMs surpass those of the USSR nuclear submarines mounting IRBMs, but the Soviets are building more submarines comparable to U.S. FBM submarines and are known to be developing submarine-launched missiles that have ranges considerably greater than the 650-mile range which they now have. It is also believed that the payloads of Soviet FBM-launched missiles are being increased. The current U.S. advantage in FBM submarines and their missiles can therefore be expected to disappear in the near future. The U.S. has a special advantage in the form of some supplemental mobile nuclear strike capability in aircraft carriers.

With respect to general purpose ground, sea, and air forces, and their bases, the U.S. and USSR have quite different deployment situations. The USSR and her European satellites together form a land mass or heartland permitting them to operate on interior communication lines. Under the present strategic situation, one forward deployment of the USSR and her contiguous satellites is on her western perimeter. The USSR also has forces deployed on her southeastern frontiers to counter any forward moves by Communist China and some concentration in eastern Siberia in the Maritime Provinces.

On the other hand, in order to contain the Soviet, Warsaw Pact, and Chinese Communist powers, the U.S. is required to maintain continuing capability for application of force at points around the eastern and southeastern arc of the Sino-Soviet (Eurasian) perimeter and also simultaneously to retain forward deployment in Western Europe, as a part of NATO, in order to counter the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threats to move westward. The U.S. therefore must, in effect, maintain frontiers at great distances from the U.S. zone of the interior and retain control of long lines of communication to the required advanced bases and forces.



The U.S. must preserve a continuing readiness to deploy intervention, or counter-aggressor forces to distant locations. "Strategic position" refers to advance positioning of combat forces and equipment in a potential trouble area or area of unrest. Existence of balanced forces in the foreign area—even if they be only of sufficient strength to accomplish a limited offensive mission pending reinforcement—acts as a positive factor for deterrence or containment of hostilities, or control and limitation of wars. A combination of forces in a high state of readiness near the scene of action, and a strategic reserve ready for rapid deployment by air from the continental United States is indicated as a position of choice. Highly mobile ground and airborne units, tactical fighter aircraft, and air transport (troop and cargo) under control of the joint U.S. Strike Command are currently available for immediate response with air deployment to trouble areas.

At the present time, the capacity of airfields which would be under U.S. control in some potential conflict areas for accepting high traffic volume and/or large aircraft is greatly limited. Although overseas airlift will be used to the maximum capability, the volume requirement for sea-lift, and consequently for overseas naval and logistic shipping bases may be expected to be high. As an example of a sea-lift requirement, the U.S. Tactical Air Force in overseas conflict will depend upon seaborne POL lift.

The Soviet navy and merchant fleet have been growing rapidly in recent years. USSR is now a first-class maritime nation and the world's second largest naval power. Although Russia, traditionally a land power, in the past operated its navy mainly on a defensive concept, the Soviets have recently made rapid advances in their appreciation and development of sea power. They project it over the world's oceans, from home bases, principally with their submarine fleet, their fishing fleet, and their oceanographic survey activities. The Soviets conduct the most vigorous oceanographic program in the world today. The USSR merchant fleet is growing rapidly and the USSR now ranks as the fifth nation in the world in number of ships and seventh in tonnage capacity. The Soviets have lately gained an appreciation of the principles of oceanpower as understood by the western nations for centuries, and they are strengthening their position at a rapid rate. However, in spite of their recent maritime and naval growth, the Soviets, generally speaking, operate from home bases. Compared to the U.S., the USSR is currently weak in capability to sustain large-scale combat in overseas areas.

#### COMPARISON OF STRATEGIC ORIENTATION OF THE U.S. AND USSR

Although the United States possess a superiority over the USSR in numbers of intercontinental (strategic) missiles and aircraft, the situation,



with regard to strategic nuclear war, is, for practical purposes, a stalemate. The USSR intercontinental missiles are fewer in number but each can carry a much larger payload and the Soviets are known to have tested high yield weapons. The U. S. is better equipped to deliver a counterforce second strike, since it has more weapons and intercontinental aircraft. The USSR appears to be oriented toward the countervalue attack in strategic warfare.

Both the U. S. and USSR are prepared, but with varying specific capabilities, to engage in warfare at the various levels of the spectrum below central strategic nuclear war.

The U. S. is essentially oriented toward the following:

1. Strategic deterrence, with second-strike capability.
2. Applications of balanced forces in limited conflicts in remote areas, over long communication lines.
3. Availability of rapidly deployable, mobile strategic reserve in the zone of the interior.


The USSR is essentially oriented toward the following:

1. Strategic, intercontinental missile warfare.
2. "Land-mass" warfare on interior lines.
3. Exploitation of "rocketry" (support of large-scale ground warfare by IRBM's and tactical nuclear weapons).
4. Support of insurgency and wars of liberation in order to expand Communism and Soviet national power and influence.

Based upon appreciation of the strategic situation summarized above, the resulting strategic deployment and readiness requirements for the United States, and the present U. S. - USSR force balance, strengths, and weaknesses, some general conclusions and considerations are submitted below:

#### CONCLUSIONS

1. In the examination of any proposed partial or general disarmament measures involving general force reductions, the U. S. freedom of action within total force numbers must be safeguarded.



Although total forces and armaments allowable at any phase of disarmament, or in any partial disarmament agreement, might be adequate for the U. S., careful attention by military planners would have to be given to: (a) force allocations within the total in each phase of a disarmament plan, and (b) deployments of the remaining forces allowed.

2. It is believed that the U. S. should avoid any agreement that would operate to give the Soviets any increased margin of ground force superiority, including during periods of phased force and armament reduction.
3. Any arms control measure adopted by the United States must provide for retention by the U. S. of armaments and facilities to preserve her capability to apply forces for conflicts below the general war level and sustain them, with secure sea and air communication lines, at long distances from the U. S.
4. In evaluating treaty proposals and in negotiating or bargaining efforts to reduce U. S. amphibious lift, troop and cargo airlift capacity and overseas logistic shipping must be firmly resisted.
5. The U. S. cannot, under the present strategic balance, accept any restriction or limitation on antisubmarine warfare (ASW) ships, ASW aircraft, ASW submarines, or ASW weapons (depth charges, mines, torpedoes, ASROC, SUBROC).
6. Any proposal to reduce total U. S. -USSR submarine strengths, exclusive of FBMs, on a percentage or parity basis, would be good for the United States under the existing balance and would improve the overseas sea communication situation, but if such a measure is effected, verification will be difficult and evasion might be an easy matter. In no case should an agreement of this sort be accepted if U. S. ASW capability must be relinquished in exchange.
7. An agreement with the Soviets mutually to reduce naval cruiser forces would not be advantageous to the U. S., again in the interests of U. S. amphibious warfare-limited war requirements. USSR cruiser capabilities are not vitally serious threats while loss of U. S. cruiser gunfire support capabilities for shore bombardment is not acceptable, at present or in the next 5-to-10-year period.

8. It would be to the advantage of the U. S. to outlaw or reduce the numbers of Soviet motor torpedo boats, under the present balance of forces, and to reduce USSR sea mine warfare capability, if any arms control agreement or trade could ever be expected to result in such fortuitous circumstances for the United States and allies. It is obviously doubtful that such terms could be brought about.
9. The Soviets could be expected to attempt to achieve terms reducing U.S. attack aircraft carrier capability, of which they possess none. No reasonable exchange proposal can be envisioned which might induce the U. S. to sacrifice this important extension of airpower required for conduct of warfare overseas, including air strikes and close air support of amphibious landing forces.
10. Consideration of nuclear free zones is contained elsewhere in this report. Under present military strategic orientation and postures, a nuclear free zone in Central Europe would be expected to be a disadvantage for the U. S. and NATO, since the tactical nuclear deterrent capability would be lost in a critical area in which NATO confronts larger numbers of USSR ground forces. An agreed zone in the same geographical area in which U. S. and USSR forces are withdrawn and no longer are in confrontation might be acceptable to the U. S. provided tactical nuclear medium-range weapons and IRBM's remain readily available close to the U. S. - NATO rear of the zone.
11. Discussion and evaluation of arms control measures involving reduction of overseas bases and forward deployments are contained in other sections of this report. As developed in the above discussion on general U. S. strategic deployment versus the Sino-Soviet position, the U. S. must retain certain overseas bases, at least for the next 5-to-10-year period. Certain U. S. overseas bases might be eliminated by unilateral action without detriment to the U. S. position. Carefully selected U. S. foreign bases could be closed in exchange for some significant arms control measure by USSR. Military and strategic requirements, with regard to Communist China, must always be considered in any case.



## STABILITY UNDER DISARMAMENT CONDITIONS

### DECISIVENESS IN NUCLEAR WAR

One of the major arguments against disarmament (GCD) rests on the assumption that exclusive possession of even a very small number of thermonuclear weapons will be a decisive advantage. This assumption is open to challenge, and must be considered in further detail.

The first problem that emerges in such a study is the question of "decisiveness." Under what circumstances will a nation surrender rather than continue to fight? Historically, most nations, and field armies as well, have not fought to the last man; only a small number have fought to the last woman and child.<sup>1</sup> Almost all defeated powers have, in fact, retained rather significant military capabilities. On the other hand, history also records several instances in which nations have clearly had no chance to win, but continued to fight desperately. In a small number of such cases, they have actually won despite the disparity in odds, usually because their enemies were nowhere near as strong as was generally believed.

In the modern world, it is contended that few nations wish elimination of 30% or more of their population.<sup>2</sup> Given that destruction of this level is threatened, and there is no deterrent capability—no means to reply in kind—few political leaders would refuse to comply with an ultimatum backed up by such a threat. It might be said that all this capability would therefore be decisive.

However, the question remains as to what means might be available to a nation which has received such an attack. Thirty percent of a population is a lot of people, but nations have survived and won after such losses. It depends, in many respects, on which thirty percent, and how much other damage was done as well.

### STRATEGIES AT LOW INVENTORY LEVELS

Two strategic options appear reasonable to the exclusive possessor of a small number of strategic weapons. One is a policy of blackmail, using the enemy population as hostages; the other is to launch the most malevolent attack possible, and rely on winning the ensuing arms race/war.

<sup>1</sup>Xenophon describes a village taken by the Ten Thousand in which the women threw their children over a precipice and jumped after them. Carthage is supposed to have resisted until physically prevented from doing so. Most countries of modern times have surrendered long before their physical capacity to resist was removed.

<sup>2</sup>Kahn, On Thermonuclear War.



A blackmail strategy requires that the aggressor insure against clandestine rearmament of the enemy. This would mean changes in the enemy governments and, possibly, occupation of the enemy. Several science fiction stories have employed this theme and illustrate methods which the "defeated" power could use to thwart the enemy occupation inspectors. However, they have failed to consider the fact that the establishment of secret laboratories in anticipation of this event would constitute violations of the GCD agreement which preceded the situation. If the GCD inspectors had done their work well there would be no secret facilities which could operate after occupation.

The response to an ultimatum from the exclusive possessor of a small number of weapons cannot, of course, be predicted. It is as possible to imagine that the President would be temperamentally unsuited to surrender as it is to imagine him overcome with trepidation at the thought of the loss of a large part of the population.

If blackmail fails, or if the ultimatum were rejected, the consequences of the employment of the second strategic alternative—a malevolent attack—can be calculated with relative ease and depend on the number and nature of the weapons the aggressor possessed. It is true that it is very hard to destroy the economy of a nation merely by destroying ten or even thirty cities. This is particularly true of the United States. However, after this holocaust, the attacked power would have to produce both nuclear weapons and delivery systems from scratch, while the enemy continued to use his weapons as fast as they were produced. The result would be a long and drawn out war, with each side striving to make each weapon produce the maximum result. One might suspect that such a war would not be preferable in the long run, to a "spasm" war fought from high inventory levels.

#### INCENTIVES FOR REARMAMENT

Any specific statement as to what is "decisive" can be challenged. However, it appears reasonable to believe that the exclusive possession of perhaps ten thermonuclear weapons might lead their possessors to believe that they had a decisive capability. Under the circumstances, the wish would be more important than the reality.

It is also important to note that, once revealed, such a decisive capability must be used quickly. The exclusive possession of nuclear weapons would be an ephemeral condition unless measures were taken to prevent the other side from rearming. Incentives for launching a preventative attack under such circumstances are very high, much higher than at present. This is the very definition of instability.

It should be noted that it has been unnecessary to decide which power found itself in exclusive possession of nuclear weapons under GCD. The



incentive structure for both sides is approximately the same. It is not necessary to have a world conquest as a conscious goal in order to launch a preventative attack. The United States, it is true, possessed a nuclear monopoly for many years after World War II and did not use it. Many influential persons, however, strongly advocated using these weapons to disarm the Soviet Union. Among these were Bertrand Russell and J. Robert Oppenheimer.

The reciprocal fear of surprise attack produces its own incentives for preventative war, exclusive of the ambitions of the powers. Many historical examples can be cited, and it is even more true in the nuclear area.

This whole question of stability at low inventory levels requires considerable study. Variables which must be considered in the study include the manner in which low inventories are achieved; the effectiveness of the inspection apparatus which enforces the lowered strategic inventories; internal politics of the powers under the agreement; long-range goals and objectives of the powers; and possible breakthroughs in weapons technology. The question is obviously important, in that the desirability and feasibility of GCD as an objective depends on the answer. If, as appears from the above brief analysis, low inventory levels produce strategic instability, GCD is undesirable per se, and the better a GCD proposal is designed, the more undesirable the situation it will produce. On the other hand, if, as the proponents of GCD believe, low inventory levels are more stable and safer than the present environment, then discussions of GCD should be directed toward the workability of the particular proposal, rather than toward the concept of GCD itself.

It has been considered sufficient to merely raise the questions in this study. A thorough analysis of strategic decisiveness and stability at low inventory levels would be sufficiently complex as to require efforts not available to this study team.

#### POSITION ASSUMED IN THIS STUDY

For the purpose of this study, the question of stability at low inventory levels has been left open, with some tendency to regard low levels as unstable. The U. S. and Soviet proposals currently before the Eighteen Nation Committee are mutually unacceptable to the superpowers, and the probability of their adoption may be considered to be very low due to the technical details of the proposals. A more general study of disarmament would require an examination of the stability problem in detail.



## FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN THE STUDY OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT (GCD)<sup>1</sup>

Early in the study, the arms control proposals to be studied were separated into two classes: (1) those measures directed at particular elements of the military forces to control their deployment and employment in order to reduce the likelihood of war and the destructive consequences of war which were labeled arms control; and (2) those measures directed at eliminating or drastically reducing military forces, along with their costs and threat of mass destruction, which were designated disarmament measures. When this distinction was made the achievement of GCD through formal agreement was considered to be such a low-probability event in the foreseeable future that it was decided it should be given only a small amount of study effort.

The study staff believes that the accomplishment of complete disarmament is a low-probability event in the foreseeable future; however, two facets of GCD make it worthy of study at this time: (1) if general and complete disarmament is considered to be an acceptable long-range goal,<sup>2</sup> and if arms control measures are steps in the direction of this goal,<sup>3</sup> then a study of GCD would be an appropriate vehicle for the evaluation of arms control measures; and (2) if achieving GCD means that military force is no longer necessary to maintain national security, then it is appropriate to examine arms control measures, in terms of their effect on that component of national security supplied by the military, as changes conducive to GCD occur. Because both of these facets are applicable, some effort was devoted to an analysis of GCD in these contexts.

Both the U. S. and the Soviet Union have committed themselves, in principle, to the long-range objective of GCD. A future in which national security and integrity may be maintained without a military establishment has been identified by some government officials as a more desirable future than one that continues the present situation in which military conflict, continuing crises, high armament costs, and the danger of a nuclear war are the order of the day. The probability of such a world actually occurring may be inferred from the tortuous chain of events which had to be assumed to occur before an environment conducive to GCD could be postulated.

<sup>1</sup>Examination of the effects of immediate adoption of GCD measures is presented in Volume I. This paper is directed toward a hypothetical future environment.

<sup>2</sup>There is, of course, nothing like universal agreement on this proposition. The study staff neither accepts nor rejects GCD as an acceptable long-range goal.

<sup>3</sup>One conclusion of this study is that arms control is not necessarily a mere step toward disarmament; however, this is not universally accepted.



The first and most obvious conclusion is that if a nation agrees to (and does) implement GCD, it will have no military establishment and therefore no national security. This is especially true in the present world in which military might is the hallmark of national security.

In a world in which there are no international institutions to replace force, fear, and coercion as the means of obtaining objectives, the above conclusion is a serious one. However, there are other aspects of the present world situation that tend to cloud the issue and add uncertainty to this conclusion. In the past, the preservation and extension of national security and sovereignty has been the prime function and motivation of national governments and institutions. There has been, for some time, a growing feeling in some quarters that national security may be achieved through international cooperation. The advent of nuclear weapons has greatly stimulated this growing belief. For hundreds of years the belief has been that national security is positively correlated with military force: the more military capability the more security. The possession of nuclear weapons by the major powers is believed by some analysts to have changed this traditional formula. In a nuclear age where any one of several major powers can (and some do) have the capability to utterly destroy any potential enemy in a short span of time, the procurement of increased military capability poses a problem. Perhaps this increase in military power may actually be accompanied by a decrease in national security. This is one of the dilemmas facing the nuclear powers today.<sup>1</sup>

Resolution of this dilemma has been the basis of most of the arms control discussions to date. Discussions have centered around two themes: (1) that of halting the increase in military force (arms race) before the danger of a nuclear war becomes too great; and (2) that of reducing the military force available to a nation to zero (GCD).<sup>2</sup> One result of these discussions and studies has been the realization by the advocates of disarmament that before GCD can be accomplished the nations of the world must achieve new levels of international behavior in which the use of military force as a means of obtaining national objectives has been abandoned and replaced by other institutions.

In order to examine the kind of world in which GCD might actually be adopted and thereby frame some estimate of the factors operative in a post GCD environment, it was necessary to construct a chain of events which might lead to an environment conducive to GCD. Several members of the study staff were therefore instructed to view GCD in as sympathetic a manner

<sup>1</sup>The reader is referred to the analysis of the "Three Dilemmas in Strategic Planning" in Volume I.

<sup>2</sup>C.f. "Arms Control and Disarmament", Volume I.



as possible, and to attempt to define an environment in which the United States and the Soviet Union might actually conclude a disarmament treaty. The scenario presented in the following text was prepared under these ground rules.

In examining the scenario, the reader must understand that one fundamental assumption is an absolute prerequisite: namely, it must be assumed that the nature of Communism does not require it to seek world conquest as its primary goal. This assumption is obviously open to challenge. There is nothing like universal agreement on the nature of Communism, either among members of the U.S. government, the press, or within the Academies. Before, however, it is even remotely possible that GCD could become a reality, Communism would necessarily have to have abandoned world conquest as a goal, or at least to convince the West that this had been done. This scenario begins, therefore, with the assumption that through some change or modification of the leadership structure of the Soviet Union, the government of Russia will act in a manner suited to a Russian national government, pursuing the "legitimate national interests" of the Russian nation. An analysis of the probability of this event is outside the scope of this study.

It is also necessary that the reader keep in mind that this scenario is not a plan, and is not advocated by the study team. It is merely one (remotely) possible future. There will undoubtedly be readers who believe that even if all the rather far-fetched events of the scenario took place, the United States should not agree to disarm. The study team neither accepts nor rejects this opinion; it is merely assumed that if the conditions described in the scenario actually took place, it is at least possible that an elected government of the United States might then sign the hypothetical GCD treaty presented below.

#### DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO A GCD POSTURE

If it be assumed that GCD is desirable and attainable at some future date, the question of the effects of the various GCD proposals on national security must be answered. One answer to this question which has already been developed is: when GCD becomes possible, the requirement for a military establishment to maintain national security will, by definition, no longer exist. However, national security may be affected during the interim period when an environment favorable to GCD is being generated.

The examination of this latter problem requires a detailed comparison and analysis of the various GCD proposals and their interaction with national security. To facilitate this analysis the following material was prepared.

1. An item-by-item comparison of the 1962 U. S. and the USSR proposals for GCD



2. A scenario depicting one of the many possible sequences of future events leading to GCD
3. A partial general disarmament treaty
4. A final phase general disarmament treaty
5. An item-by-item comparison of these composite treaties with the U. S. and USSR GCD proposals of 1962

Items one and five on this list have been combined and are shown in tabular form at the end of this paper.

Items two, three and four are contained in the scenario which is based upon a composite version of both U. S. and USSR proposals for GCD combined with separable proposals as contained in the U. S. five point program and other selected measures. The scenario was prepared to provide an analytical tool for the analysis of operative factors and the effects of the various measures on the national security goals and problem areas. The scenario is based upon hypothetical events and no validity is expressed or implied. The time is arbitrary. The sequence of events and times is for evaluating the effects and impacts of specified actions whether they occur as a consequence of agreements or by other means. The scenario is a hypothetical generation of a possible arms control environment.

The assessment of the probability of actual occurrence of the events of this scenario must be left to the reader. However, it is important to note that some such events which have the effects described below are absolute prerequisites to the generation of an environment in which the United States and the Soviet Union might agree to such a treaty. The assumption that International Communism either (1) no longer rules Russia, or (2) no longer places world conquest high on its list of objectives, must also be remembered.

## SCENARIO<sup>1</sup>

### Arms Control Activities

Prior to 1965, multinational arms control negotiations at Geneva had produced limited tangible results, but the international climate for arms control had improved. By late 1965 the atmosphere at the Geneva Arms Control and Disarmament Conference was more conducive to cooperation than in several preceding years. Tensions between the East and West had eased noticeably. The economic wealth of the U. S. continued to grow, and the economic position of the USSR was improving. The Western world and the Soviet Bloc both viewed the attitude and the position of Communist China and Indonesia with growing concern. In October 1964, the Communist China had exploded a nuclear device of about 20- to 50-kiloton yield. In July and

---

<sup>1</sup>Events postulated in this scenario have been assumed for study purposes only.



August 1965, Communist China tested four nuclear weapons of various types; these explosions were in the small and medium yield ranges. In September 1965, Indonesia tested a nuclear device.

In November 1965, the U. S. and the USSR reached an agreement that provided for disposal by destruction of all U. S. B-47 and USSR Badger (TU-16) bomber aircraft. The action was completed before the agreed upon date of 31 March 1966. During 1965, additional agreements were formalized that extended the scope of the 1964 U. S. -USSR unilateral actions to curtail the production of fissionable weapons material (FWM). The U. S., the UK, and the USSR were the signatories. France, Communist China, and Indonesia declined to participate.

On 1 June 1966, an arms control agreement initially proposed by the U. S. was executed. Under the terms agreed upon, no nuclear weapons (warheads or bombs), delivery vehicles, launching devices, or weapons-grade fissionable material would be transferred by any signatory nation to any other state. This treaty had been developed in the January 1966 Geneva Arms Control and Disarmament Conference, with the U. S., the USSR, and the UK the principal makers of the terms. Representatives of 26 nations were present. The treaty was signed by the U. S., the UK, the USSR, and seven other countries, including France, Sweden, and Israel. The UAR did not sign the agreement.

In July 1966, at the Geneva Arms Control and Disarmament Conference, a specific proposal was made by the USSR that would provide for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe and would include the establishment of observation posts, control centers, and certain inspection provisions within the zones. Additionally, observers were to be permitted on access routes to the zones. After considerable negotiation, submission of counterproposals, and modification to the original USSR plan, a formal agreement was signed in January 1967 and formally ratified by the U. S. Government in March 1967. Eight European nations, including France and West Germany, ratified the nuclear-free zone treaty. The effective date agreed upon for completed action was 30 September 1967. The term of duration of the treaty subject to renewal, was 10 years from the date of ratification by all signatory powers. A United Nations General Assembly Resolution noted with approval the action of the treaty nations in establishment of the zone and urged referral of disputes to the International Court of Justice. These events are summarized in Figure 1.

As early as 21 January 1964, President Johnson had, in a message to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, outlined a U. S. proposal for several specific major arms control measures. This outline was referred to as the President's five-point disarmament program. As summarized earlier in this narrative, a 10-nation agreement was executed 1 June 1966, in which the U. S., the USSR, the UK, and seven other signatory states agreed to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons and FWM

EVENTS	TIME			
	1964	1965	1966	1967
POLITICAL AND ARMS CONTROL DEVELOPMENTS	<p>▲ MORE LIBERAL ECONOMIC POLICIES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BECOME EFFECTIVE</p> <p>▲ U.S. AND U.S.S.R. CANCEL PROPOSED AGREEMENTS</p>	<p>▲ INCREASED COOPERATION AT GENEVA CONFERENCE</p> <p>▲ COMMUNIST CHINESE GOVERNMENT LEADERS COMMIT SUICIDE</p> <p>▲ BILATERAL U.S.-U.S.S.R. AGREEMENT FOR RESTRICTION OF OBSOLETE BOMBER AIRCRAFT</p> <p>▲ FRENCH POLICIES REORIENTED TOWARD U.S., U.K., AND NATO</p> <p>▲ COMMUNIST CHINA ADMITTED TO U.N.</p>	<p>▲ DEVELOPMENT OF NONPROLIFERATION TREATY</p> <p>▲ DESTRUCTION OF BOMBERS COMPLETED</p> <p>▲ EXECUTION OF MULTINATION NONPROLIFERATION TREATY</p> <p>▲ U.S.S.R. PROPOSES NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE</p> <p>▲ SPAIN AGREES TO ADDITIONAL U.S. BASE PRIVILEGES IN SPANISH TERRITORY</p> <p>▲ NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE TREATY SIGNED</p>	<p>▲ U.S. GOVERNMENT RATIFIES CENTRAL EUROPEAN NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE TREATY</p> <p>▲ EFFECTIVE DATE FOR NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE TREATY</p>
MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS		<p>██████ AGGRESSIVE ACTS BY COMMUNIST CHINA AND NORTH VIETNAM AGAINST U.S., AND SEATO</p> <p>▲ U.S.S.R. ADOPTATES U.S.S.R.-CHINA MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY</p> <p>██████ U.S. PUNITIVE WAR VS COMMUNIST CHINA AND NORTH VIETNAM</p>		<p>▲ U.S. JCS ORDER IMPLEMENTING ACTION CONFORMING TO CENTRAL EUROPEAN NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE TREATY</p> <p>▲ U.S. JCS APPROVE CANCEL REDEPLOYMENT PLAN WITH NATO CONCURRENCE</p> <p>▲ U.S. HAS 41 FBMS (534) IN COMMISSION</p> <p>▲ 4 SHIP. OF NAVAL HELF IN OPERATION</p> <p>▲ ACTION COMPLETED TO DENUCLEARIZE TREATY ZONE</p> <p>▲ ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF U.S. &amp; NATO REDEPLOYMENT PLAN SECURED 30 SEPT</p>

LEGEND: ▲ = ACTION OCCURRING AT SPECIFIC TIME ████████ = ACTION OR ACTIONS OCCURRING OVER A PERIOD OF TIME

(S)

to nations not already controlling them. This measure had been one of the original five points put forward by President Johnson.

The next major arms control step (also one proposed by the President of the United States in January 1964) was a U. S. proposal at Geneva in May 1967 for the U. S., the USSR, and their respective allies to explore and finally agree to a verified freeze on the number and limitations on the characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles, and restrictions upon their production and testing. Research activities were not restricted by the terms of the agreement.

The nuclear vehicles, considered by the U. S. and the USSR and the other disarmament conference states with regard to the proposed freeze, were as follows:

1. Ground-based surface-to-surface missiles having a range of 5000 kilometers or greater, together with their associated launching facilities; and sea-based surface-to-surface missiles having a range of 100 kilometers or greater, together with their associated launchers
2. Strategic bombers having an empty weight of 40,000 kilograms or greater, together with any associated air-to-surface missiles having a range of 100 kilometers or greater
3. Ground-based surface-to-surface missiles having a range of between 1000 kilometers and 5000 kilometers, together with their associated launching facilities
4. Strategic bombers having an empty weight between 25,000 kilograms and 40,000 kilograms, together with any associated air-to-surface missiles having a range of 100 kilometers or greater
5. Strategic antimissile systems, together with their associated launching facilities.

The United States also submitted a proposal for a system of verification of compliance with its recommended agreement for freezing and limiting production of strategic nuclear vehicles. The U. S. proposal called for a verification system that would provide adequate assurance of compliance and that would include:

1. Continuing inspection of declared facilities
2. A specified number of inspections per year to check undeclared locations for possible prohibited activities, such as armament production or launching-site construction



3. The stationing of observers to verify all space launchings and all allowed missile firings in order that stated requirements for replacement missiles could be verified and the launching prohibited types of missiles detected
4. Observation of the destruction of (or, in the case of accidents, other confirmation of) vehicles and launchers being replaced.

General agreement on the U. S. proposal was finally obtained from the USSR and several other countries following a series of counterproposals. After some minor variations and modification to the proposal had been negotiated, agreement between the U. S. and the USSR was reached by late 1968, and in December 1968, a treaty was signed. A provision was included in the treaty to specify that neither of the two major nuclear powers would in any case be required by the bilateral treaty to allow its strategic nuclear delivery capability to drop below that of any third power. The production of new types of armaments in the prohibited categories was banned by the treaty. Production of existing types of armaments was to be halted, except that one-for-one replacement was permitted to cover maintenance, accidental losses, and expenditures within agreed annual quotas for confidence and training firings. The treaty was made effective 15 April 1969 by the U. S., the USSR, and all principal Eastern and Western allied nations.

In May 1969, the U. S. proposed to the Geneva conference the final steps in halting all production of fissionable weapons materials. By this time, production of FWM had been greatly curtailed unilaterally or by formal agreement in several nations. The President of the United States, in a statement forwarded to the conference in January 1964 when submitting his original proposal, pointed out that he considered a halt in the production of FWM to be an important element of Stage I of the 1962 United States proposal for general and complete disarmament. He also stated that the transfer to nonweapon uses of agreed quantities of U-235 by the United States and the Soviet Union was an important Stage I measure affecting nuclear weapons. By October 1969, a bilateral agreement was signed by the U. S. and the USSR. The essential points of the agreement were:

1. A progressive plant-by-plant shutdown, with inspections of the facilities actually shut down being made by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
2. Declaration of other facilities that remained open for production of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes
3. Reciprocal inspection by the U. S. and the USSR of facilities in order to guard against FWM production at undeclared facilities



4. A cutoff of all FWM production by the signatories nine months from the effective date of the agreement. The agreement was effective 15 April 1968.

Even earlier than the presentation in 1964 of the President's five-point program to the USSR and the nations of the world, preliminary conversations and exchanges of memoranda had taken place between U. S. and USSR representatives to arrange a formal agreement for a system of observation posts to reduce the danger of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack. Other NATO and Warsaw Pact nations also had participated in the Geneva discussions on this subject. An allied subject under discussion was that of exchange of military missions between the U. S. and the USSR. By February 1970, agreements had been reached and a formal treaty had been implemented for observation posts at specified locations in NATO and Warsaw Pact nations. Provisions had been made for limited airborne and certain seaborne posts, as well as for ground observation stations. The ground observation stations were located in the continental U. S. and overseas U. S. areas, U. S. overseas base areas, the USSR, and most of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Generally, the ground posts were placed near military bases and installations and probable staging areas, near national borders, and at transportation centers. Exchange missions were posted at higher-echelon military headquarters.

#### Political Developments and Military Activity<sup>1</sup>

Cuban Communist influence in Latin America spread more rapidly after Che Guevara replaced Fidel Castro, who was assassinated in August 1965. The poor economic situation of Cuba worsened in 1965 and in 1966, and late in 1965 the USSR withdrew all its support. Evidence disclosed that all Soviet military advisory and technical support for the Guevara government was being completely terminated.

In November 1965, President de Gaulle of France died. The new government headed by de Gaulle's successor followed a changed policy. France became more in harmony with the U. S., the U. K., and NATO in general. Meanwhile, France increased in stature as a nuclear power.

In late 1965, the United States fought a punitive limited war against North Vietnam and Communist China. This was in retaliation for aggressive acts by both North Vietnam and Communist China against U. S. military forces and for light air attacks against SEATO-country cities, including Manila. Responses by the U. S. were controlled with the use of only

---

<sup>1</sup>Events postulated in this scenario are assumed for study purposes only.



conventional (nonnuclear) weapons. All Communist Chinese nuclear plants and facilities were pinpointed and destroyed by U.S. air attacks. The USSR did not participate in the attacks and maintained strict neutrality.

Communist China and North Vietnam suffered very heavy destruction of military installations and port facilities and agreed to a policy of non-aggression on terms set by the U.S. and the UN. No military occupation was carried out by the U.S. As a result of these actions, the political and military situations in South Vietnam and Laos were brought under control to the satisfaction of the U.S., SEATO, and the UN. No change was effected in the nature of the Communist Chinese government as a result of the action by the U.S. nor was any political control imposed by the U.S. in China subsequent to the war. Mao Tse Tung and Chou En Lai were reported to have committed suicide. The new leader appeared to be conservative and cooperative.

The foregoing actions were explained to the UN as required by the UN charter. No definitive action was taken, other than a majority vote signifying general approval of the U.S. action (Russia abstained). Communist China's economy was at a low ebb after the war. In March 1966, Communist China was admitted to the United Nations.

In May 1966, a large-scale revolution took place in Cuba. Che Guevara was killed. The Guevara government was overthrown. A non-Communist regime was established. Relations between Cuba and other states were restored. The United States began providing substantial economic assistance to Cuba.

In 1967 and 1968, Malaysia, with considerable military aid from the U.S. and the U.K., grew in military stature and gradually gained control over the Indonesian guerrillas who for some time had been active on the Malaysian coasts and across its borders in the mountains of Borneo. By the middle of 1968 and after it had suffered the loss of all aid from USSR and Communist China, Indonesia's military posture deteriorated rapidly. The Indonesian government then changed to a conciliatory policy in relations with both Western and Eastern nations.

#### Trends and Significant Changes, 1965 - 1969

Between April 1965 and 1969, there had been no essential changes in the political situation with respect to East and West Germany, except for Berlin. In August 1967, despite strong objections by West Germany, Berlin was internationalized under UN control. The U.S. had initiated action to effect this arrangement. Changes or trends during that period to late 1969 included:



1. A change in policy and orientation by France which brought that country's policies closer to those of the U.S., the UK and NATO in general.
2. France showed a marked growth in its status as a nuclear power.
3. Considerable economic progress was established by Western Europe.
4. The GNP of the Soviet Union increased 30 percent. Living standards improved as the drain of heavy industrialization tapered off.
5. The USSR relaxed considerably the close control it formerly exercised over the Central European satellites, and more freedom of action by the satellite governments was apparent.
6. An increased degree of friendly cooperation was evidenced by tangible acts with the West by Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. East Germany was an exception in this trend.
7. Russia abrogated the USSR - Communist China mutual defense treaty.

#### Assumed World Conditions in Late 1969

World conditions in January 1969 are assumed to be substantially as follows:

1. The United States policies, goals, and political trends continued as they were in 1965.
2. The political status and political orientation of all areas in Europe remained approximately as they were in 1965, except for the change in the French policy indicated in the foregoing section and the new status of Berlin.
3. The military strength and capability of the East and West were reduced by a minor degree by the loss of nuclear potential in Central Europe (1967 Nuclear-Free Zone Agreement) and by the cutoff of production of FWM. The power balance remained essentially as it was in 1965.
4. The United States' armed forces in Europe, including ground and air, were reduced about 30 percent since July 1967, when West German and French combat strength available to NATO in Central Europe had been increased.



5. China's military capabilities were greatly reduced.
6. The objectives of the United States and NATO remained unchanged. Certain administrative, procedural, and structural changes were effected within NATO.
7. The United States had its fleet of 41 ballistic missile nuclear submarines in commission; the UK had three.
8. The NATO multilateral naval force was in operation with 12 surface ships mounting Polaris - 2 and Polaris - 3 IRBM's in commission.
9. Cold war tensions between the East and West power blocs had eased greatly since 1965. Worldwide international relations, with some exceptions, were improved in general.

#### Treaty Providing for Partial General Disarmament - 1971

During 1970, proposals, counterproposals and negotiations at Geneva resulted in an agreement for a partial reduction in all the armament categories and in the deployment of forces. A compromise treaty draft was prepared and agreed to by the U.S. and the USSR in early 1971. Several of the principal nations of the world (those with significant military strengths) eventually signed the Armament Reduction Treaty in 1971. Verification was to be performed by an International Arms Control Commission (IACC), administered by the United Nations.

The treaty provided that within a period of 24 months after the execution date of the treaty, 1 August 1971, a reduction of 40 percent would be made in the following categories.

1. Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 2500 kilograms or greater
2. Ground-based surface-to-surface missiles of all types having a range of 75 kilometers or greater and associated launching facilities
3. Air-to-surface missiles having a range of 100 kilometers or greater
4. Sea-based surface-to-surface missiles having a range of 100 kilometers or greater
5. Antimissile-missile systems with associated launching facilities



6. Surface-to-air missiles, together with their launching pads, other than antimissile-missile systems
7. Tanks, all classes
8. Armored cars and personnel carriers
9. All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of 100 mm or greater
10. Combat ships and submarines of all classes, including attack transports, attack cargo ships, and amphibious assault landing ships of over 400 tons standard displacement
11. Nuclear warheads, bombs, mines, and torpedoes of all types that are either deployed or in stockpiles

All of the above listed reductions were to be made in 6-month increments; each increment would be 10 percent of the initial levels on the effective date of the treaty.

#### Additional Provisions

1. The armed force levels of the U.S. and the USSR were to be reduced to 1,900,000 uniformed military personnel each by the end of 24 months. Other nations would reduce their force levels during the 24 months by amounts and at rates of decrease prescribed by terms of the agreement.
2. Partial reduction would be made of agreed upon specified bases in foreign territory.
3. Military forces of all types deployed in foreign territory would be reduced 50 percent in four, equal 6-month phases over 24 months.
4. Weapons of mass destruction were prohibited in outer space.
5. All chemical and biological warfare weapons and materials, deployed and in depots, would be eliminated.
6. Production of all nuclear weapons would be discontinued by the end of a 24 months period.



7. The treaty required that advance notice of major military movements and maneuvers would be given each signatory nation to all other signatories and to the IACC.

During the implementation by the world powers and other signatories of the Armament Reduction Treaty of 1971 (partial reduction of armaments), negotiations by the signatory states were conducted at Geneva in an atmosphere of good cooperation. As a result, a second treaty, designed to achieve the final steps of General and Complete Disarmament (GCD), was agreed upon. The new general disarmament treaty provided that over a period of three years, commencing upon the verified completion of the Armament Reduction Treaty of 1971, on 1 August 1973, the final reductions in all categories of national armaments would be achieved. Military bases, in home countries or in foreign areas, would be eliminated.

#### The Final Phase General Disarmament Treaty

The 1973 treaty, known as the Final Phase General Disarmament Treaty, provided that advance notice of major military movements, maneuvers, and exercises would be given by each signatory nation to all other parties and to the IACC.

The treaty provided for the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force to come into existence at the beginning of the final phase and to grow in increments to full authorized strength by the end of the Final Phase Treaty period. The agreement further provided that the United Nations Peace Force would be composed of national armed forces of the appropriate military specialties and branches from the participating nations. In accordance with an agreed-upon treaty provision, each state was to furnish a share determined by several variables. The agreement also provided that upon completion of general disarmament, 1 August 1976, the individual countries would be permitted to retain small forces of their own (with limited armaments and weapons and under their respective national jurisdictions) for internal security purposes.

During the period covered by the second disarmament treaty, reductions in most categories (in accordance with specifically prescribed terms) would be executed in three equal phases starting 1 August 1973. In general, 20 percent reduction of the 1971 strength would be made in each step. The entire scenario is summarized in Figure 2.

**Note:** Events postulated in this scenario are assumed for study and discussion purposes only.

**Figure 2. Hypothetical Scenario Events Conductive to GCD**



## ANALYSIS OF THE SCENARIO

The scenario describes a hypothetical future in which a disarmament treaty might be negotiated. Several vitally important changes in the world environment are prerequisite to the conclusion of such a treaty and have been postulated in the scenario. These include the following:

1. A highly visible change in the goals of the Russian leaders, including relaxation of control over the satellites, willingness to allow inspection of the Soviet Union, opening of Russia to Western ideas and economic goods, and the renunciation of the use of force in the pursuit of national objectives is prerequisite. This is, in essence, the elimination of evangelistic Communism as a factor in the Russian government.<sup>1</sup>
2. The forcible elimination of China as a world power, and a complete change of leadership in China is prerequisite. The postulation of suicide by the Chinese leaders may be far-fetched; yet it is difficult to imagine a less fantastic event which would allow Chinese leaders to accept a reduced status and abandon expansionism.
3. Successful solution of many of the economic problems of the world, including the birth-famine cycle is prerequisite. Population pressure alone will produce strong incentives for expansionism in many nations, even if Communism were eliminated. Unless the world's economic problems are successfully solved, some of the poorer nations are quite likely to covet the wealth of the West and will be strongly tempted to redress the imbalance of wealth in more or less traditional ways. It is difficult to see how either the United States or the Soviet Union could eliminate military forces under such conditions.

Even, however, if it be granted that all of these itemized changes have occurred, there remains the problem of instability at low weapons inventory levels. Nuclear weapons are expensive, but they are not so expensive that war lords, gangs, or even wealthy private individuals could not acquire a few. In a disarmed world, the possession of even a very few such weapons might result in acquisition of power on a scale dreamed of only by a few historical conquerors. If it seems fantastic to believe that a private citizen or fanatical group might attempt to acquire nuclear weapons as instruments of world conquest, it is still no less so than, say, the career of a petty nomad chieftain named Temujin, who was driven from his own tent by a rival

<sup>1</sup>At the very least, the rulers of the Soviet Union must act in such a manner that the leaders and people of the west believe this to be true.



tribe at an early age, yet eventually became Genghis Khan, Emperor of All Men, Master of Thrones and Crowns, and Scourge of God. Men have used more fantastic means than nuclear weapons in a search for conquest.

### Military Capability of the United States to Provide for the National Security and Protect Vital National Interests

Under the conditions of the treaty, at the culmination of the treaty the United States would essentially retain no military capability to provide for the national security or protect vital national interests. If, in fact, the GCD agreement had worked as planned and no nation successfully concealed even a few nuclear weapons, the great industrial potential of the United States would, in fact, tend to guarantee that the U. S. could rearm much faster than any other State; provided, of course, that the government could convince the population that rearmament was necessary. It is likely that certain minority groups would oppose such rearmament through acts of civil disobedience and that resolute action on the part of the government would be required for mobilization.

### Status and Prospects of Military Policy Goals

Under the conditions of the agreement, the military would cease to exist as such. There would be a national constabulary, related in some manner to a UN directed peace force. It is likely that the U. S. constabulary would be able, in the absence of nuclear weapons, to prevent any actual invasion of the United States, but there would, of course, be no question of deterring aggression against U. S. allies except through the UN peace force.

As there would be no military, the policy goals specified in the world statement would cease to be relevant. Other nonmilitary policy goals would have replaced them.

### Status and Prospects in Six Specified National Security Areas

#### Security of the United States From Open Attack by Major Powers

The national constabulary would undoubtedly be able to deal with any open attack not supported by nuclear weapons.

#### Security of U. S. Interests in Latin America and the Caribbean

The primary influence the U. S. would exert outside her own borders would be dependent on her diplomatic and economic resources. There could be no question of intervention in the affairs of another national state, either



to preserve stability or to protect U.S. lives and property. Presumably, the UN peace force would undertake these tasks. Control of the activities of this force would become a primary policy goal.

#### Security of the United States From Direct Attack by Minor Powers

No significant threat would exist, again assuming that nuclear weapons were not developed clandestinely.

#### Challenge to U.S. Interests Through Subversion and Economic Warfare

It is difficult to imagine that the United States would actually agree to disarm in the face of continued attempts by the Communists or other ideological enemies to subvert foreign governments. If this did occur, however, the capability of the UN peace force would be the only obstacle to subversion and internal war as methods of conquest. The probability of success of the UN peace force in this kind of operation may be inferred from the experience of the Congo.

With regard to economic warfare, presumably, there would be a very large increase in resources available for this purpose.<sup>1</sup> Estimation of the capabilities of the U.S. and other nations in this conflict area are in the main outside the scope of this study. The reader is referred to the position paper on subversion, economic warfare, and challenges to world markets for further data.

#### Challenges From (Open or Clandestine) Rearmament

It is unlikely that any nation would be able to defeat the United States through an open arms race. Therefore, if a GCD treaty were formally abrogated, it is likely that some clandestine preparation for this event would have taken place. The nature of modern weapons is such that a very small head start, followed by immediate use of the first weapons to cripple the enemy, might very well be decisive.

Clandestine rearmament is a much greater threat than open rearmament. The study staff has been unable to contrive any kind of agreement that would definitely assure that clandestine rearmament could not occur. The disarmament inspection agency, even given powers far beyond those now possessed by any constitutional officer of the United States, would still be faced with a nearly impossible task. Solution to this problem will require a great deal of research and, if it can be solved at all, will require resources not available in this study.

<sup>1</sup>This is not necessarily the case. The arms control inspectorate would be an expensive proposition and would require highly sophisticated detection equipment.



### Challenges to U. S. Position in World Markets

The reader is referred to the position paper on this subject.

### Factors Operative in the Post GCD World

1. The possible existence of hidden nuclear weapons, whether concealed by the government, insubordinate officers, or other sources, would be extremely critical.
2. There would be no means of coercion likely to be decisive against even a few nuclear weapons. The UN peace force might retain nuclear weapons, in which case, control of this force would be vitally important.
3. There would be no military means for dealing with subversion, except through the UN force.
4. There would exist a strong likelihood of suspicion on the part of any government that discovered evidence, no matter how thin, of a violation on the part of a traditional enemy. The risks of allowing an enemy a very small head start are so great that the stability of the situation is to be doubted.
5. The difficulty of enforcement coupled with the enormous power which an enforcement agency would require as a prerequisite to even minimal effectiveness would present a serious problem. At the very least, the inspectors would require power of arbitrary search and seizure. The inspectorate plus the peace force would have the physical means of world conquest. Control of these agencies would be difficult.
6. Since it is extremely unlikely that the economic problems of the world will be permanently solved, there will be considerable pressure on the wealthy nations to share with less fortunate. The history of human nature does not lend itself to encouraging predictions about such a situation—the donors may become reluctant to continue giving, and few recipients of aid have remained satisfied with the amounts they receive.



### COMPARISON OF 1962 U.S. AND USSR GCD PROPOSALS AND HYPOTHETICAL COMPOSITE TREATIES

In developing the working data for the general and complete disarmament arms control measure scenario, the provisions of the U. S. and USSR proposals for GCD were utilized. The elements of these proposals are presented in Table I.

A tabular form of presentation is used to facilitate cross comparison of the U. S. and USSR proposals of 1962 as well as comparison of these proposals with the hypothetical summary of a GCD treaty prepared to provide data for the analysis of general and complete disarmament measures.

The hypothetical treaty draws upon the provisions of the U. S. and USSR proposals. It might be considered to be a composite or compromise; however, the hypothetical treaty does contain provisions not contained in either proposal.



**Table 1. Comparison of 1962 U.S. and U.S.S.R. GCD Proposals  
and Hypothetical Composite Treaties**

U. S. Proposal for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) 1962 (Actual)	Composite 1971 Partial Disarmament Treaty and 1973 Final Disarmament Treaty (Hypothetical)	U. S. S. R. Proposal, Draft Treaty for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) 1962 (Actual)
<b>TIME PHASING</b>		
<u>Stage I:</u> 3 years	<u>Partial Treaty, 1971:</u> Four equal 6-month reduction phases over a 24-month period; completion 1 August 1973	<u>Stage I:</u> 15 months; begins six months after effective date of treaty
<u>Stage II:</u> 3 years	<u>Final Phase Treaty, 1973:</u> Achieves final reductions in all categories of forces and armaments; reductions are carried out in three equal increments over a 3-year period; completion 1 August 1976	<u>Stage II:</u> 15 months
<u>Stage III:</u> Completion of disarmament within a final period to be agreed upon		<u>Stage III:</u> 12 months
<b>ARMAMENT REDUCTION</b>		
<u>Stage I:</u> Reduction of 30 percent (10 percent in each 1-year phase) of nuclear delivery vehicles and major conventional armaments in total declared inventories; eliminated armaments are transferred to IDO for destruction, or conversion to peaceful use	<u>Partial Treaty, 1971:</u> Reduction of 40 percent in most categories of armaments, nuclear and conventional, is effected in four equal phases of 6 months each	<u>Stage I:</u> Complete elimination of all systems - rockets, military aircraft, artillery, surface ships, submarines - capable of delivering nuclear weapons
<u>Stage II:</u> Continued reductions in all categories to 65 percent of declared inventories at start of Stage I; categories of armaments affected are specified in outline of proposed treaty	<u>Final Phase Treaty, 1973:</u> Reduction in armaments of all categories and in three equal phases; only agreed amounts of weapons appropriate for UN and internal security forces are retained	<u>Stage II:</u> Levels of conventional armaments to be proportional to reduction of forces in Stage II
<u>Stage III:</u> Reduction of all armaments to agreed levels required for internal security; nuclear weapons eliminated		<u>Stage III:</u> Destruction or conversion to peaceful uses of all armaments and military equipment



**Table 1. Comparison of 1962 U. S. and U. S. S. R. GCD Proposals and Hypothetical Composite Treaties (Cont)**

U. S. Proposal for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) 1962 (Actual)	Composite 1971 Partial Disarmament Treaty and 1973 Final Disarmament Treaty (Hypothetical)	U. S. S. R. Proposal, Draft Treaty for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) 1962 (Actual)
<b>ARMED FORCES</b>		
<b>Stage I:</b> Reduce force levels of U. S. and U. S. S. R. to 2.1 million each; all other signatory states, with agreed exceptions, reduce force levels to 100,000 or 1 percent of their population; reduce 1/3-strength each year	<b>Partial Treaty, 1971:</b> Reduce total armed force level to 1,900,000 uniformed personnel by end of 24 months in four equal 6-month reduction phases, all categories	<b>Stage I:</b> Reduce force levels of U. S. and U. S. S. R. to 1.7 million each; all other signatory states to reduce forces to levels to be agreed upon; military personnel and civilian employees included
<b>Stage II:</b> Reduce force levels of U. S. and U. S. S. R. to 1.05 million each; reduce levels of other countries an agreed percentage; limit compulsory military training and refresher training for reserves	<b>Final Phase Treaty, 1973:</b> Reduce force levels of all military categories in three equal phases; retain agreed levels in specified categories for internal security of participating nations and composition of a UN Peace Force; each state provides components	<b>Stage II:</b> Reduce U. S. and U. S. S. R. force levels to one million each; force levels for other signatory states to be agreed upon
<b>Stage III:</b> All armed forces are disbanded, except those agreed upon to maintain internal security and to provide components of UN Peace Force		<b>Stage III:</b> Disband all personnel of armed forces; demobilize general staff and destroy all weapons; abolish military reserves; signatory nations permitted to retain units of militia and light weapons necessary to maintain internal security
<b>NUCLEAR WEAPONS</b>		
<b><u>Reduction and Production Limitations</u></b>		
<b>Stage I:</b> Stop production of fissionable materials for weapons (FMW)	Production of FMW stopped by treaty effective April 1968	<b>Stage I:</b> No comparable proposal



Table 1. Comparison of 1962 U.S. and U.S.S.R. GCD Proposals  
and Hypothetical Composite Treaties (Cont)

U. S. Proposal for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) 1962 (Actual)	Composite 1971 Partial Disarmament Treaty and 1973 Final Disarmament Treaty (Hypothetical)	U. S. S. R. Proposal, Draft Treaty for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) 1962 (Actual)
<b>NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Cont)</b>		
<b><u>Reduction and Production Limitations (Cont)</u></b>		
<b>Stage II:</b> In light of examination of Stage I, reduce stocks of nuclear weapons to minimum levels; transfer fissionable weapons materials to peaceful uses; destroy non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons	<b>Partial Treaty, 1971:</b> Forty percent reduction of nuclear weapons, deployed or in stockpiles, in four 6-month phases  <b>Final Phase Treaty, 1973:</b> All remaining nuclear weapons are eliminated during 3-year period	<b>Stage II:</b> Production of nuclear weapons to be discontinued; all nuclear weapons to be destroyed; stockpiles of nuclear weapon materials to be transferred to a fund for peaceful uses
<b>Stage III:</b> Eliminate all nuclear weapons which may be remaining at disposal of the party nations		<b>Stage III:</b> Nuclear weapons eliminated in Stage II
<b><u>Transfer to Peaceful Uses</u></b>		
<b>Stage I:</b> An agreed quantity of weapons (grade U-235) is transferred by U. S. and U. S. S. R. to peaceful uses	No comparable proposal	No proposal on this subject
<b><u>Transfer Between States for Peaceful Uses</u></b>		
<b>Stage I:</b> Transfer between countries of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes is subjected to appropriate safeguards developed in agreement with IAEA	No comparable proposal	No proposal on this subject
<b><u>Nontransfer of Nuclear Weapons</u></b>		
<b>Stage I:</b> States are prohibited from transferring control, or providing assistance in the manufacture, of nuclear weapons to parties to the treaty which have not manufactured nuclear weapons and are forbidden to acquire them or to attempt to manufacture them	Similar restrictions were made effective for all signatories of a treaty, 1 June 1966; no similar provisions are provided in the Partial or the Final Disarmament Treaties of 1971 and 1973	<b>Stage I:</b> States having nuclear weapons to be prohibited from transferring control of weapons, or transmitting information for production to states not possessing them; parties to the treaty which do not possess nuclear weapons are required to refrain from production or obtaining them; nuclear weapons shall not be admitted to their territory



**Table 1. Comparison of 1962 U.S. and U.S.S.R. GCD Proposals  
and Hypothetical Composite Treaties (Cont)**

U. S. Proposal for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) 1962 (Actual)	Composite 1971 Partial Disarmament Treaty and 1973 Final Disarmament Treaty (Hypothetical)	U. S. S. R. Proposal, Draft Treaty for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) 1962 (Actual)
<b>NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Cont)</b>		
<u>Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions</u>		
<u>Stage I:</u> Nuclear weapons tests are prohibited under effective international control.	Tests are limited by provisions of U. S. - U. S. S. R. Treaty, effective April, 1969, which made effective a freeze on strategic nuclear-delivery vehicles; this treaty permits certain testing under specified conditions	<u>Stages I, II and III:</u> All nuclear testing prohibited
<u>Additional Measures</u>		
<u>Stage I:</u> Signatory states examine feasibility and means of reducing and eliminating stockpiles	<u>Partial and Final Phase Treaties:</u> Phased elimination of all nuclear stockpiles	<u>Stage II:</u> Nuclear weapons stockpiles eliminated (see Reduction and Production Limitations, above)
<b>CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS</b>		
<u>Stage I:</u> Examine means of eliminating chemical and biological weapons and materials in Stages II and III	<u>Partial Treaty, 1971:</u> Provides for elimination of all chemical and biological weapons and materials, deployed or at storage depots	<u>Stage I:</u> No applicable proposal
<u>Stage II:</u> Cease all production of chemical and biological warfare weapons; reduce stockpiles by 50 percent of level at beginning of this stage		<u>Stage II:</u> All chemical, biological and radiological weapons shall be destroyed or neutralized; all instruments for combat use of these materials shall be destroyed; all production of CBR weapons is to cease
<u>Stage III:</u> Eliminate all chemical and biological weapons		



Table 1. Comparison of 1962 U. S. and U. S. S. R. GCD Proposals  
and Hypothetical Composite Treaties (Cont)

U. S. Proposal for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) 1962 (Actual)	Composite 1971 Partial Disarmament Treaty and 1973 Final Disarmament Treaty (Hypothetical)	U. S. S. R. Proposal, Draft Treaty for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) 1962 (Actual)
OUTER SPACE		
Stage I: Signatory states are prohibited from placing in orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction	Partial Treaty, 1971: Prohibits weapons of mass destruction in outer space	Stage I: Signatory states prohibited from placing in orbit or stationing in outer space any special device capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, until all means of delivering nuclear weapons have been destroyed
FOREIGN MILITARY BASES AND MILITARY FORCES IN FOREIGN TERRITORY		
Stage I: No comparable proposal	Partial Treaty, 1971: Provides for partial reduction of agreed upon bases in foreign territory; 50 percent reduction, in four equal 6-month phases, of military forces of all types deployed in foreign territory	Stage I: All foreign military bases to be dismantled  Stage II: No additional provisions  Stage III: Article 31 of draft treaty provides that International Disarmament Organization (IDO) shall control the conversion of all "premises" to peaceful uses
MILITARY EXPENDITURES		
Report on Expenditures		
Itemized reports on military expenditures, to be filed with the International Disarmament Organization (IDO) at the end of each step of each stage	No comparable provision	IDO to have full access to records of central financial offices of nations in connection with budgetary allocations to activities subject to arms control measures



**Table 1. Comparison of 1962 U. S. and U. S. S. R. GCD Proposals  
and Hypothetical Composite Treaties (Cont)**

U. S. Proposal for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) 1962 (Actual)	Composite 1971 Partial Disarmament Treaty and 1973 Final Disarmament Treaty (Hypothetical)	U. S. S. R. Proposal, Draft Treaty for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) 1962 (Actual)
<b>MILITARY EXPENDITURES (Cont)</b>		
<u>Verifiable Reduction of Expenditures</u>		
Examination to be made by the signatory countries of questions related to the verifiable reduction of military expenditures	No comparable provision	Military expenditures to be reduced in proportion to first-stage reduction in arms and armed forces; an agreed portion of the funds released for economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries
<b>INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION</b>		
<u>Stage I:</u> International Disarmament Organization (IDO) is established within the framework of the UN upon entry into force of the agreement; ensures compliance with treaty obligations by verifying execution of measures agreed upon, and assisting the states in developing verification and disarmament measures	International Arms Control Commission (IACC), administered by the UN, performs verification functions	<u>Stage I:</u> IDO to be established within the framework of the UN, to begin functioning as soon as disarmament measures are implemented; function of IDO would be to exercise control over the compliance of the participating states with their treaty obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and forces
<u>Stages II and III:</u> IDO to be strengthened, and maintained on a continuing basis		<u>Stage II:</u> No additional proposal  <u>Stage III:</u> IDO to have access at any time to any point within the territory of any signatory nation, in order to prevent re-establishment of military forces or armaments



Table 1. Comparison of 1962 U.S. and U.S.S.R. GCD Proposals  
and Hypothetical Composite Treaties (Cont)

U. S. Proposal for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) 1962 (Actual)	Composite 1971 Partial Disarmament Treaty and 1973 Final Disarmament Treaty (Hypothetical)	U. S. S. R. Proposal, Draft Treaty for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) 1962 (Actual)
<b>REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR</b>		
<u>Advance Notice of Military Movements</u>		
<u>Stages I, II, and III:</u> States provide advance notification of major military movements and maneuvers to other parties to the treaty and the IDO	<u>Partial and Final Phase Disarmament Treaties of 1971 and 1973:</u> Provisions requiring advance notification by party governments to other parties to treaty and to IACC of major military movements and exercises	<u>Stage I:</u> Warships prohibited to sail from territorial waters; all aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction to be prohibited from leaving national airspace  <u>Stages II and III:</u> No additional proposal
<u>Observation Posts</u>		
<u>Stage I:</u> Observation posts are established by specified parties at major ports, railway centers, motor highways, river crossings, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces	<u>1971 and 1973 Partial and Final Treaties:</u> Observation posts are not provided for verification of treaty; assumed to be included in verification procedures, agreed upon separately; observation-post agreement of February 1970 is in effect; it provides for system of observation posts to reduce danger of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack	<u>Stage I:</u> No applicable proposal in U. S. S. R. draft of treaty, but contained in a memorandum by U. S. S. R. Foreign Minister Gromyko, 28 September 1961
<u>Exchange of Military Missions</u>		
<u>Stage I:</u> Exchange of military missions between states or groups of states is undertaken by specified parties to improve communication and understanding between them	No comparable provision in 1971 and 1973 disarmament treaties	<u>Stage I:</u> No applicable proposal



Table 1. Comparison of 1962 U.S. and U.S.S.R. GCD Proposals  
and Hypothetical Composite Treaties (Cont)

U. S. Proposal for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) 1962 (Actual)	Composite 1971 Partial Disarmament Treaty and 1973 Final Disarmament Treaty (Hypothetical)	U. S. S. R. Proposal, Draft Treaty for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) 1962 (Actual)
<b>UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE</b>		
<p><u>Stage I:</u> Signatory states conclude arrangements for the establishment in Stage II of a UN Peace Force</p>	<p><u>Partial Treaty, 1971:</u> No UN Peace Force or similar organization provided for during partial disarmament treaty period</p> <p><u>Final Phase Treaty, 1973:</u> UN Peace Force is organized at the beginning of the 3-year term of the treaty, and grows in increments to full authorized strength by the end of the final-phase treaty period; each participating state provides a share of the UN Peace Force</p>	<p><u>Stage I:</u> Agreements to be concluded within the UN Security Council to make available to it armed forces, assistance, and facilities as provided in Article 43 of UN Charter; Peace Force to be composed of national armed forces which shall be stationed in their own territories and shall be placed at the disposal of the Security Council under the command of national military authorities</p>
<p><u>Stage II:</u> UN Peace Force to be established and made operative during the first year of Stage II and to be progressively strengthened during Stage II</p>		<p><u>Stage II:</u> Armed forces to be continued to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council</p>
<p><u>Stage III:</u> UN Peace Force to be progressively strengthened until it becomes so strong that no nation could challenge it</p>		<p><u>Stage III:</u> States would be required to make available to the UN Security Council Militia retained by the states, and to provide assistance and facilities including rights of passage; command of the UN Peace Force units would be made up of representatives of the three principal groups of world nations</p>



## SUBVERSION, ECONOMIC WARFARE, AND CHALLENGES TO THE U.S. POSITION IN WORLD MARKETS

It is often difficult to define subversion and economic warfare. Both may be related to a more traditional challenge to the position of a rival in world markets, and all three concepts are clearly interdependent. For example, one goal of subversion may be to so involve the United States in aid to a foreign country that her resources for answering purely economic threats are absorbed.

### SUBVERSION AND ECONOMIC WARFARE

Subversion and economic warfare are particularly difficult concepts to define. In general, both are nonmilitary or paramilitary conflict techniques directed against social institutions or governments, with the goals of neutralizing, disabling, or destroying the existing social order. Subversion may be coupled with internal war, in which more traditional military means of conquest are also employed. The aggression in Vietnam began as simple subversion, continued to include raids and reprisals, and finally developed into a full-scale internal war supported by both cadres and regulars infiltrated from outside. The differences between subversion and internal war are, therefore, seen to be differences of degree, not of kind.

Major characteristics of subversion and economic warfare are outlined in Table 2. It will be seen from Table 2 that a decision as to what constitutes subversion or economic warfare should probably be made on a case to case basis, with due attention to foreign interference and the probable intent of the action under study. Particularly in the case of economic warfare, what may appear to one party as a hostile act might appear to its perpetrator as merely sharp trading or "good business." Before foreign trade was more closely regulated, the United States was often accused of engaging in economic warfare because of the activities of her businessmen; in actual fact, the U. S. had no control over these activities.

Subversion, as commonly used, denotes actions fomenting unrest against established institutions; as employed in strategic analysis, there is also a strong connotation of support from outside the country, usually from one or more branches of International Communism. The term is very broad and not all "subversive" activities are necessarily disapproved of by the United States. For example, insofar as the Voice of America seeks to make the inhabitants of the Communist satellite empire unhappy with their lot, the U. S. Information Agency carries on subversive activities. Radio Free Europe, a private foundation which enjoys considerable overt U. S. approval (such as tax exempt status) openly seeks to subvert the satellites.



Table 2. Major Process Characteristics—Subversion of Economic Warfare

Subversion	Economic Warfare
<b>JCS DEFINITION</b>	
Actions by underground resistance groups of predominantly indigenous origin to reduce the military, psychological, or political potential of an enemy. As resistance groups develop strength, their actions may become overt and the status shifted to that of a guerrilla force.	The defensive use in peacetime, as well as during a war, of any means by military and civilian agencies to maintain or expand the economic potential for war of a nation and its (probable) allies, and conversely, the offensive use of any measure in peace or war to diminish or neutralize the economic potential for war of the (likely) enemy and his accomplices.
<b>ADDITIONAL DEFINITION</b>	
The neutralizing, disabling, or destroying of established social institutions; with the ultimate goal of replacing established institutions with new institutions. An intermediate goal may be the gaining of indirect control of the decision-making apparatus.	Measures of trade, aid or finance disrupting the normal operation or modifying the structure of economic processes.
<b>TARGETS</b>	
Government Social order Economy International relationships	<u>Economic activity:</u> Trade Finance Aid
<b>EXISTING CONTROLS</b>	
Limited national	Limited international
<b>TYPES</b>	
Subversion of U. S. institutions within the United States Pro-U. S. subversion within hostile territory (resistance) Pro-U. S. subversion within a third nation (counterinsurgency) Subversion within a third nation encouraged by a hostile power (insurgency)	Limited-objective System-defeating
<b>TECHNIQUES</b>	
Psychological warfare Propaganda Sabotage Civil disturbances Coordinated political, economic, and psychological pressures	<u>Mildly dislocative:</u> Trade restrictions (exchange controls, direct commercial policy measures such as tariffs or import quotas) Moderate foreign aid International cartels <u>Seriously dislocative:</u> Dumping Boycott Nationalization of industry



Table 2. Major Process Characteristics—Subversion of Economic Warfare (Cont)

Subversion	Economic Warfare
TECHNIQUES (Continued)	
	Seriously dislocative; (con't) Massive foreign aid Blockade Quarantine Cutting of pipelines
COUNTERMEASURES	
<u>Education:</u> Informing citizenry Altering emotional and intellectual attitudes Improvement of techniques to distinguish subversion from growth in early stages Formulation of improved political methods to meet political problems Institution of international regulative mechanisms	Imposition of an economic burden or cost on the adversary Denial of the availability of needed resources Prevention of the transportation of needed resources Prevention of the use of conventional means of payment

Subversion has been described as "boring from within." It is an internally applied, although not necessarily internally generated, technique of nonmilitary conflict. Subversion is a technique particularly suited to the Communists, in that it is most successful against democratic governments, and least successful against police states. It is also often the only technique which the Communists can employ, as the West usually stands ready to counter overt invasion and other open forms of conquest.

#### Role in Modern World Conflict

As noted in other parts of this study, the arms race and modern weapons in general have tended to produce a state in which open conflict is unusual; furthermore, the balance of military power in all forms of war short of the ultimate thermonuclear exchange is such that the United States and her allies clearly would win any war which was considered important enough to warrant full mobilization of the resources of the West. More importantly, open warfare tends to remove all doubt and unite the West against the common enemy. Consequently, International Communism has attempted to disguise its expansionist designs through the use of subversion, economic warfare, and internal war. In his famous "secret speech," Khrushchev declared that "a Wars of National Liberation" were "sacred," "holy wars" which would enjoy the full support of the Communist Party of the USSR. There is no evidence to indicate that Khrushchev's successors have abandoned this view.

The nature of Communism is such that it thrives on discord and disorder. Consequently, subversion and economic warfare are techniques which



suit the objectives of Communism far better than they do those of the West. The Communists may always hope that people will become so disaffected with disorder that they will welcome any government, no matter how brutal, which can restore civil regularity. The Free World is forced to work through established institutions, fully recognizing that self government and freedom must evolve, rather than be imposed from without. When the West does make use of autocratic regimes, which it occasionally must in order to preserve order, it is immediately charged with violating its own rules; the Communists, of course, suffer from no such restrictions.

Consequently, International Communism often makes relatively small investments of resources in the hopes of creating chaos in areas of opportunity. This effort does not usually pay, but on infrequent occasions there is a very high gain, as, for example, in Cuba. Usually, however, subversion has fewer ideological implications than might appear at first glance. In particular, subversive activities by noncommunist countries, such as the activities by certain African nations, are better understood as weapons in national warfare than as genuine crusades in pursuit of causes. As such, their intensity and focus may be expected to follow lines dictated by balance of power politics. However, even nonideological practitioners of subversive warfare are not above seizing opportunities of the moment when they arise.

In the classical terms of international politics, the United States and Western Europe are status quo powers, while the Communists and not a few of the "new nations" are imperialist.<sup>1</sup> Western nations, attempting to preserve stability and order in the world, are often forced to oppose subversive activities in areas where they would normally have no national interests. Thus, in this form of conflict, the West can almost never seize the initiative, and must stand ready to oppose the enemies of order in surprising and unexpected areas. It is very definitely not in the interests of the West to conclude agreements which compromise the capability of the United States to counter subversion and economic warfare.

For these reasons, the assumptions of the process of subversion and economic warfare existing side by side with an extensive arms control arrangement is, perhaps, artificial even in the context of a purely analytical construct; however, there is merit in exploring the dynamics of these non-military modes of conflict in relation to limited arms control arrangements, such as those relating to big-power special weapons like nuclear warheads. There also should be sensitivity to these considerations in the process of framing treaty language and the provision of escape features in the agreement.

<sup>1</sup>See Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations. Alfred A. Knopf (1963). Imperialist nations seek to upset the current division of power and resources.



### Mode of Application

Targets of subversion include the government, the social order, the economy, and international relationships. Techniques employed include psychological warfare, propaganda, sabotage, and civil disturbances.

Subversion is characterized by concealment, gradualness, and lack of international controls. Because it is a hidden process that takes place over a long period, subversion is often difficult to identify. Subversion also may be hard to identify because some types of internal change that tend to subvert existing institutions may be healthy and desirable, as when directed against corrupt governments or practices. Institutions are always subject to change. Usually there is a need for them to change, to meet the changing requirements of the societies they serve. Therefore, a movement toward change may not necessarily be undesirable. The problem of confusing subversion with normal growth is very real. On the other hand, the substitution of anarchy, even for corrupt government, is unlikely to be in the best interest of the United States.

Possibilities for economic warfare are as broad as the entire field of economic activity. Economic warfare may take place in any or all of the areas of trade, finance, or aid. Economic warfare measures may be classified as (1) measures having a limited objective or set of objectives, and (2) measures aiming at the defeat of a certain type of economic system.

The limited-objective-type economic war is classical economic warfare, consisting of short-range provocative or retaliatory measures disrupting normal international economic activity and instituted for economic or political reasons. Examples are boycotts, quarantines, dumping, and the cutting of pipelines. This type of economic warfare is overt, relatively short-range, and is regulated to some degree by international controls. The use of some types of limited-objective economic warfare as sanctions is covered by customary international law.

System-defeating economic warfare entails the use of medium-to-long-range measures designed to effect more or less permanent changes in the structure of international economic relationships, for the purpose of inhibiting the operation of some type of economic system (e. g., laissez-faire trade, capitalism, socialism). Examples are trade restrictions, such as exchange controls; tariffs or import quotas; foreign aid; international cartels; nationalized industry; and interference with sources of materials.

Economic warfare measures of the classical type are usually less damaging to a mature, diversified economy than to a less developed economy that relies on a single commodity or on a limited group of products. The American boycott of Cuba, coupled with the 1964 crash of world sugar prices,



resulted in severe problems for the Cuban economy, for instance. However, economic warfare measures may have little or no effect on a subsistence level economy.

### Countermeasures

Insurgency and counterinsurgency require the ability on the part of the U. S. to meet political problems with political remedies, as well as with military force. The ultimate remedy is the altering of emotional and intellectual attitudes, which is, of course, a long-range education problem. Awareness of each society's right to determine its own destiny depends upon genuine universal acceptance of the fact that there is room in the world for many different approaches to problems of social organization and action, and that some other social system does not constitute a threat solely because it is not identical to one's own. The U.S.'s stated desire to make the world "safe for diversity" is a strong and appealing basis for policy.

At the same time, education, aid, and other "peaceful" countermeasures to subversion are of no use if the enemy is allowed to employ terror tactics, unopposed. Hitler used to say that "the noblest of spirits may be eliminated if their bearer is beaten to death with a rubber truncheon." The Communists have learned this technique well. The most successful U.S. education efforts are simply countered if the students are beheaded by terrorists. In Vietnam, for example, hundreds of freely elected village officials have been assassinated by the Viet Cong; no education technique can succeed if the population cannot be protected from these tactics. The United States must stand ready to introduce sufficient military forces to restore order, even though she must also recognize that, by its very nature, the military cannot provide the ultimate solution to subversion. The primary requirement is for sufficient resources to preserve order and protect U.S. AID and Peace Corps officials.

Intermediate-range measures to meet the challenge of subversion include improvement of techniques to distinguish subversion from growth in early stages and the formulation of improved political methods for meeting political problems. The institution of some international regulative agencies to assist in control of subversion may also be a useful countermeasure.

Aid is a principal tool of economic diplomacy for both the Western nations and for the Communist states. To date, Western aid programs have involved much larger sums than Communist programs. Between the end of World War II and March 31, 1962, U.S. aid expenditures totaled \$84.1 billion, about two-thirds of it in the form of economic assistance and most of the remainder in the form of military assistance. The purpose of this aid has been to help rebuild strong national economies in Western Europe and Japan and to strengthen the economies in some of the less developed countries. Soviet aid by the end of June 1962, comprised 78 percent of the total



extended by the Communist bloc, and totaled \$5.6 billion in credits and grants to 25 less developed countries on four continents. Economic credits accounted for about \$3.6 billion and military credits for about \$2 billion. Table 3 shows the economic credits and grants extended by the Soviet Union to underdeveloped countries in the period January 1954 to June 1962.

Table 3. Economic Credits and Grants Extended by U. S. S. R.  
to Underdeveloped Countries -- January 1954 to June 1962  
(Million U. S. dollars)<sup>1</sup>

Latin America	
Argentina	100
Cuba	300
Total	400
Middle East	
Iraq	180
Syrian Arab Republic	150
Turkey	10
United Arab Republic	510
Yemen	25
Total	875
Africa	
Ethiopia	100
Ghana	95
Guinea	65
Mali	50
Somali Republic	55
Sudan	25
Tunisia	30
Total	420
Asia	
Afghanistan	505
Burma	10
Cambodia	5
Ceylon	30
India	810
Indonesia	370
Nepal	10
Pakistan	35
Total	1,775
Europe	
Iceland	5
Yugoslavia	75
Total	80
TOTAL	3,550

<sup>1</sup>Thunberg, Penelope Hartland, "The Soviet Union in the World Economy," in United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee. Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power. 87th Congress, 2nd Session (1962), pp. 409-438.



Once identified, the process of response to the economic threat can be more direct than in the case of subversion. The objectives of economic countermeasures include: (1) imposing an economic burden or cost on the adversary; (2) denial of needed resources; (3) preventing the transport of needed resources; and (4) preventing the use of conventional means of payment.

#### Effectiveness of Economic Warfare

Table 4 shows the relative economic strengths of the Western and Communist blocs. It is unrealistic to expect that the Communist bloc will neglect the sphere of economic relations. As Table 3 reveals their inferiority to the West in any open economic conflict, it, at the same time points up a paradoxical source of strength: how can pressure be brought to bear against an economy that is already acclimatized to backwardness?

#### Summary

The Soviet Union is in no position to wage successful economic warfare against the U. S. because of the overwhelming U. S. material superiority in agriculture and industrial capacity. An agreement to reduce world defense commitments could increase the Soviet rate of economic growth and pose a distant future threat; however, the time encompassed by this process would offer all signatories many opportunities for reassessment of their interests in the light of changing circumstances. Economic warfare has proven to be a relatively short-range tactic, easily countermeasured by an adversary with adequate resources.

Subversion and internal war are far more serious threats. Furthermore, as military capabilities are reduced by arms control agreements, the importance of "Wars of National Liberation" is greatly increased. The United States has a far higher regard for the lives of her citizens than do the Communist nations, and therefore prefers to counter insurgency and internal war with sophisticated weapons. Restrictions on the weapons which may be used to counter Communist expansionism will inevitably force the United States to utilize her citizens; and this, in turn, naturally aids the efforts of those who oppose U. S. commitments abroad to undermine U. S. determination. Any arms control agreement which restricts the United States in her means of resisting subversion must therefore be examined with particular care.



Table 4. The Communist Bloc and The West in The World  
Economy, 1961<sup>1</sup>

Indicator	Unit	Communist Bloc*	West†	Rest of World	Total World
POPULATION	Million	1,047	559	1,455	3,061
	Percent	34.2	18.3	47.5	100.0
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT†	Billion dollars	418	982	**	**
	Percent	**	**	**	**
ENERGY CONSUMPTION**	Million metric tons (HCE)	1,391	2,642	547	4,562
	Percent	30.5	57.5	12.0	100.0
EXPORTS	Billion dollars	16.1	81.4	36.3	133.8
	Percent	12.0	60.9	27.1	100.0
IMPORTS	Billion dollars	16.3	80.9	42.7	139.9
	Percent	11.7	57.8	30.5	100.0
ELECTRIC POWER	Billion kilo-watt-hours	512	1,574	349	2,435
COAL**	Million metric tons (HCE)	1,113	874	233	2,220
	Percent	50.1	39.4	10.5	100.0
CRUDE STEEL	Million metric tons	110	203	42	355
	Percent	31.0	57.2	11.8	100.0
CRUDE PETROLEUM	Million metric tons	186	401	534	1,120
	Percent	16.5	35.8	47.7	100.0
PRIMARY ALUMINUM	Thousand metric tons	1,065	3,262	258	4,575
	Percent	23.3	71.1	5.6	100.0
PASSENGER CARS	Thousands	291	10,511	519	11,321
	Percent	2.6	92.8	4.6	100.0
COMMERCIAL VEHICLES	Thousands	494	2,401	740	3,635
	Percent	13.6	66.0	20.4	100.0
* U. S. S. R., East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Communist China, North Korea, North Viet-Nam, and Outer Mongolia † United States, Canada, and Western Europe ‡ Converter at purchasing power equivalents ** Not available †† For 1960; hard coal, lignite, coke, peat, petroleum, natural gas and hydropower in terms of hard coal equivalents ‡‡ Hard coal and lignite in terms of hard coal equivalents					

<sup>1</sup>Herman, Leon M. "The Political Goals of Soviet Foreign Aid," in United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee. Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power. 87th Congress, 2nd Session (1962), pp. 475-495.



## CHALLENGE TO WORLD MARKET POSITION

Depending upon the degree of arms reduction associated with particular agreements, significant realignment of world trade dynamics would be expected in a post-arms control environment. Principal modes through which change would be effected are as follows:

1. Direct reduction of traffic in war material, as a function of levels prescribed in the agreement.
2. Reduction of corollary industries linked to arms traffic (communications, heavy maritime shipping, military personnel and dependents logistics, etc.).
3. Alteration of formal political arrangements constraining East-West trade, with corresponding revision of seller and consumer attitudes toward "trading with the enemy."
4. Enlargement of the concept of contraband.
5. Reduction of informal restraints upon competition derived from allegiances to allies.
6. Improvement or cancellation of U. S. balance of payments deficit.
7. Price changes of raw materials and finished products resulting from production capacity released through the reduction in arms manufacture.
8. Shift of East-West balance of power emphasis to the economic arena

A complete economic model of the post-arms control situation would include the interactions of these and other factors making up the world-trade picture. The question as to who would gain or lose by the challenge of world market competition has both cyclical and secular aspects. Losers during the early period of adjustment may emerge as long-term winners. On the other hand, this is not a zero-sum game; each one can be both loser and winner simultaneously. Established economic growth indexes, coupled with a likely "take-off" by undeveloped nations, would appear to favor a gain for all, independent of any arms control arrangements. Uncertainty will continue about roles to be assigned public and private sectors during this take-off, with corresponding uncertainty about expropriation policy. Official programs by governments, to guarantee private investment in undeveloped countries, are likely to become integral factors in the competition for markets. This would tend to more closely link the government, including the military, and industry.



Results of a preliminary survey of major factors bearing upon U.S. responsiveness to the challenge of the post-arms control economic environment are presented in the following text.

#### The United States in International Trade

In 1961, U.S. exports were valued at more than \$20 billion, and represented nearly 16 percent of the total world exports of \$133 billion. In the same year, U.S. imports were about 10 percent of total world imports. Table 5 shows the value of U.S. exports and imports for selected years.

Table 5. United States Exports and Imports  
(Billions of Dollars)

Year	Exports	Imports	Excess (exports over imports)
1950	10.3	8.9	1.4
1957	20.9	13.0	7.9
1959	17.6	15.2	2.4
1960	20.5	14.7	5.8
1961	21.0	14.7	6.3
1962	21.6	16.4	5.2

Table 6 indicates that a much more rapid growth of trade has been achieved by Europe than by the United States since 1950. Exports of the European Economic Community (EEC) countries increased 248 percent in that period, while U.S. exports increased 103 percent. EEC imports have increased 188 percent, and U.S. imports have increased 63 percent. Other European countries have experienced much smaller expansion of trade than have the members of the EEC.

Despite the competition for markets with Europe and Japan, the developed nations are the chief purchasers of U.S. goods. Canada and Japan, in that order, are the ranking customers for exported U.S. items.

Returns for the first few months of 1964 indicated that export expansion programs sponsored by the U.S. Government since 1962 have been very successful. Exports in the first four months of 1964 rose to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of \$24.6 billion, an increase of 17 percent over the same period in 1963. Imports reached an annual rate of \$17.8 billion in the same period, or 8 percent above 1963. The continuance of this performance through 1964 will give the United States a favorable trade balance of \$6.8 billion for the year, as compared with the 1963 excess of \$5.1 billion.



Table 6. Indexes of Industrial Production, Imports, and Exports—  
Europe and the United States (1950 and 1961)<sup>1</sup>

Country	Industrial Production Indexes (1953=100)		Imports (\$1,000,000)		Exports (\$1,000,000)	
	1950	1961	1950	1961	1950	1961
<b>EEC COUNTRIES</b>						
Belgium	93	135	161 <sup>a</sup>	347 <sup>a</sup>	137 <sup>a</sup>	326 <sup>a</sup>
France	89	175	255 <sup>b</sup>	557	255 <sup>b</sup>	602
Germany (F. R.)	72 <sup>c</sup>	190	225 <sup>b</sup>	912	165 <sup>b</sup>	1,057
Italy	78	200	120	438	100	351
Luxembourg	89	142	a	a	a	a
Netherlands	88	159	170	426	116	359
<b>Total</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>182</b>	<b>930</b>	<b>2,580</b>	<b>773</b>	<b>2,695</b>
<b>OTHER EUROPE</b>						
Austria	86	187 <sup>d</sup>	40	124	27	100
Denmark	98	e	71	155 <sup>e</sup>	54	126 <sup>e</sup>
Greece	77	194	36	60	8	19
Iceland	f	f	38	68	28	65
Ireland	91	141	37 <sup>h</sup>	61 <sup>h</sup>	17 <sup>h</sup>	42 <sup>h</sup>
Norway	88	161	56	135 <sup>e</sup>	32	77 <sup>e</sup>
Portugal	f	186	23	54	15	28
Spain	f	f	33	91	34	59
Sweden	95	142	98	243 <sup>e</sup>	92	228 <sup>e</sup>
Switzerland	f	f	87	225	75	170
Turkey	77	f	24	42	22	29
United Kingdom	64	130 <sup>i</sup>	607 <sup>jk</sup>	1,026	526 <sup>j</sup>	896 <sup>jk</sup>
Yugoslavia	94	264	20	76	13	47
<b>UNITED STATES</b>	<b>82<sup>l</sup></b>	<b>120<sup>l</sup></b>	<b>729<sup>m</sup></b>	<b>1,196<sup>m</sup></b>	<b>845</b>	<b>1,720</b>
a - Luxembourg included with Belgium b - Through June 1959, data for Germany exclude, and data for France include, the Saar c - Excludes the Saar and W. Berlin d - 1956 = 100 e - General trade f - Not available g - Special trade, including imports into and reexports from, "credit" warehouses h - General imports and domestic exports plus reexports i - 1958 = 100 j - General imports, and exports of produce and manufactures plus reexports k - Includes the Channel Islands l - Excludes Alaska and Hawaii m - Imports are valued f. o. b.						

<sup>1</sup>Statistical Abstract of the United States 1963, 84th Annual Edition, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office (1963), p. 916.



Obviously, U.S. concern with expanding the volume of its export trade does not result from an unfavorable trading position but from other factors. These factors include persistent balance of payments difficulties and the slow growth of exports in relation to gross national product.

Despite its favorable trade balance, the U.S. had an unfavorable balance of payments for many years. Items in the U.S. balance of international payments that have not been offset by the trade surplus include the cost of maintaining troops overseas, foreign aid, investments in other countries, and money spent on travel. Payments for these items have accounted for balance of payments deficits of approximately \$3 billion per year during the past several years and have resulted in the gold drain. The expansion of exports is one means of offsetting this deficit.

Although U.S. exports are more than 15 percent of total world exports, this constitutes only about 4 percent of the U.S. gross national product. In contrast, Germany exports 16 percent of its gross national product, Italy 10 percent, Japan 9 percent, Sweden 19 percent, Switzerland 22 percent, and the Netherlands 35 percent. In addition to being a small percent of gross national product, U.S. exports have shown a long-term decline in relation to that indicator.

In view of the balance of payments problems and the failure of trade to keep pace with overall economic growth, the U.S. has sought to retain and to expand its markets.

#### U.S. Legislation Affecting the Trade Challenge

The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 authorized the reduction of existing tariffs by up to 50 percent of the existing levels by Executive Agreement, and incorporated the principle of unconditional most-favored-nation treatment. Under the act and its extensions, the general tariff level was reduced by 60 percent, and exports expanded from \$2 billion to \$20 billion. The U.S. became a party to the multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (GATT), which provided that tariff concessions made in bilateral agreements between GATT parties would extend automatically to every other GATT party, and which has resulted in world-wide reduction of tariff levels and expansion of trade.

With the development of European trading communities, since the late 1950's, the U.S. began to experience severe competition in selling in European markets. The EEC was established in 1958 by France, West Germany, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy. The EEC aims at



complete elimination of all tariffs between members and at the establishment of a common external tariff. The European Free Trade Association, (EFTA) was formed in 1960 by the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, and Portugal. EFTA members have progressively lowered tariffs among themselves while maintaining existing tariffs against outsiders.

The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, a bill "to promote the general welfare, foreign policy and security of the United States through international trade agreements and through adjustment assistance. . ." was designed to meet the problems presented by balance of payments deficits and by increasing competition from European producers.

The Trade Expansion Act gave the U.S. greater flexibility in negotiating with trade associations, particularly the EEC, than did the old Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. The Trade Expansion Act permitted the reduction of tariffs by 50 percent over a 5-year period, on an industry rather than an individual items basis; allowed the elimination or reduction of all tariffs on products where the U.S. and the EEC accounted for 80 percent or more of world trade; and authorized compensations to U.S. industries adjusting to import competition.

#### Soviet Economic Competition

Competition in international trade from the Soviet Union has been of great concern to the United States. Table 7 compares U.S., Soviet, and total world trade, by country. It will be noted that U.S.S.R. exports are about one-fourth those of the U.S. and that U.S.S.R. imports are about one-third those of the U.S. The U.S.S.R. has a negligible trade surplus. Soviet trade with Communist European and Asian countries far exceeds U.S. trade with those countries, while U.S. trade with free developed and less developed countries significantly exceeds that of the U.S.S.R.

In recent years, the volume of Soviet foreign trade has grown more rapidly than either Soviet production or total world trade. Although still of minor significance in total world exports, Soviet exports increased from 3 percent to 5 percent of the total between 1950 and 1960. Since 1955, the average annual growth rate of Soviet commodity trade has been about 11 percent, outstripping the average annual growth rates of either gross national product or industrial production.

Fear of Soviet penetration of markets is due more to political propaganda than to economic fact. The U.S.S.R. lags far behind the U.S. in its share of world markets. Several features of the Soviet economy make the U.S.S.R. an inefficient participant in international commerce. The Soviet economy is centrally planned and foreign trade is a state monopoly.



Table 7. Imports and Exports by Country of Origin and Destination  
(Millions of Dollars)<sup>1</sup>

Factor	Imports			Exports		
	World Total	U. S. 1960	U. S. S. R. 1960	World Total	U. S. 1960	U. S. S. R. 1961
WORLD TOTAL	140,200	14,702	5,832	133,400	20,755	5,998
U. S.		---	50.7		---	24.3
U. S. S. R.		22.7	---		42.7	---
COMMUNIST BLOC, EUROPE		57.5	3,066.0		87.8	3,420.1
Albania	*	†	21.8	*	---	20.3
Bulgaria	666	†	326.1	661	†	356.2
Hungary	1,026	1.8	326.8	1,029	1.4	359.3
East Germany	*	3.2	875.9	*	2.8	1,209.1
Poland	1,687	38.8	476.9	1,504	74.8	530.7
Rumania	815	1.5	340.8	793	1.4	291.8
Czechoslovakia	2,024	12.2	697.7	2,046	7.4	652.7
COMMUNIST BLOC, ASIA		†	714.4		†	578.0
Communist China	*	†	551.4	*	†	367.3
North Vietnam	*	*	25.7	*	*	41.3
North Korea	*	†	79.1	*	---	77.0
Outer Mongolia	*	†	58.2	*	†	92.4
FREE DEVELOPED NATIONS			1,092.3			1,058.9
Austria	1,485	49.3	76.7	1,202	58.6	45.2
United Kingdom	11,864	992.7	128.2	10,308	1,130.1	226.8
Belgium	4,219	363.5	33.9	3,924	420.4	33.7
Netherlands	5,112	213.0	29.0	4,307	697.2	46.9
Denmark	1,873	98.3	5.3	1,537	111.2	23.3
Italy	5,222	393.1	98.0	4,168	794.1	130.2
Norway	1,616	86.5	16.3	931	91.7	18.4
West Germany	10,941	897.2	179.3	12,687	1,073.4	118.8
Finland	1,153	52.3	145.8	1,064	36.1	136.9
France	6,678	396.1	120.4	7,210	544.8	79.4
Switzerland	2,707	198.0	8.9	2,041	272.0	6.2
Sweden	2,927	170.2	61.3	2,743	260.4	51.4
Japan	5,810	1,148.7	66.6	4,236	1,739.3	113.0
Australia	2,063	142.1	28.6	2,324	320.0	0.7
New Zealand	901	119.0	8.8	793	68.4	0
Canada	5,694	2,900.8	45.7	5,811	3,643.0	4.7
LESS DEVELOPED NATIONS			950.4			813.8
Greece	714	33.5	16.9	223	72.1	21.1
Iceland	78	10.5	5.5	71	13.2	9.3
Spain	1,092	87.7	2.1	710	268.9	1.9
Portugal	686	34.9	0	328	56.6	0
Yugoslavia	910	40.7	54.7	539	153.9	35.9
Afghanistan	---	19.8	19.7	---	18.4	39.4
Burma	216	1.2	2.4	220	6.9	3.9
India	2,246	228.1	66.9	1,386	482.8	95.4
Indonesia	794	216.1	33.9	784	134.0	31.3
Iraq	408	27.2	4.7	602	37.4	37.3
Iran	572	51.3	18.3	111	92.0	18.1

<sup>1</sup>Statistical Abstract of the United States 1963, 94th Annual Edition. United States Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Washington 25, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (1963), 11. 878-883 and 922-925.



Table 7. Imports and Exports by Country of Origin and Destination  
(Millions of Dollars) (Cont)

Factor	Imports			Exports		
	World Total	U. S. 1960	U. S. S. R. 1960	World Total	U. S. 1961	U. S. S. R. 1961
LESS DEVELOPED NATIONS (con't)						
Yemen	*	*	1.4	*	*	2.1
Cambodia	*	6.6	6.2	*	11.3	1.6
Cyprus	*	---	1.6	*	---	1.4
Lebanon	343	3.5	3.8	42	45.4	4.7
Malayan Federation	*	156.3	169.6	*	23.1	2.0
Pakistan	642	36.0	4.3	400	195.3	3.0
Syria	199	8.5	4.3	110	26.8	17.0
Thailand	485	55.5	9.8	477	62.6	1.7
Turkey	509	60.2	4.9	347	141.8	5.8
Ceylon	358	38.7	9.0	364	14.9	1.8
Algeria	*	1.4	0	*	42.1	1.4
Ivory Coast	*	*	0	*	*	0
Ghana	*	52.5	6.8	*	21.2	15.4
Guinea	*	*	4.2	*	*	27.2
Cameroon	*	6.1	0	*	4.2	0
Libya	*	†	0.6	*	33.7	1.4
Mali	*	*	3.8	*	*	8.6
Morocco	*	10.5	5.2	*	66.0	3.3
Nigeria	*	39.9	0.1	*	26.8	0
United Arab Republic	678	31.6	96.2	485	162.7	108.7
Federation of Rhodesia	*	16.4	13.2	*	13.6	0
Sudan	*	5.4	10.4	*	11.6	9.3
Togoland	*	*	0	*	*	0.1
Tunisia	*	†	2.8	*	39.5	2.3
Uganda	*	*	4.1	*	*	0
Ethiopia	93	27.0	0.7	76	10.9	0.9
Union of So. Africa	1,406	108.0	0	1,393	228.4	0
Argentina	1,460	98.2	19.9	964	424.2	10.6
Brazil	1,460	570.0	24.0	1,403	494.1	18.3
Cuba	808	357.3	311.9	617	13.7	275.9
Mexico	1,139	443.3	0.3	826	813.0	0.1
Peru	468	183.2	2.4	494	173.1	0
Uruguay	208	21.0	4.1	175	48.0	0.6
* Not available						
† Less than .5 million						

Governmental control of all aspects of an economy is cumbersome and reactions to international market fluctuations are frequently slow and inappropriate. Even the once captive markets of the Satellite empire are now being penetrated by the West.

The insulation of a controlled economy from the world market and the lack of the market-price mechanism make it necessary for Communist countries to collect extensive information about world market prices. In the ministries of foreign trade of most Communist countries, there is an office that collects such price information. Once a price has been set, it remains in force for an entire year, and often for several years.



The ruble is not traded internationally, and official monetary exchange rates are established with the intention of insulating the internal economy from external influences without regard to relative price levels. In trading with western countries, the domestic equivalent of export receipts is, in most cases, considerably below the internal price of the commodity that the opposite is true of import payments. These price differentials that result in price losses on exports and profits on imports are absorbed by the national budget.

In order to gain access to western markets, the USSR has often had to lower prices below world levels to attract marginal buyers. Such bargain prices have tended to disrupt the order of the market, but are usually abandoned after Soviet sales at lower prices have attained the desired volume.

#### Summary

An arms control environment will change the pattern of prices and money flow in international commerce, depending upon the types and quantities of goods, services and material involved in the agreement. Historic trends, affecting the gross U. S. position in world markets, have been only slightly influenced since World War II by the East-West conflict, mobilization cycles, and limited war engagements. Our balance of trade remains on the plus side and any agreement which increases trade with the Soviet bloc is likely to increase this advantage. The Communist countries need industrial equipment and consumer goods, including food, that must be imported from the West.

If an agreement significantly reduces the personnel contingent of the U. S. in Europe, our balance of payments problem will be favorably affected. If an agreement, incidently, lowers commercial trade barriers with China, the positive balance would be further extended by reviving our dormant trade relations with that country (augmented by their now increased demand for heavy capital equipment). It is of interest to note that loss of this market has not deeply disturbed our basic trading position in the world.

These are qualitative generalizations that would bear further analysis in depth. A more detailed diagnosis would undertake to extrapolate the direction of the following second-order effects:

1. The rate of growth of U. S. trade in the world market, measured as a percent of GNP, has been declining. How will these parameters be influenced by variables of arms control?



2. Although Soviet participation in world trade is small, its rate of growth is high. Is this merely a perturbation, or does it represent an established trend? If the latter is true, where is the line converging to?
3. Gross participation in world trade is generally rising everywhere as a function of increased productivity although percentages of participation are changing. Who is slicing the growing pie? Are inflection points to be expected, followed by decline?



## II. ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL DOCUMENTATION

### SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

On March 15, 1962, the Soviets submitted a "Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under Strict International Control" to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva. On September 22, 1962 the Soviet delegation submitted a revised draft to the United Nations First Committee of the General Assembly.

A summary of the provisions of the Draft Treaty is presented herein, in a form which parallels the organization of the text of the Draft Treaty. The text of the Soviet proposal follows the summary.

#### SUMMARY OF THE SOVIET GCD PROPOSAL

##### PART I. General

Article 1: Disarmament Obligations: Signatories are required to carry out general and complete disarmament over a five-year period in three consecutive stages as set forth in Parts II, III, and IV of the Treaty.

Article 2: Control Obligations: An International Disarmament Organization (IDO) within the United Nations would be established which would recruit internationally from the signatory States to ensure adequate representation of the three major groups of States. The organization would exercise both temporary and permanent control over the processes and state of disarmament.

Article 3: Obligations to Maintain International Peace and Security: Signatories are obligated to support the principles of peaceful and friendly coexistence and not to resort to threat or use of force to resolve international disputes.

##### PART II. First Stage of General and Complete Disarmament

Article 4: First Stage Tasks: Disarmament measures to be undertaken are identified in the first stage of the Treaty.



**CHAPTER I. ELIMINATION OF THE MEANS OF DELIVERING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN MILITARY BASES IN ALIEN TERRITORIES, AND WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM THOSE TERRITORIES. CONTROL OVER SUCH MEASURES**

**A. Means of Delivery**

**Article 5: Elimination of Rockets Capable of Delivering Nuclear Weapons:** Included in this category are all strategic, operational, and tactical rockets as well as pilotless aircraft, except for a strictly limited number of ICBMS. All launching platforms and silos are also eliminated. It further requires the dismantling and/or conversion of all means, methods, and places of producing rockets and pilotless aircraft. The article permits retention of anti-aircraft missiles of ground-to-air category within interior zones. Inspectors from IDO would confirm the results.


**Article 6: Elimination of Military Aircraft Capable of Delivering Nuclear Weapons:** Aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons would be destroyed, and their airfields and support facilities would be rendered inoperative or converted to peaceful purposes. Inspectors from the IDO would confirm the results.

**Article 7: Elimination of All Surface Warships Capable of Being Used As Vehicles for Nuclear Weapons, and Submarines:** All surface ships and submarines capable of delivering nuclear weapons would be destroyed. The bases and support facilities would be dismantled and turned over to the merchant marine. The IDO would inspect for compliance.

**Article 8: Elimination of All Artillery Systems Capable of Serving as Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons:** All nuclear artillery systems including storage areas and depots would be destroyed along with non-nuclear munitions that could be used in such systems. Non-nuclear munition production and means of production would be discontinued. The IDO would verify implementation.

**B. Foreign Military Bases and Troops in Alien Territories**

**Article 9: Dismantling of Foreign Military Bases:** This measure would take place concurrently with destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles. Army, air force, and navy bases would be dismantled, military personnel would return to national territory, and all military equipment would be destroyed or evacuated to national territory. Basing Treaty



rights would lapse and would not be renewed. National legislature would enact legislation prohibiting the lease of national territory to a foreign power for establishment of military bases. The IDO would inspect for compliance.

**Article 10: Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from Alien Territories:** All military troops in foreign territories would return to national territory. The supporting military equipment would also be returned or destroyed pursuant to the controlled equipment provisions referenced above. IDO inspectors would verify troop withdrawals and equipment destruction and evacuation.

## **CHAPTER II. REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES, CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES. CONTROL OVER SUCH MEASURES**

**Article 11: Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments:** In the first stage the U.S. and USSR military establishments including enlisted men, officers and civilian employees would be limited to 1,900,000 people. Personnel assigned to nuclear delivery systems would be reduced first. Demobilization and evacuation of foreign bases and territories would account for some of the cutbacks. Personnel assigned to conventional military branches and systems would be reduced by 30 percent. IDO inspectors would exercise control at disbanding and reduction points.

**Article 12: Reduction of Conventional Armaments Production:** Conventional armament would be reduced proportionately (30 percent) to the reduction in armed forces as specified in Article 11.

**Article 13: Reduction of Military Expenditure:** The national military budgets and appropriations would reflect a commensurate reduction in line with Articles 5 through 12 of the Treaty. The funds released by the reduction would be used for peaceful purposes with a certain portion committed to economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. The IDO would verify the implementation of this Article.

## **CHAPTER III. MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF STATES**

**Article 14: Restriction of Displacements of the Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons:** Signatories would not place vehicles capable of delivering nuclear weapons in orbit. All other nuclear delivery systems still in existence would be confined to each State's national territory. The IDO would exercise control over compliance.



**Article 15: Control Over Launchings of Rockets for Peaceful Purposes:** The launching of all rockets and space systems would be confined to peaceful objectives. The IDO will exercise control over implementation through inspection teams at the sites.

**Article 16: Prevention of the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons:** States possessing nuclear weapons would not transfer technology or weapons to non-nuclear States. Non-nuclear States would refrain from obtaining or producing nuclear weapons.

**Article 17: Prohibition of Nuclear Tests:** Nuclear tests of all kinds would be prohibited.

**Article 17a: Measures to Reduce the Danger of Outbreak of War:** Large-scale military movements and maneuvers by two or more States is prohibited. Advanced notification of large-scale military movements and maneuvers within national boundaries must be given. Signatory States would agree to exchange military missions. Signatories also would agree to implement communication channels between heads of governments and the U.N. Secretary-General.

**Article 18: Measures to Strengthen the Capacity of the United Nations to Maintain International Peace and Security:** Subsequently to the signing of the Treaty and prior to its entrance into force, signatory state would conclude agreements with the U. N. Security Council making available to it a portion of their armed forces. These forces would remain within the national territory of each State. These forces also would comprise the forces that each State is allowed to retain under provisions of the Treaty. They would be fully equipped.

#### **CHAPTER IV. TIME-LIMITS FOR FIRST STAGE MEASURES TRANSITION FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND STAGE**

**Article 19: Time-limits for First-Stage Measures:** The Stage I reduction would begin six months after the Treaty comes into force. The IDO would be established during this period. Duration of the Stage I would be 18 months.

**Article 20: Transition from the First to the Second Stage:** During the last three months of the Stage I the IDO would review all implementation and submit reports on the progress to all signatory States, the Security Council and General Assembly of the U. N.



### PART III. Second Stage of General and Complete Disarmament

**Article 21: Second Stage Tasks:** The disarmament measures to be undertaken in this Stage of the Treaty are identified.

#### **CHAPTER V. ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. CONTROL OVER SUCH MEASURES**

**Article 22: Elimination of Nuclear Weapons:** Nuclear weapons of all kinds would be destroyed and production discontinued. All depots and storage areas would be destroyed. Fissionable material along with plants and laboratories used in its production would be converted to peaceful purposes. These measures would be implemented under the control of IDO inspectors.

**Article 23: Elimination of Chemical, Biological and Radiological Weapons:** All chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, plants, production lines, storage areas, and transportation means would be destroyed.

#### **CHAPTER Va. THE DESTRUCTION OF ROCKETS CAPABLE OF DELIVERING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH WERE RETAINED AFTER THE FIRST STAGE.**

**Article 23a: Destruction of Missiles:** The ICBM and antimissile missiles and antiaircraft missiles of the ground-to-air category retained under Article 5 of this Treaty would be destroyed. Launching facilities and guidance systems would also be destroyed. IDO inspectors would verify results.

#### **CHAPTER VI. FURTHER REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES, CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES. CONTROL OVER SUCH MEASURES**

**Article 24: Further Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments:** The U.S. and USSR military establishments would be limited to 1,000,000 enlisted men, officers, and civilian employees. Force levels for other signatory States would also be specified. The first cutbacks would be personnel manning nuclear weapons. Complete conventional units and ships crews would be demobilized. Total conventional force reduction would amount to 35 percent of original force levels. IDO would exercise control for these measures.



**Article 25: Further Reduction of Conventional Armaments Production:** A proportionate reduction (35 percent) would be made in conventional armament production to reflect the cutbacks made under Article 24. IDO inspectors would exercise control at places of troop disbandment and demobilization.

**Article 26: Further Reduction of Military Expenditures:** Signatory States would reduce military budget and appropriation in line with the reductions made in Articles 22 through 25. Funds thus released would be used to lower taxes, subsidize the economy and assist under-developed countries. Financial inspectors from IDO would be granted free access to records.

#### **CHAPTER VII. MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF STATES**

**Article 27: Continued Strengthening of the Capacity of the United Nations to Maintain International Peace and Security:** Signatory States would continue to implement Article 18 of the Treaty.

#### **CHAPTER VIII. TIME-LIMITS FOR SECOND-STAGE MEASURES TRANSITION FROM THE SECOND TO THE THIRD STAGE**

**Article 28: Time-Limits for Second Stage Measures:** The duration period of the second stage would be 24 months.

**Article 29: Transition from the Second to the Third Stage:** During the last three months of Stage II the IDO would review the Stage II implementation measures. Transition from the second to the third stage would be comparable to transitions presented in Article 20 for the Treaty.

#### **PART IV. Third Stage of General and Complete Disarmament**

**Article 30: Third Stage Tasks:** Signatory States would agree to complete the disbanding of their armed forces in this stage.

#### **CHAPTER IX. COMPLETION OF THE ELIMINATION OF THE MILITARY MACHINERY OF STATES CONTROL OVER SUCH MEASURES**

**Article 31: Completion of the Elimination of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments:** The entire personnel of the armed forces, including those in reserve units, would be disbanded. All military armament and munitions would be destroyed. Military equipment which could not be converted to peaceful purposes would be destroyed. IDO inspectors would exercise control over troop demobilization centers and armament destruction sites.

**Article 32: Complete Cessation of Military Productions: Factories and production plants of military armaments would be converted to peaceful purposes. All specialized military production tools and blueprints would be destroyed. Exceptions to above measures would be the light firearms production referred to in Article 36. All military production requests of national and foreign powers and private industry would be cancelled.**

**Article 33: Abolition of Military Establishments: Departments of war and their ministries, general staffs and other military and paramilitary forces and institutions would be abolished. Inspectors from IDO will exercise control over the entire process.**

**Article 34: Abolition of Military Conscription and Military Training: The national legislatures would initiate legislation prohibiting military training and military conscription. Institutions and organizations dealing with military training would also be disbanded.**

**Article 35: Prohibition of the Appropriation of Funds for Military Purposes: Appropriations in any form for military purposes by either government bodies or private citizens would be discontinued. Funds thus released would be used for peaceful purposes: lower taxation, subsidization of the economy, and international assistance. To control this measure IDO inspectors would have access to budgetary and legislative documents.**

#### **CHAPTER X. MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF STATES AND TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

**Article 36: Contingents of Police (Militia): Signatory States would be allowed to maintain police forces (militia) and to equip them with light firearms. The force levels for these contingents of militia would be specified for each State. The States would also be able to manufacture light firearms to equip the forces to maintain peace and security. IDO inspectors would supervise compliance with these measures.**

**Article 37: Police (Militia) Units to be Made Available to the Security Council: Units from the internal militia would be available to the Security Council upon its request. This transfer of needed facilities and right of passage would be extended to the Security Council. Military forces would be maintained by the States in a high state of readiness. The size of the militia force, location, and facilities would be specified in an agreement with the Security Council.**



Article 38: Control over the Prevention of the Reestablishment of Armed Forces: IDO inspectors would verify strength, location, and armaments of militia force. IDO inspectors would have the right of free access within territories of signatory States. The IDO would have the right to employ aerial inspection and aerial photography.

#### CHAPTER XI. TIME-LIMITS FOR THIRD-STAGE MEASURES

Article 39: Time-Limits: This stage would be completed over a period of one year. During the last three months, IDO would inspect for compliance and submit reports of findings to all signatory States U.N. Security Council and U.N. General Assembly.

#### PART V. Structure and Functions of the International Disarmament Organization

Article 40: Functions and Main Bodies: The IDO would consist of a Conference of all signatory States and a Control Council. The IDO would be responsible for supervising compliance by States with obligations of the Treaty. The U.N. Security Council would deal with all questions regarding safeguards and security in implementing the Treaty.

Article 41: The Conference: The Conference would consist of all signatory States. Regular sessions would be held at least once a year. Special sessions would be called by the Control Council. Each State would have one vote. Simple majority would be needed to pass procedural matters. Two-thirds majority would be needed for all other questions. The Conference would discuss implementation of the Treaty and make recommendations to the Council.

Article 42: The Control Council: The Council would consist of five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Other States could be elected for two year periods. Proper representation of the three principal groups of States must be maintained. Each member would have one vote. Passage of measures would be the same as for the Conference. The Council would submit a budget to the Conference, implement the Treaty, study IDO reports, request additional information on armament from member States, and perform other necessary functions. The Council would meet continuously.



Article 43: Privileges and Immunities: The IDO personnel would be extended privileges and immunities within the territory of member States as is necessary to control the implementation of the Treaty.

Article 44: Finances: The IDO expenses would be provided by the signatory States according to a predetermined scale. The budget of the IDO would be drafted by the Control Council and approved by the Conference.

Article 45: Preparatory Commission: The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee would, upon the completion of signing of the Treaty, establish a Preparatory Commission to establish the IDO.

#### PART VI. Final Clauses

Article 46: Ratification and Entry into Force: Ratification of the Treaty by regular constitutional procedures of each State would be completed within six months from the date of signing. It would enter into force when the five permanent members of the Security Council have deposited instruments of ratification with the U.N. Secretariat.

Article 47: Amendments: Proposals for amendments would enter into force when adopted by two-thirds majority of the member States meeting in conference and ratified by all the States as discussed in Article 46 of this Treaty.

Article 48: Authentic Texts: The Treaty is prepared in Russian, English, French, Chinese, and Spanish languages. All texts would be equally authentic and would be deposited with the U.N. Secretariat, and would be transmitted to the signatory States.

#### TEXT OF THE SOVIET GCD PROPOSAL

Revised Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under  
Strict International Control, September 22, 1962

#### PREAMBLE

The States of the World,  
Acting in accordance with the aspirations and will of the peoples,  
Convinced that war cannot and must not serve as a method for settling international disputes, especially in the present circumstances of the precipitate development of means of mass annihilation such as nuclear weapons and rocket devices for their delivery, but must forever be banished from the life of human society,



Fulfilling the historic mission of saving all the nations from the horrors of war,

Basing themselves on the fact that general and complete disarmament under strict international control is a sure and practical way to fulfill mankind's age-old dream of ensuring perpetual and inviolable peace on earth,

Desirous of putting an end to the senseless waste of human labour on the creation of the means of annihilating human beings and of destroying material values,

Seeking to direct all resources towards ensuring a further increase in prosperity and socio-economic progress in all countries in the world,

Conscious of the need to build relations among States on the basis of the principles of peace, good neighbourliness, equality of States and peoples, non-interference and respect for the independence and sovereignty of all countries,

Reaffirming their dedication to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty and to implement forthwith general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

## PART I. General

### Article 1

#### Disarmament Obligations

The States parties to the present Treaty solemnly undertake:

1. To carry out, over a period of five years, general and complete disarmament entailing:

The disbanding of all armed forces and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever;

The prohibition and destruction of all stockpiles and the cessation of the production of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, biological and radiological weapons;

The destruction and cessation of the production of all means of delivering weapons of mass destruction to their targets;

The dismantling of all kinds of foreign military bases and the withdrawal and disbanding of all foreign troops stationed in the territory of any State;

The abolition of any kind of military conscription for citizens;

The cessation of military training of the population and the closing of all military training institutions;



The abolition of war ministries, general staffs and their local agencies, and all other military and paramilitary establishments and organizations;

The elimination of all types of conventional armaments and military equipment and the cessation of their production, except for the production of strictly limited quantities of agreed types of light firearms for the equipment of the police (militia) contingents to be retained by States after the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament;

The discontinuance of the appropriation of funds for military purposes, whether from State budgets or by organization or private individuals.

2. To retain at their disposal, upon completion of general and complete disarmament, only strictly limited contingents of police (militia) equipped with light firearms and intended for the maintenance of internal order and for the discharge of their obligations with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter and under the provisions of article 37 of the present Treaty.

3. To carry out general and complete disarmament simultaneously in three consecutive stages, as set forth in parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty. Transition to a subsequent stage of disarmament shall take place after adoption by the International Disarmament Organization of a decision confirming that all disarmament measures of the preceding stage have been carried out and verified and that any additional verification measures recognized to be necessary for the next stage have been prepared and can be put into operation when appropriate.

4. To carry out all measures of general and complete disarmament in such a way that at no stage of disarmament any State or group of States gains any military advantage and that the security of all States parties to the Treaty is equally safeguarded.

## Article 2

### Control Obligations

1. The States parties to the Treaty solemnly undertake to carry out all disarmament measures, from beginning to end, under strict international control and to ensure the implementation in their territories of all control measures set forth in parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty.

2. Each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure.

3. To implement control over disarmament, an International Disarmament Organization composed of all States parties to the Treaty shall be established



within the framework of the United Nations. It shall begin operating as soon as disarmament measures are initiated. The structure and functions of the International Disarmament Organization and its bodies are laid down in part V of the present Treaty.

4. In all States parties to the Treaty the International Disarmament Organization shall have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way as to ensure the adequate representation of all three groups of States existing in the world.

This staff shall exercise control on a temporary or permanent basis, depending on the nature of the measure being carried out, over the compliance by States with their obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and the production of armaments and to reduce or disband their armed forces.

5. The States parties to the Treaty shall submit to the International Disarmament Organization in good time such information on their armed forces, armaments, military production and military appropriations as is necessary for the purpose of carrying out the measures of the stage concerned.

6. Upon completion of the programme of general and complete disarmament, the International Disarmament Organization shall be kept in being and shall exercise supervision over the fulfilment by States of the obligations they have assumed so as to prevent the re-establishment of the military potential of States in any form whatsoever.

### Article 3

#### Obligations to Maintain International Peace and Security

1. The States parties to the Treaty solemnly confirm their resolve in the course of and after general and complete disarmament:

(a) to base relations with each other on the principles of peaceful and friendly coexistence and co-operation;

(b) not to resort to the threat or use of force to settle any international disputes that may arise, but to use for this purpose the procedures provided for in the United Nations Charter;

(c) to strengthen the United Nations as the principal institution for the maintenance of peace and for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

2. The States parties to the Treaty undertake to refrain from using the contingents of police (militia) remaining at their disposal upon completion of general and complete disarmament for any purpose other than the safeguardi



of their internal security or the discharge of their obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

## PART II. First Stage of General and Complete Disarmament

### Article 4

#### First Stage Tasks

The States Parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the first stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the simultaneous elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and of all foreign military bases in alien territories, to withdraw all foreign troops from these territories and to reduce their armed forces, their conventional armaments and production of such armaments, and their military expenditure.

### CHAPTER I

#### Elimination of the Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Military Bases in Alien Territories, and Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from those Territories. Control over Such Measures

##### A. Means of Delivery

### Article 5

#### Elimination of Rockets Capable of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. All rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons of any calibre and range, whether strategic, operational or tactical, and pilotless aircraft of all types shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed, except for an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category, to be retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, exclusively in their own territory, until the end of the second stage. A strictly limited number of rockets to be converted to peaceful uses under the provisions of article 15 of the present Treaty shall also be retained.

All launching pads, silos and platforms for the launching of rockets and pilotless aircraft, other than those required for the missiles to be retained under the provision of this article, shall be completely demolished. All instruments for the equipment, launching and guidance of rockets and pilotless aircraft shall be destroyed. All underground depots for such rockets, pilotless aircraft and auxiliary facilities shall be demolished.



2. The production of all kinds of rockets and pilotless aircraft and of the materials and instruments for their equipment, launching and guidance referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. All undertakings or workshops thereof engaged in their production shall be dismantled; machine tools and equipment specially and exclusively designed for the production of such items shall be destroyed; the premises of such undertakings as well as general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. All proving grounds for tests of such rockets and pilotless aircraft shall be demolished.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

4. The production and testing of appropriate rockets for the peaceful exploration of space shall be allowed, provided that the plants producing such rockets, as well as the rockets themselves, will be subject to supervision by the inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

#### Article 6

##### Elimination of Military Aircraft Capable of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. All military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Military airfields serving as bases for such aircraft and repair and maintenance facilities and storage premises at such airfields shall be rendered inoperative or converted to peaceful uses. Training establishments for crews of such aircraft shall be closed.

2. The production of all military aircraft referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. Undertakings or workshops thereof designed for the production of such military aircraft shall be either dismantled or converted to the production of civil aircraft or other civilian goods.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

#### Article 7

##### Elimination of All Surface Warships Capable of Being Used as Vehicles for Nuclear Weapons, and Submarines

1. All surface warships capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons and submarines of all classes or types shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Naval bases and other installations for



the maintenance of the above warships and submarines shall be demolished or dismantled and handed over to the merchant marine for peaceful uses.

2. The building of the warships and submarines referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. Shipyards and plants, wholly or partly designed for the building of such warships and submarines, shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful production.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

#### Article 8

##### Elimination of All Artillery Systems Capable of Serving as Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. All artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivering nuclear weapons shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. All auxiliary equipment and technical facilities designed for controlling the fire of such artillery systems shall be destroyed. Surface storage premises and transport facilities for such systems shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. The entire stock of non-nuclear munitions for such artillery systems, whether at the gun site or in depots, shall be completely destroyed. Underground depots for such artillery systems and for the non-nuclear munitions thereof shall be destroyed.

2. The production of the artillery systems referred to in paragraphs 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. To this end, all plants or workshops thereof engaged in the production of such systems shall be closed and dismantled. All specialized equipment and machine tools at these plants and workshops shall be destroyed, the remainder being converted to peaceful uses. The production of non-nuclear munitions for these artillery systems shall be discontinued. Plants and workshops engaged in the production of such munitions shall be completely dismantled and their specialized equipment destroyed.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

**B. Foreign Military Bases and Troops in Alien Territories****Article 9****Dismantling of Foreign Military Bases**

1. Simultaneously with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty which have army, air force or naval bases in foreign territories shall dismantle all such bases, whether principal or reserve bases, as well as all depot bases of any types. All personnel of such bases shall be evacuated to their national territory. All installations and armaments existing at such bases and coming under article 5-8 of the present Treaty shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall either be destroyed on the spot in accordance with article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the Territory of the State which owned the base. All installations of a military nature at such bases shall be destroyed. The living quarters and auxiliary installations of foreign bases shall be transferred for civilian use to the States in whose territory they are located.

2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be fully applicable to military bases which are used by foreign troops but which may legally belong to the State in whose territory they are located. The said measures shall also be implemented with respect to army, air force and naval bases that have been set up under military treaties and agreements for use by other States or groups of States, regardless of whether any foreign troops are present at those bases at the time of the conclusion of the present Treaty.

All previous treaty obligations, decisions of the organs of military blocs and any rights or privileges pertaining to the establishment or use of military bases in foreign territories shall lapse and may not be renewed. It shall henceforth be prohibited to grant military bases for use by foreign troops and to conclude any bilateral or multilateral treaties and agreements to this end.

3. The legislatures and Governments of the States parties to the present Treaty shall enact legislation and issue regulations to ensure that no military bases to be used by foreign troops are established in their territory. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.



Article 10

Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from Alien Territories

1. Simultaneously with the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty which have troops or military personnel of any nature in foreign territories shall withdraw all such troops and personnel from such territories. All armaments and all installations of a military nature which are located at points where foreign troops are stationed and which come under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall either be destroyed on the spot in accordance with article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the territory of the State withdrawing its troops. The living quarters and auxiliary installations previously occupied by such troops or personnel shall be transferred for civilian use to the States in whose territory such troops were stationed.

2. The measures set forth in paragraph 1 of this article shall be fully applicable to foreign civilians employed in the armed forces or engaged in the production of armaments or any other activities serving military purposes in foreign territory.

Such persons shall be recalled to the territory of the State of which they are citizens, and all previous treaty obligations, decisions by organs of military blocs, and any rights or privileges pertaining to their activities shall lapse and may not be renewed. It shall henceforth be prohibited to dispatch foreign troops, military personnel or the above-mentioned civilians to foreign territories.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the withdrawal of troops, the destruction of installations and the transfer of the premises referred to in paragraph 1 of this article. The International Disarmament Organization shall also have the right to exercise control over the recall of the civilians referred to in paragraph 2 of this article. The laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 3 of article 9 of the present Treaty shall include provisions prohibiting citizens of States parties to the Treaty from serving in the armed forces or from engaging in any other activities serving military purposes in foreign States.



## CHAPTER II

### Reduction of Armed Forces, Conventional Armaments and Military Expenditure. Control over such Measures

#### Article 11

#### Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments

1. In the first stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be reduced to the following levels:

The United States of America—1,900,000 enlisted men, officers and civilian employees;

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—1,900,000 enlisted men, officers and civilian employees . . . . . (Agreed force levels for other States parties to the Treaty shall be included in this article.)

2. The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out in the first place through the demobilization of personnel release as a result of the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories, as provided for in articles 5-10 of the present Treaty, but chiefly through the complete disbandment of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilized.

3. Conventional armaments, military equipment, munitions, means of transportation and auxiliary equipment in units and depots shall be reduced by 30 percent for each type of all categories of these armaments. The reduced armaments, military equipment and munitions shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and auxiliary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds belonging to such units, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

4. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control at places where troops are being disbanded and released, conventional armaments and military equipment are being destroyed, and shall also verify the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

## Article 12

### Reduction of Conventional Armaments Production

1. The production of conventional armaments and munitions not coming under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty shall be reduced proportionately to the reduction of armed forces provided for in article 11 of the present Treaty. Such reduction shall be carried out primarily through the elimination of undertakings engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions. These undertakings shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises, and general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

## Article 13

### Reduction of Military Expenditure

1. The States parties to the present Treaty shall reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and the discontinuance of their production, to the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories as well as to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and to the reduction of the production of such armaments, as provided for in articles 5-12 of the present Treaty.

The funds released through the implementation of the first-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article through its financial inspectors, to whom the States parties to the Treaty undertake to grant unimpeded access to the records of central financial institutions concerning the reduction in their budgetary appropriations resulting from the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign military bases and the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, and to the relevant decisions of their legislative and executive bodies.



## CHAPTER III

Measures to Safeguard the Security of States

## Article 14

Restriction of Displacements of the Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. From the very beginning of the first-stage and until the final destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons under Articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, the placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of any special devices capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, the leaving of their territorial waters by warships, and the flying beyond the limits of their national territory by military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, shall be prohibited.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over compliance by the States parties to the Treaty with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article. The States parties to the Treaty shall provide the International Disarmament Organization with advance information on all launchings of rockets for peaceful purposes provided for in article 15 of the present Treaty, as well as on all movements of military aircraft within their national frontiers and of warships within their territorial waters.

## Article 15

Control over Launchings of Rockets for Peaceful Purposes

1. The launching of rockets and space devices shall be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article through the establishment, at the sites for peaceful rocket launchings of inspection teams, which shall be present at the launchings and shall thoroughly examine every rocket or satellite before its launching.



## Article 16

Prevention of the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons

The States parties to the Treaty which possess nuclear weapons undertake to refrain from transferring control over nuclear weapons and from transmitting information necessary for their production to States not possessing such weapons.

The States parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons undertake to refrain from producing or otherwise obtaining nuclear weapons and shall refuse to admit the nuclear weapons of any other State into their territories.

## Article 17

Prohibition of Nuclear Tests

The conducting of nuclear tests of any kind shall be prohibited (if such a prohibition has not come into affect under other international agreements by the time this Treaty is signed).

## Article 17a

Measures to Reduce the Danger of Outbreak of War

1. From the commencement of the first stage large-scale joint military movements or manoeuvres by armed forces of two or more States shall be prohibited.

The States parties to the Treaty agree to give advance notification of large-scale military movements or manoeuvres by their national armed forces within their national frontiers.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall exchange military missions between States or groups of States for the purpose of improving relations and mutual understanding between them.

3. The States parties to the Treaty agree to establish swift and reliable communication between their Heads of Government and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

4. The measures set forth in this article shall remain in effect after the first stage until the completion of general and complete disarmament.



## Article 18

Measures to Strengthen the Capacity of the United Nations to  
Maintain International Peace and Security

1. With a view to ensuring that the United Nations is capable of effectively protecting States against threats to or breaches of the peace, all States parties to the Treaty shall, between the signing of the Treaty and its entry into force, conclude agreements with the Security Council by which they undertake to make available to the latter armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, as provided for in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.

2. The armed forces specified in the said agreements shall form part of the national armed forces of the States concerned and shall be stationed within their territories. They shall be kept up to full strength and shall be fully equipped and prepared for combat. When used under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, these forces, serving under the command of the military authorities of the States concerned, shall be placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

## Chapter IV

Time-Limits for First-Stage Measures Transition from the  
First to the Second Stage

## Article 19

Time-Limits for First Stage Measures

1. The first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be initiated six months after the Treaty comes into force (in accordance with Article 46, within which period the International Disarmament Organization shall be set up.

2. The duration of the first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be 18 months.

## Article 20

Transition from the First to the Second Stage

In the course of the last 3 months of the first stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of the first-stage measures of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting



a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

### **PART III. Second Stage of General and Complete Disarmament**

#### **Article 21**

##### **Second Stage Tasks**

The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the second stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, to conclude the destruction of all military rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons which were retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America after the implementation of the first stage, and to make a further reduction in their armed forces, conventional armaments and production of such armaments, and military expenditure.

#### **CHAPTER V**

##### **Elimination of Nuclear, Chemical, Biological and Radiological Weapons.** **Control over such Measures**

#### **Article 22**

##### **Elimination of Nuclear Weapons**

1. (a) Nuclear weapons of all kinds, types and capacities shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Fissionable materials extracted from such weapons, whether directly attached to units or stored in various depots, shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for the direct reconstitution into weapons and shall form a special stock for peaceful uses, belonging to the State which previously owned the nuclear-weapons. Non-nuclear components of such weapons shall be completely destroyed.

All depots and special storage spaces for nuclear weapons shall be demolished.

(b) All stockpiles of nuclear materials intended for the production of nuclear weapons shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for direct use in nuclear weapons and shall be transferred to the above-mentioned special stocks.

(c) Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures to eliminate nuclear-weapons referred to above in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.



2. (a) The production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes shall be completely discontinued. All plants, installations and laboratories specially designed for the production of nuclear weapons or their components shall be eliminated or converted to production for peaceful purposes. All workshops, installations and laboratories for the production of the components of nuclear weapons at plants that are partially engaged in the production of such weapons shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes.

(b) The measures for the discontinuance of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above shall be implemented under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to inspect all undertakings which extract raw materials for atomic production or which produce or use fissionable materials or atomic energy.

The States parties to the Treaty shall make available to the International Disarmament Organization documents pertaining to the extraction and processing of nuclear raw materials and to their utilization for military or peaceful purposes.

3. Each State party to the Treaty shall, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, enact legislation completely prohibiting nuclear weapons and making any attempt by individuals or organizations to reconstitute such weapons a criminal offence.

### Article 23

#### Elimination of Chemical, Biological and Radiological Weapons

1. All types of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, whether directly attached to units or stored in various depots and storage places, shall be eliminated from the arsenals of States and destroyed (neutralized). All instruments and facilities for the combat use of such weapons, all special facilities for their transportation, and all special devices and facilities for their storage and conservation shall simultaneously be destroyed.

2. The production of all types of chemical, biological and radiological weapons and of all means and devices for their combat use, transportation and storage shall be completely discontinued. All plants, installations and laboratories that are wholly or partly engaged in the production of such weapons shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes.

3. The measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be implemented under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.



## CHAPTER V A

The Destruction of Rockets Capable of Delivering Nuclear Weapons  
which were Retained after the First Stage

## Article 23A

1. All intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America under paragraph 1 of article 5 shall be destroyed, together with their launching installations and guidance systems.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above.

## CHAPTER VI

Further Reduction of Armed Forces, Conventional Armaments and  
Military Expenditures. Control over such Measures.

## Article 24

Further Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments

1. In the second stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be further reduced to the following levels:

The United States of America	—	One million enlisted men, officers and civilian employees;
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	—	One million enlisted men, officers and civilian employees.
.....	—	.....

(Agreed force levels for other States parties to the Treaty shall be included in this article).

The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out in the first place through the demobilization of personnel previously manning the nuclear or other weapons subject to elimination under articles 22 and 23 of the present Treaty, but chiefly through the complete dismantlement of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilized.



2. Conventional armaments, military equipment, munitions, means of transportation and auxiliary equipment in units and depots shall be reduced by 35 from the original levels for each type of all categories of these armaments. The reduced armaments, military equipment and munitions shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and auxiliary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds belonging to such units shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

3. As in the implementation of such measures in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control at places where troops are being disbanded and released conventional armaments and military equipment are being destroyed, and shall also verify the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

#### Article 25

##### Further Reduction of Conventional Armaments Production


1. The production of conventional armaments and munitions shall be reduced proportionately to the reduction of armed forces provided for in article 24 of the present Treaty. Such reduction shall, as in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, be carried out primarily through the elimination of undertakings engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions. These undertakings shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises and general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses.

2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

#### Article 26

##### Further Reduction of Military Expenditure

1. The States parties to the Treaty shall further reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the destruction of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons and the discontinuance of the production of such weapons as well as to the further



reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and the reduction of the production of such armaments, as provided for in articles 22-25 of the present Treaty.

The funds released through the implementation of the second-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. Control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 13 of the present Treaty. Financial inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall also be granted unimpeded access to records concerning the reduction in the budgetary appropriations of States resulting from the elimination of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

## CHAPTER VII

### Measures to Safeguard the Security of States

#### Article 27

### Continued Strengthening of the Capacity of the United Nations to Maintain International Peace and Security

The States parties to the Treaty shall continue to implement the measures referred to in article 18 of the present Treaty regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council for use under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter.

## CHAPTER VIII

### Time-Limits for Second-Stage Measures Transition from the Second to the Third Stage

#### Article 28

### Time-Limits for Second-Stage Measures

The duration of the second stage of general and complete disarmament shall be twenty-four months.



## Article 29

Transition from the Second to the Third Stage

In the course of the last three months of the second stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of this stage.

Measures for the transition from the second to the third stage of general and complete disarmament shall be similar to the corresponding measures for the first stage, as laid down in article 20 of the present Treaty.

## PART IV. Third Stage of General and Complete Disarmament

## Article 30

Third Stage Tasks

The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the third stage of general and complete disarmament, fully to disband all their armed forces and thereby to complete the elimination of the military machinery of States.

## CHAPTER IX

Completion of the Elimination of the Military Machinery of States  
Control over such Measures

## Article 31

Completion of the Elimination of Armed Forces and Conventional  
Armaments

1. With a view to completing the process of the elimination of armed forces, the States parties to the Treaty shall disband the entire personnel of the armed forces which remained at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of disarmament. The system of military reserve of each State party to the Treaty shall be completely abolished.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall destroy all types of armaments, military equipment and munitions, whether held by the troops or in depots, that remained at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of the Treaty. All military equipment which cannot be converted to peaceful uses shall be destroyed.



3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the disbanding of troops and over the destruction of armaments and military equipment, and shall control the conversion to peaceful uses of transport and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

The International Disarmament Organization shall have access to documents pertaining to the disbanding of all personnel of the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty.

## Article 32

### Complete Cessation of Military Production

1. Military production at factories and plants shall be discontinued, with the exception of the production of agreed types and quantities of light fire-arms for the purposes referred to in article 36, paragraph 2, of the present Treaty. The factories and plants subject to elimination shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and the premises, general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. All scientific research in the military field at all scientific and research institutions and at designing offices shall be discontinued. All blueprints and other documents necessary for the production of the weapons and military equipment subject to elimination shall be destroyed.

All orders placed by military departments with national or foreign government undertakings and private firms for the production of armaments, military equipment, munitions and material shall be cancelled.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

## Article 33

### Abolition of Military Establishments

1. War ministries, general staffs and all other military and para-military organizations and institutions for the purpose of organizing the military effort of States parties to the Treaty shall be abolished. The States parties to the Treaty shall:

- (a) demobilize all personnel of these institutions and organizations;
- (b) abrogate all laws, rules and regulations governing the organization of the military effort and the status, structure and activities of such institutions and organizations;
- (c) destroy all documents pertaining to the planning of the mobilization and operational deployment of the armed forces in time of war.

(Y)

2. The entire process of the abolition of military and para-military institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

#### Article 34

##### Abolition of Military Conscription and Military Training

In accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, the States parties to the Treaty shall enact legislation prohibiting all military training, abolishing military conscription and all other forms of recruiting the armed forces, and discontinuing all military courses for reservists. All establishments and organizations dealing with military training shall simultaneously be disbanded in accordance with article 33 of the present Treaty. The disbanding of all military training institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

#### Article 35

##### Prohibition of the Appropriation of Funds for Military Purposes

1. The appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form, whether by government bodies or private individuals and social organizations, shall be discontinued.

The funds released through the implementation of general and complete disarmament shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction or complete abolition of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. For the purpose of organizing control over the implementation of the provisions of this article, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access to the legislative and budgetary documents of the States parties to the present Treaty.

## CHAPTER X

### Measures to Safeguard the Security of States and to Maintain International Peace

#### Article 36

##### Contingents of Police (Militia)

1. After the complete abolition of armed forces, the States parties to the Treaty shall be entitled to have strictly limited contingents of police (militia), equipped with light firearms, to maintain internal order, including the safeguarding of frontiers and the personal security of citizens, and to provide for compliance with their obligations in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

The strength of these contingents of police (militia) for each State party to the Treaty shall be as follows:

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall be allowed to manufacture strictly limited quantities of light firearms intended for such contingents of police (militia). The list of plants producing such arms, the quotas and types for each party to the Treaty shall be specified in a special agreement.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over compliance by the States parties to the Treaty with their obligations with regard to the restricted production of the said light firearms.

#### Article 37

##### Police (Militia) Units to be made Available to the Security Council

1. The States parties to the Treaty undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council, on its request, units from the contingents of police (militia) retained by them, as well as to provide assistance and facilities, including rights of passage. The placing of such units at the disposal of the Security Council shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. In order to ensure that urgent military measures may be undertaken, the States parties to the Treaty shall maintain in a state of immediate readiness those units of their police (militia) contingents which are intended for joint international enforcement action. The size of the units which the States parties to the Treaty



undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council as well as the areas where such units are to be stationed shall be specified in agreements to be concluded by those States with the Security Council.

2. The command of the units referred to in paragraph 1 shall be composed of representatives of the three principal groups of States existing in the world on the basis of equal representation. It shall decide all questions by agreement among its members representing all three groups of States.

#### Article 38

#### Control over the Prevention of the Re-establishment of Armed Forces

1. The police (militia) contingents retained by the States parties to the Treaty after the completion of general and complete disarmament shall be under the control of the International Disarmament Organization, which shall verify the reports by States concerning the areas where such contingents are stationed, concerning the strength and armaments of the contingents in each such area, and concerning all movements of substantial contingents of police (militia).

2. For the purpose of ensuring that armed forces and armaments abolished as a result of general and complete disarmament are not re-established, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access at any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the Treaty.

3. The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to institute a system of aerial inspection and aerial photography over the territories of the States parties to the Treaty.

#### CHAPTER XI

#### Time-limits for Third-Stage Measures

#### Article 39

The third stage of general and complete disarmament shall be completed over a period of one year. During the last three months of this stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of the third-stage measures of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.



## **PART V. Structure and Function of the International Disarmament Organization**

### **Article 40**

#### **Functions and Main Bodies**

The International Disarmament Organization to be set up under article 2, paragraph 3, of the present Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Organization", shall consist of a Conference of all States parties to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Conference" and a Control Council, hereinafter referred to as the "Council".

The Organization shall deal with questions pertaining to the supervision of compliance by States with their obligations under the present Treaty. All questions connected with the safeguarding of international peace and security which may arise in the course of the implementation of the present Treaty, including preventive and enforcement measures, shall be decided by the Security Council in conformity with its powers under the United Nations Charter.

### **Article 41**

#### **The Conference**

1. The Conference shall comprise all States parties to the Treaty. It shall hold regular sessions at least once a year and special sessions which may be convened by decision of the Council or at the request of a majority of the States parties to the Treaty with a view to considering matters connected with the implementation of effective control over disarmament. The sessions shall be held at the headquarters of the Organization, unless otherwise decided by the Conference.

2. Each State party to the Treaty shall have one vote. Decisions on questions of procedure shall be taken by a simple majority and all other matters by a two-thirds majority. In accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty, the Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

3. The Conference may discuss any matters pertaining to measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament and may make recommendations to the States parties to the Treaty and to the Council on any such matter or measure.



4. The Conference shall:
  - (a) Elect non-permanent members of the Council;
  - (b) Consider the annual, and any special, reports of the Council;
  - (c) Approve the budget recommended by the Council;
  - (d) Approve reports to be submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;
  - (e) Approve amendments to the present Treaty in accordance with article 47 of the present Treaty;
  - (f) Take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the Conference for this purpose by the Council;
  - (g) Propose matters for consideration by the Council and request from the Council reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Council.

#### Article 42

##### The Control Council

1. The Council shall consist of:
  - (a) The five States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council;
  - (b) ... (number) other States parties to the Treaty, elected by the Conference for a period of two years.

The composition of the Council must ensure proper representation of the three principal groups of States existing in the world.

2. The Council shall:
  - (a) Provide practical guidance for the measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament; set up such bodies at the headquarters of the Organization as it deems necessary for the discharge of its functions; establish procedures for their operation, and devise the necessary rules and regulations in accordance with the present Treaty;
  - (b) Submit to the Conference annual reports and such special reports as it deems necessary to prepare;
  - (c) Maintain constant contact with the United Nations Security Council as the organ bearing the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; periodically inform it of the progress achieved in the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and promptly notify it of any infringements by the States parties to the Treaty of their disarmament obligations under the present Treaty;
  - (d) Review the implementation of the measures included in each stage of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;



(e) Recruit the staff of the Organization on an international basis so as to ensure that the three principal groups of States existing in the world are adequately represented. The personnel of the Organization shall be recruited from among persons who are recommended by Governments and who may or may not be citizens of the country of the recommending Government;

(f) Prepare and submit to the Conference the annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Organization;

(g) Draw up instructions by which the various control bodies are to be guided in their work;

(h) Make a prompt study of incoming reports;

(i) Request from States such information on their armed forces and armaments as may be necessary for control over the implementation of the disarmament measures provided for by the present Treaty;

(j) Perform such other functions as are envisaged in the present Treaty.

3. Each member of the Council shall have one vote. Decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be taken by a simple majority, and on other matters by a two-thirds majority.

4. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. The Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure and shall be authorized to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

#### Article 43

#### Privileges and Immunities

The Organization, its personnel and representatives of the States parties to the Treaty shall enjoy in the territory of each States party to the Treaty such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of independent and unrestricted control over the implementation of the present Treaty.

#### Article 44

#### Finances

1. All the expenses of the Organization shall be financed from the funds allocated by the States parties to the Treaty. The budget of the Organization shall be drawn up by the Council and approved by the Conference in accordance with article 41, paragraph 4 (c), and article 42, paragraph 2 (f), of the present Treaty.



2. The States parties to the Treaty shall contribute funds to cover the expenditure of the Organization according to the following scale:

.....  
(The agreed scale of contributions shall be included in the present article.)

#### Article 45

##### Preparatory Commission

Immediately after the signing of the present Treaty, the States represented in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee shall set up a Preparatory Commission for the purpose of taking practical steps to establish the International Disarmament Organization.

#### PART VI. Final Clauses

#### Article 46

##### Ratification and Entry into Force

The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the Signatory States in accordance with their constitutional procedures within a period of six months from the date of its signature, and shall come into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification with the United Nations Secretariat by all the States which are permanent members of the Security Council, as well as by those States that are their allies in bilateral and multilateral military alliances, and by . . . . . (number) non-aligned States.

#### Article 47

##### Amendments

Any proposal to amend the text of the present Treaty shall come into force after it has been adopted by a two-thirds majority at a conference of all States parties to the Treaty and has been ratified by the States referred to in article 48 of the present Treaty in accordance with their constitutional procedures.

**Article 48****Authentic Texts**

The present Treaty, done in the Russian, English, French, Chinese and Spanish languages, all texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the United Nations Secretariat, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the Signatory States.



## U.S. PROPOSAL FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

President Kennedy, in connection with an address before the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, 1961, submitted to the General Assembly a United States declaration for "A Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World." The declaration formed the basis for the "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" submitted by the United States to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva on April 18, 1962.

A summary of the provisions of this proposal and subsequent corrections and amendments is presented. The summary organization parallels that of the proposal text. The text of the proposal submitted follows the summary.

### SUMMARY OF THE U.S. GCD PROPOSAL

The objectives of the United States' GCD proposal are to ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and that war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems; and (b) general and complete disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The principles which would guide achievement are that (a) disarmament would be so balanced that no state or group of states could gain military advantage; (b) the United Nations would be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to ensure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences; and (c) transitions from one stage to the next would take place upon decision that all measures in the preceding stage had been implemented.

### Introduction

The Treaty is divided into three stages. It would enter into force upon signature and ratification of the U.S., USSR, and other states as agreed upon. Stage II would begin when all militarily significant states had become parties to the Treaty. Stage III would begin when all states possessing armed forces and armaments had become parties to the Treaty.



### Stage I

This stage would be completed in three years. The International Disarmament (IDO) and measures necessary to keep the peace would be established during this stage.

#### **A. Armaments**

1. Reduction of Armaments. Armaments in agreed categories would be reduced by 30 percent. The agreed limitations would encompass specified broad categories of armaments. Illustrative examples are: armed combat aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles, antimissile missiles, surface-to-air missiles, armored and artillery units, and combat ships.

2. Method of Reduction. The reductions would be completed in three equal steps. Armaments to be eliminated in each step would be placed in depots, inspected by IDO inspectors, and destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes. Each step would be concluded when the IDO verified that retained armaments were not in excess of agreed levels. Numbers and locations of these depots would be specified in an annex to this Treaty.

3. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities. Armament production would be limited to agreed types in Stage I and would cease completely in Stage II. Production of new parts for retained armaments would be permitted, but new armament testing and production and the expansion of production facilities would be prohibited.

4. Additional Measures. Unresolved questions regarding reduction of chemical and biological weapons in subsequent stages would be examined.

#### **B. Armed Forces**

1. Reduction of Armed Forces. Levels of U.S. and USSR forces would be reduced to 2.1 million each. Certain other signatories would also be reduced to 2.1 million. All other members would be reduced to 100,000 or one percent of their population.

2. Armed Forces Subject to Reduction. Personnel demobilization would pertain to all uniformed troops supported by the national government.

3. Method of Reduction of Armed Forces. Subsequent to declarations of current force levels, reductions would be completed in three equal steps, each lasting one year. IDO inspectors would verify reductions and retained force levels.

4. Additional Measures. Procedures on consultation would be established for discussion of civilian employment by military establishments.



### C. Nuclear Weapons

1. Production of Fissionable Materials for Nuclear Weapons. Production of fissionable materials for weapons would be halted and that for peaceful purposes would be limited. Declarations of production facilities, together with amounts and types of material, would be submitted to the IDO. IDO inspectors would verify compliance with these measures.

2. Transfer of Fissionable Material to Purposes Other Than Use in Nuclear Weapons. U.S. and USSR would transfer to peaceful purposes an agreed quantity of weapons-grade U-235. Transfer arrangements would be handled by IDO inspectors.

3. Transfer of Fissionable Materials Between States for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. Transfers of fissionable materials would be solely for peaceful purposes. Safeguards would be developed in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

4. Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons. States possessing nuclear weapons which are parties to the Treaty would agree not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers or to assist such States in development of nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear parties would agree not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons.

5. Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions. Agreements prohibiting nuclear weapons testing would be an annex to the Treaty. All nuclear explosions would be prohibited by the Treaty.

6. Additional Measures. Discussions would be held to determine the means of eliminating nuclear stock piles in Stages II and III.

### D. Outer Space

1. Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Orbit. Signatory States would not place such weapons in orbit.

2. Peaceful Cooperation in Space. Signatory States would pursue peaceful development of outer space.

3. Notification and Pre-Launch Inspection. Prior to launch of space vehicles, States would notify the IDO and permit inspection of launch sites and vehicles.

4. Limitation on Production and on Related Activities. The IDO would monitor limitations on space booster production, testing, and stockpiling.



#### E. Military Expenditures

Itemized military expenditures would be submitted by member States to the IDO. All States would consider appropriate restrictions after evaluation of these expenditures.

#### F. Reduction of the Risk of War

In order to reduce the risk of war, parties to the Treaty would give advance notification of military movements and maneuvers and would agree to the stationing of observation posts within their territory, exchange of military missions, increased communications between the heads of government and Secretary-General of the U.N., and a subsidiary International Commission to the IDO.

#### G. The International Disarmament Organization

##### 1. Establishment of the International Disarmament Organization.

The IDO would be established upon the initiation of the Treaty and function within the framework of the U.N.


2. Cooperation of the Parties to the Treaty. All parties to the Treaty would extend their full cooperation to the IDO.

3. Verification Functions of the International Disarmament Organization. The IDO inspectors would verify: the destruction of reduced armaments at specific depots; the measures designed to halt or limit production and testing through access to specific facilities; and that the retained armaments and force levels were not being exceeded.

4. Composition of the International Disarmament Organization. The IDO would be composed of a General Conference, a Control Council, and an Administrator.

5. Functions of the General Conference. The General Conference would have the following functions: election of non-permanent members of the Control Council; approval of specific admission to the Treaty, certain agreements, IDO budgets, reports to the U.N. and amendments to the Treaty; and appointment of the Administrator.

6. Functions of the Control Council. The Control Council would have the following functions: recommending to the Conference the appointment of the Administrator, and the IDO budget; considering reports of the Administrator and matters of general interest; requesting advisory opinions from International Court of Justice; establishing verification procedures and standards; and adopting rules for implementing the Treaty.



7. Functions of the Administrator. The Administrator would have the following functions: overseeing the operations of the verification system; transmitting verification data; preparing the IDO budget; and making reports on disarmament progress.

8. Privileges and Immunities. Each signatory State would prepare an annex to the Treaty of the privileges and immunities that will be extended to IDO staff members within their respective national territories.

9. Relations With the United Nations and Other International Organizations. The IDO Administrator and Secretary-General of the U.N. would consult with each other on matters of mutual interest. The IDO Control Council would transmit periodic and annual reports to the U.N. The main organs of the U.N. could also make recommendations to the IDO.

#### H. Measures to Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping the Peace.

1. Obligations Concerning Threat or Use of Force. Signatory States would refrain from the threat or use of force as a means of solving international problems.

2. Rules of International Conduct. Parties to the Treaty would support a study for the codification of rules of international conduct.

3. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. Parties to the Treaty would seek all appropriate means to solve international disputes—organs of the U.N., IDO, and International Court of Justice. Member States would also support a study of international solutions to disputes to be undertaken by the General Assembly of the U.N.

4. Maintenance of International Peace and Security. Member States would seek to strengthen the U.N.

5. United Nations Peace Force. A United Nations Peace Force would be planned in Stage I and implemented in Stage II.

6. United Nations Peace Observation Corps. A permanent Peace Corps cadre would be staffed under U.N. jurisdiction. The purpose of this force would be to insure international peace.

#### I. Transition.

During the last three months of Stage I, the Control Council would review to insure that the following conditions are completed: Stage I measures, Stage II preparations, and membership in the treaty of all States of military significance. A two-thirds majority of the Control Council would also determine whether Stage I measures are complete. Permanent members of the Security Council may extend Stage I by three months.



## Stage II

The duration of Stage II would be three years. During this period, armaments and armed forces would be reduced further, the IDO would continue to verify compliance, and the U. N. Peace Force would be strengthened.

### A. Armaments

1. Reduction of Armaments. Armaments in agreed categories previously reduced by 30 percent will be reduced by 50 percent in Stage II. Parties to the Treaty who did not participate in Stage I would reduce corresponding armaments by 65 percent.

2. Additional Armaments Subject to Reduction. The types of armaments that would be reduced are similar to those specified in Stage I, Section A, paragraph 1. In addition, noncombatant naval vessels and small arms would also be reduced. IDC inspectors would verify compliance with the measure.

3. Method of Reduction. The method of reductions made in Stage II would be similar to those specified in Stage I, Section A, paragraph 2.

4. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities. Production of armaments would be limited to agreed levels and consistent with reduced armaments. Flight testing of existing missiles would be limited to agreed categories. All other new weapons tests would be halted.

5. Additional Measures. All aspects of the production and testing of chemical and biological weapons would cease, and the stockpiles would be reduced 50 percent below their level at the beginning of Stage II. Facilities used in their production would be converted to peaceful purposes.

### B. Armed Forces

1. Reduction of Armed Forces. Armed forces of the U. S. and USSR would be reduced by 50 percent, based on force levels at the end of Stage I. Forces of Parties not participating in Stage I would be reduced by a greater percentage. Forces of other States would reduce by an agreed percentage.

2. Method of Reduction. The method of reduction would be similar to those presented in Stage I, Section B, paragraph 3.

3. Additional Measures. Agreed limitations would be placed on military training.



## **C. Nuclear Weapons**

1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons. Declarations on the amounts, types, and classification of nuclear weapons and fissionable material would be made to the IDO. Nuclear weapons and fissionable material would be reduced to minimum levels agreed upon. Non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons would be destroyed. IDO would insure compliance with provisions set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

2. Registration of Nuclear Weapons for Verification Purposes. All nuclear weapons would be registered and serialized during the last six months of Stage II.

## **D. Military Bases and Facilities**

Military bases would be dismantled and converted according to provisions set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

## **E. Reduction of the Risk of War**

Parties to the Treaty would cooperate with the International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War and would help extend measures adopted in Stage I.

## **F. The International Disarmament Organization.**

The IDO would be strengthened according to the principles set forth in Stage I, Section G, paragraph 3.

## **G. Measures to Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping the Peace**

Parties to the Treaty would extend support to the studies on peaceful settlement of disputes and the establishment of rules of international conduct undertaken in Stage I. Member States would accept all rules adopted and approved by the Control Council in furtherance of these principles. Objection by two-thirds majority would abrogate any proposed rule.

The U. N. Peace Force would be established during the first year of Stage II.

## **H. Transition**

Conditions and criteria of the transition between Stages II and III are similar to those between Stages I and II as set forth in Stage I, Section I.

**Stage III**

Stage III would complete the disarmament process and would be completed within an agreed period of time.

**A. Armaments**

Except for the necessary armaments which the national forces are allowed to retain for internal security, all non-nuclear armaments together with their associated research and production, would be eliminated. The method to be followed in this process would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. The IDO would verify the results.

**B. Armed Forces**

Except for the national security forces maintained to insure internal order and support the U.N. Peace Force, all armed forces would be eliminated according to provisions set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

There would be no further military conscription. National legislation contrary to these measures would be annulled. IDO would verify the results.

**C. Nuclear Weapons**

All nuclear weapons and stockpiles and facilities used in their production would be eliminated or converted to peaceful purposes. Sequence and other reductions arrangements would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. The IDO would ascertain compliances.

**D. Military Bases and Facilities**

All military bases and complexes except those set aside for internal security forces would be dismantled or converted to peaceful purposes. The sequence of dismantling would be specified in an annex to the Treaty. IDO would verify results.

**E. Research and Development of Military Significance**

Prior to Stage III, all potential militarily significant research would be reported to the IDO. Subsequent to Stage III, the Control Council of the IDO would set up expert study groups to evaluate and make recommendations to monitor such research. The IDO would implement control of such measures.



#### F. Reduction of the Risk of War

The Parties to the Treaty would strive to extend and implement all arrangements recommended by the International Commission on the Reduction of the Risk of War.

#### G. International Disarmament Organization

The IDO would be progressively strengthened through an extension of the provisions set forth in Stage I, Section G, paragraph 3.

#### H. Measures to Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping the Peace.

Parties to the Treaty would progressively strengthen the United Nations Peace Force until it had sufficient armed forces and armaments to resist any challenge.

#### I. Completion of Stage III

Upon completion of the agreed time period for Stage III, the Control Council would conduct a review of all measures in this stage. All obligations of all stages would continue after the completion of Stage III.

### GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL STAGES

1. Subsequent Modification or Amendments of the Treaty. Signatory States would consider revisions or amendments to the Treaty after a specified period of time.

2. Interim Agreement. Parties to the Treaty would, subsequent to the signing, consider such measures as are necessary to initiate the Treaty.

3. Parties to the Treaty, Ratification, Accession and Entry into Force of the Treaty. The Treaty would be open for signature and ratification by all U.N. members and any other State. The Treaty would come into force when ratified by the U.S., USSR and a specified number of other States. Treaty ratification would be completed by constitutional procedures of each State.

4. Finance. The financial obligations of the IDO would be supported by all parties to the Treaty according to an adjusted scale.

**TEXT OF THE U.S. GCD PROPOSAL****Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General  
and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, April 18, 1962**

In order to assist in the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the United States submits the following outline of basic provisions of such a treaty. The Preamble of such a treaty has already been the subject of negotiations and is therefore not submitted as part of this treaty outline.

**A. Objectives**

1. To ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) general and complete disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. Taking into account paragraphs 3 and 4 below, to provide, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:
  - a. Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;
  - b. Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons;
  - c. Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;
  - d. Abolition of the organizations and institutions designed to organize the military efforts of states, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions;
  - e. Discontinuance of military expenditures.



3. To ensure that, at the completion of the program for general and complete disarmament, states would have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.
4. To ensure that during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament, states also would support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations Peace Force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments necessary to ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms.
5. To establish and provide for the effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations for the purpose of ensuring that all obligations under the disarmament program would be honored and observed during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament; and to this end to ensure that the International Disarmament Organization and its inspectors would have unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

#### B. Principles

The guiding principles during the achievement of these objectives are:

1. Disarmament would be implemented until it is completed by stages to be carried out within specified time limits.
2. Disarmament would be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any state or group of states gain military advantage, and so that security would be ensured equally for all.
3. Compliance with all disarmament obligations would be effectively verified during and after their entry into force. Verification arrangements would be instituted progressively as necessary to ensure throughout the disarmament process that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded.
4. As national armaments are reduced, the United Nations would be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to ensure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international cooperation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.



5. Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next would take place upon decision that all measures in the preceding stage had been implemented and verified and that any additional arrangements required for measures in the next stage were ready to operate.

## INTRODUCTION

The Treaty would contain three stages designed to achieve a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. The Treaty would enter into force upon the signature and ratification of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and such other states as might be agreed. Stage II would begin when all militarily significant states had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied. Stage III would begin when all states possessing armed forces and armaments had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied. Disarmament, verification, and measures for keeping the peace would proceed progressively and proportionately beginning with the entry into force of the Treaty.

## STAGE I

Stage I would begin upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would be completed within three years from that date.

During Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To reduce their armaments and armed forces and to carry out other agreed measures in the manner outlined below;
2. To establish the International Disarmament Organization upon the entry into force of the Treaty in order to ensure the verification in the agreed manner of the obligations undertaken; and
3. To strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace through the measures outlined below.

### A. Armaments

1. Reduction of Armaments



- a. Specified Parties to the Treaty, as a first stage toward general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, would reduce by thirty per cent the armaments in each category listed in subparagraph b. below. Except as adjustments for production would be permitted in Stage I in accordance with paragraph 3 below, each type of armament in the categories listed in subparagraph b. would be reduced by thirty per cent of the inventory existing at an agreed date.
- b. All types of armaments within agreed categories would be subject to reduction in Stage I (the following list of categories, and of types within categories, is illustrative):
  - (1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000 kilograms or greater; missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometres or greater, together with their related fixed launching pads; and submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles having a range of 300 kilometres or greater.  
(Within this category, the United States, for example, would declare as types of armaments: the B-52 aircraft; Atlas missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Titan missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Polaris missiles; Hound Dog missiles; and each new type of armament, such as Minuteman missiles, which came within the category description, together with, where applicable, their related fixed launching pads. The declared inventory of types within the category by other Parties to the Treaty would be similarly detailed.)
  - (2) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 15,000 kilograms and 40,000 kilograms and those missiles not included in category (1) having a range between 300 kilometres and 5,000 kilometres, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)
  - (3) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 2,500 and 15,000 kilograms. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)
  - (4) Surface-to-surface (including submarine-launched missiles) and air-to-surface aerodynamic and ballistic missiles and free rockets having a range of between



10 kilometres and 300 kilometres, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

- (5) Anti-missile missile systems, together with related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)
- (6) Surface-to-air missiles other than anti-missile missile systems, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)
- (7) Tanks. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)
- (8) Armoured cars and armoured personnel carriers. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)
- (9) All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of 100 mm. or greater. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)
- (10) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater of the following classes: Aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyer types and submarines. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

## 2. Method of Reduction

- a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the reduction of armaments would submit to the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration respecting inventories of their armaments existing at the agreed date.
- b. The reduction would be accomplished in three steps, each consisting of one year. One-third of the reduction to be made during Stage I would be carried out during each step.
- c. During the first part of each step, one-third of the armaments to be eliminated during Stage I would be placed in depots under supervision of the International Disarmament Organization. During the second part of each step, the deposited armaments



would be destroyed or, where appropriate, converted to peaceful uses. The number and location of such depots and arrangements respecting their establishment and operation would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

- d. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in a Treaty annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing reduction and would provide assurance that retained armaments did not exceed agreed levels.

### 3. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

- a. Production of all armaments listed in subparagraph b. of paragraph 1. above would be limited to agreed allowances during Stage I and, by the beginning of Stage II, would be halted except for production within agreed limits of parts for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments.
- b. The allowances would permit limited production in each of the categories of armaments listed in subparagraph b. of paragraph 1. above. In all instances during the process of eliminating production of armaments:
  - (1) any armament produced within a category would be compensated for by an additional armament destroyed within that category to the end that the ten per cent reduction in numbers in each category in each step, and the resulting thirty per cent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved; and furthermore
  - (2) in the case of armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 15,000 kilograms or greater and of missiles having a range of 300 kilometres or greater, the destructive capability of any such armaments produced within a category would be compensated for by the destruction of sufficient armaments within that category to the end that the ten per cent reduction in destructive capability as well as numbers in each of these categories in each step, and the resulting thirty per cent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved.
- c. Should a Party to the Treaty elect to reduce its production in any category at a more rapid rate than required by the allowances provided in subparagraph b. above, that Party



would be entitled to retain existing armaments to the extent of the unused portion of its production allowance. In any such instance, any armament so retained would be compensated for in the manner set forth in subparagraph b. (1) and, where applicable, b. (2) above, to the end that the ten per cent reduction in numbers and, where applicable, destructive capability in each category in each step, and the resulting thirty per cent reduction in Stage I would be achieved.

- d. The flight testing of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.
- e. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

#### 4. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine unresolved questions relating to means of accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. In light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

### B. Armed Forces

#### 1. Reduction of Armed Forces

Force levels for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to 2.1 million each and for other specified Parties to the Treaty to agreed levels not exceeding 2.1 million each. All other Parties to the Treaty would, with agreed exceptions, reduce their force levels to 100,000 or one per cent of their population, whichever were higher, provided that in no case would the force levels of such other Parties to the Treaty exceed levels in existence upon the entry into force of the Treaty.



## 2. Armed Forces Subject to Reduction

Agreed force levels would include all full-time, uniformed personnel maintained by national governments in the following categories:

- a. Career personnel of active armed forces and other personnel serving in the active armed forces on fixed engagements or contracts.
- b. Conscripts performing their required period of full-time active duty as fixed by national law.
- c. Personnel of militarily organized security forces and of other forces or organizations equipped and organized to perform a military mission.

## 3. Method of Reduction of Armed Forces

The reduction of force levels would be carried out in the following manner:

- a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing reductions would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating their force levels at the agreed date.
- b. Force level reductions would be accomplished in three steps, each having a duration of one year. During each step force levels would be reduced by one-third of the difference between force levels existing at the agreed date and the levels to be reached at the end of Stage I.
- c. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the reduction of force levels and provide assurance that retained forces did not exceed agreed levels.

## 4. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing reductions would agree upon appropriate arrangements, including procedures for consultation, in order to ensure that civilian employment by military establishments would be in accordance with the objectives of the obligations respecting force levels.



### C. Nuclear Weapons

#### 1. Production of Fissionable Materials for Nuclear Weapons

- a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons.
- b. This measure would be carried out in the following manner:
  - (1) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration listing by name, location and production capacity every facility under their jurisdiction capable of producing and processing fissionable materials at the agreed date.
  - (2) Production of fissionable materials for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons would be limited to agreed levels. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization periodic declarations stating the amounts and types of fissionable materials which were still being produced at each facility.
  - (3) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared facilities and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared facilities.

#### 2. Transfer of Fissionable Material to Purposes Other Than Use in Nuclear Weapons

- a. Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would each transfer to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons an agreed quantity of weapons-grade U-235 from past production. The purposes for which such materials would be used would be determined by the state to which the material belonged, provided that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.



- b. To ensure that the transferred materials were not used in nuclear weapons, such materials would be placed under safeguards and inspection by the International Disarmament Organization either in stockpiles or at the facilities in which they would be utilized for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. Arrangements for such safeguards and inspection would be set forth in the annex on verification.
- 3. Transfer of Fissionable Materials Between States for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
  - a. Any transfer of fissionable materials between states would be for purposes other than for use in nuclear weapons and would be subject to a system of safeguards to ensure that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.
  - b. The system of safeguards to be applied for this purpose would be developed in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
- 4. Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to seek to prevent the creation of further national nuclear forces. To this end the Parties would agree that:

  - a. Any Party to the Treaty which had manufactured, or which at any time manufactures, a nuclear weapon would:
    - (1) Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons to a state which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before an agreed date;
    - (2) Not assist any such state in manufacturing any nuclear weapons.
  - b. Any Party to the Treaty which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before the agreed date would:
    - (1) Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over any nuclear weapons.
    - (2) Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any nuclear weapons.
- 5. Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions
  - a. If an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons test explosions and providing for effective international control had come into



force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, such agreement would become an annex to the Treaty, and all the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by the obligations specified in the agreement.

- b. If, however, no such agreement had come into force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, all nuclear weapons test explosions would be prohibited, and the procedures for effective international control would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

#### 6. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine remaining unresolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles. In the light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning nuclear weapons stockpiles.

#### D. Outer Space

##### 1. Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Orbit

The Parties to the Treaty would agree not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction.

##### 2. Peaceful Cooperation in Space

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support increased international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space in the United Nations or through other appropriate arrangements.

##### 3. Notification and Pre-Launch Inspection

With respect to the launching of space vehicles and missiles:

- a. Those Parties to the Treaty which conducted launchings of space vehicles or missiles would provide advance notification of such launchings to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization together with the track of the space vehicle or missile. Such advance notification would be provided on a timely basis to permit pre-launch inspection of the space vehicle or missile to be launched.



- b. In accordance with arrangement which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would conduct pre-launch inspection of space vehicles and missiles and would establish and operate any arrangements necessary for detecting unreported launchings.

4. Limitations on Production and on Related Activities

The production, stockpiling and testing of boosters for space vehicles would be subject to agreed limitations. Such activities would be monitored by the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification.

#### E. Military Expenditures

1. Report on Expenditures

The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization at the end of each step of each stage a report on their military expenditures. Such reports would include an itemization of military expenditures.

2. Verifiable Reduction of Expenditures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine questions related to the verifiable reduction of military expenditures. In the light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would consider appropriate arrangements respecting military expenditures.

#### F. Reduction of the Risk of War

In order to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to the following measures:

1. Advance Notification of Military Movements and Manoeuvres

Specified Parties to the Treaty would give advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization. Specific arrangements relating to this commitment, including the scale of movements and manoeuvres to be reported and the information to be transmitted, would be agreed.



## 2. Observation Posts

Specified Parties to the Treaty would permit observation posts to be established at agreed locations, including major ports, railway centres, motor highways, river crossings, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces. The number of such posts could be progressively expanded in each successive step of Stage I. Specific arrangements relating to such observation posts, including the location and staffing of posts, the method of receiving and reporting information, and the schedule for installation of posts would be agreed.

## 3. Additional Observation Arrangements

The Parties to the Treaty would establish such additional observation arrangements as might be agreed. Such arrangements could be extended in an agreed manner during each step of Stage I.

## 4. Exchange of Military Missions

Specified Parties to the Treaty would undertake the exchange of military missions between states or groups of states in order to improve communications and understanding between them. Specific arrangements respecting such exchanges would be agreed.

## 5. Communications Between Heads of Government

Specified Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of rapid and reliable communications among their heads of government and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Specific arrangements in this regard would be subject to agreement among the Parties concerned and between such Parties and the Secretary-General.

## 6. International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War

The Parties to the Treaty would establish an International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War as a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization to examine and make recommendations regarding further measures that might be undertaken during Stage I or subsequent stages of disarmament to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of communications, or surprise attack. Specific arrangements for such measures as might be agreed to by all or some of the Parties to the Treaty would be subject to agreement among the Parties concerned.



### G. The International Disarmament Organization

#### 1. Establishment of the International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would be established upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would function within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Treaty.

#### 2. Cooperation of the Parties to the Treaty

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to cooperate promptly and fully with the International Disarmament Organization and to assist the International Disarmament Organization in the performance of its functions and in the execution of the decisions made by it in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

#### 3. Verification Functions of the International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would verify disarmament measures in accordance with the following principles which would be implemented through specific arrangements set forth in the annex on verification:

- a. Measures providing for reduction of armaments would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization at agreed depots and would include verification of the destruction of armaments and, where appropriate, verification of the conversion of armaments to peaceful uses. Measures providing for reduction of armed forces would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization either at the agreed depots or other agreed locations.
- b. Measures halting or limiting production, testing, and other specified activities would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization. Parties to the Treaty would declare the nature and location of all production and testing facilities and other specified activities. The International Disarmament Organization would have access to relevant facilities and activities wherever located in the territory of such Parties.



c. Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded and that activities limited or prohibited by the Treaty were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided by the International Disarmament Organization through agreed arrangements which would have the effect of providing that the extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the Parties to the Treaty of possible violations. This might be accomplished, for example, by an arrangement embodying such features as the following:

- (1) All parts of the territory of those Parties to the Treaty to which this form of verification was applicable would be subject to selection for inspection from the beginning of Stage I as provided below.
- (2) Parties to the Treaty would divide their territory into an agreed number of appropriate zones and at the beginning of each step of disarmament would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the total level of armaments, forces, and specified types of activities subject to verification within each zone. The exact location of armaments and forces within a zone would not be revealed prior to its selection for inspection.
- (3) An agreed number of these zones would be progressively inspected by the International Disarmament Organization during Stage I according to an agreed time schedule. The zones to be inspected would be selected by procedures which would ensure their selection by Parties to the Treaty other than the Party whose territory was to be inspected or any Party associated with it. Upon selection of each zone, the Party to the Treaty whose territory was to be inspected would declare the exact location of armaments, forces and other agreed activities within the selected zone. During the verification process, arrangements would be made to provide assurance against undeclared movements of the objects of verification to or from the zone or zones being inspected. Both aerial and mobile ground inspection would be employed within the zone being inspected. In so far as agreed measures being verified were concerned access within the zone would be free and unimpeded, and verification would be carried out with the full cooperation of the state being inspected.



- (4) Once a zone had been inspected it would remain open for further inspection while verification was being extended to additional zones.
- (5) By the end of Stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty.

4. Composition of the International Disarmament Organization

a. The International Disarmament Organization would have:

- (1) A General Conference of all the Parties to the Treaty;
- (2) A Control Council consisting of representatives of all the major signatory powers as permanent members and certain other Parties to the Treaty on a rotating basis; and
- (3) An Administrator who would administer the International Disarmament Organization under the direction of the Control Council and who would have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to ensure effective and impartial implementation of the functions of the International Disarmament Organization.

b. The General Conference and the Control Council would have power to establish such subsidiary bodies, including expert study groups, as either of them might deem necessary.

5. Functions of the General Conference

The General Conference would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

- a. Electing non-permanent members to the Control Council;
- b. Approving certain accessions to the Treaty;
- c. Appointing the Administrator upon recommendation of the Control Council;
- d. Approving agreements between the International Disarmament Organization and the United Nations and other international organizations;
- e. Approving the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;



- f. Requesting and receiving reports from the Control Council and deciding upon matters referred to it by the Control Council;
  - g. Approving reports to be submitted to bodies of the United Nations;
  - h. Proposing matters for consideration by the Control Council;
  - i. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations;
  - j. Approving amendments to the Treaty for possible ratification by the Parties to the Treaty;
  - k. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty or disarmament in general.
6. Functions of the Control Council

The Control Council would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

- a. Recommending appointment of the Administrator;
- b. Adopting rules for implementing the terms of the Treaty;
- c. Establishing procedures and standards for the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and maintaining supervision over such arrangements and the Administrator;
- d. Establishing procedures for making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by verification arrangements;
- e. Considering reports of the Administrator on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements;
- f. Recommending to the Conference approval of the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;
- g. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations;



- h. Recommending to the Conference approval of certain accessions to the Treaty;
- i. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty or to disarmament in general.

7. Functions of the Administrator

The Administrator would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

- a. Administering the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and serving as Chief Executive Officer of the International Disarmament Organization;
- b. Making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by the verification arrangements;
- c. Preparing the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;
- d. Making reports to the Control Council on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements.

8. Privileges and Immunities

The privileges and immunities which the Parties to the Treaty would grant to the International Disarmament Organization and its staff and to the representatives of the Parties to the International Disarmament Organization, and the legal capacity which the International Disarmament Organization should enjoy in the territory of each of the Parties to the Treaty would be specified in an annex to the Treaty.

9. Relations with the United Nations and Other International Organizations

- a. The International Disarmament Organization, being established within the framework of the United Nations, would conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It would maintain close working arrangements with the United Nations, and the Administrator of the International Disarmament Organization would consult with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on matters of mutual interest.



- b. The Control Council of the International Disarmament Organization would transmit to the United Nations annual and other reports on the activities of the International Disarmament Organization.
- c. Principal organs of the United Nations could make recommendations to the International Disarmament Organization, which would consider them and report to the United Nations on action taken.

Note: The above outline does not cover all the possible details or aspects of relationships between the International Disarmament Organization and the United Nations.

#### H. Measures To Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping the Peace

##### 1. Obligations Concerning Threat or Use of Force

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake obligations to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force of any type—including nuclear, conventional, chemical or biological means of warfare—contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

##### 2. Rules of International Conduct

- a. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study by a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization of the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament.
- b. The Parties to the Treaty would refrain from indirect aggression and subversion. The subsidiary body provided for in subparagraph a. would also study methods of assuring states against indirect aggression or subversion.

##### 3. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

- a. The Parties to the Treaty would utilize all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of all disputes which might arise between them and any other state, whether or not a Party to the Treaty, including negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, submission to the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, or other peaceful means of their choice.



- b. The Parties to the Treaty would agree that disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty which were not settled by negotiation or by the International Disarmament Organization would be subject to referral by any party to the dispute to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties concerned agreed on another mode of settlement.
- c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study under the General Assembly of the United Nations of measures which should be undertaken to make existing arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature, more effective; and to institute new procedures and arrangements where needed.

4. Maintenance of International Peace and Security

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support measures strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to improve its capability to maintain international peace and security.

5. United Nations Peace Force

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to develop arrangements during Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a United Nations Peace Force. To this end, the Parties to the Treaty would agree on the following measures within the United Nations:

- a. Examination of the experience of the United Nations leading to a further strengthening of United Nations forces for keeping the peace;
- b. Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter;
- c. Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force in Stage II, including definitions of its purpose, mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control, training, logistical support, financing, equipment and armaments.

6. United Nations Peace Observation Corps

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support the establishment within the United Nations of a Peace Observation Corps, staffed with



a standing cadre of observers who could be dispatched promptly to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or a breach of the peace. Elements of the Peace Observation Corps could also be stationed as appropriate in selected areas throughout the world.

#### **I. Transition**

1. Transition from Stage I to Stage II would take place at the end of Stage I, upon a determination that the following circumstances existed:
  - a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage I had been carried out;
  - b. All preparations required for Stage II had been made; and
  - c. All militarily significant states had become Parties to the Treaty.
2. During the last three months of Stage I, the Control Council would review the situation respecting these circumstances with a view to determining whether these circumstances existed at the end of Stage I.
3. If, at the end of Stage I, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of Stage I would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.
4. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances still did not exist, the question would be placed before a special session of the Security Council; transition to Stage II would take place upon a determination by the Security Council that the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist.

#### **STAGE II**

Stage II would begin upon the transition from Stage I and would be completed within three years from that date.



During Stage II, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stage I;
2. To reduce further the armaments and armed forces reduced during Stage I and to carry out additional measures of disarmament in the manner outlined below;
3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage II; and
4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace through the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force and through the additional measures outlined below.

#### A. Armaments

##### 1. Reduction of Armaments

- a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had during Stage I reduced their armaments in agreed categories by thirty per cent would during Stage II further reduce each type of armaments in the categories listed in Section A, subparagraph 1.b of Stage I by fifty per cent of the inventory existing at the end of Stage I.
- b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures for the reduction of armaments during Stage I would submit to the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration respecting the inventories by types, within the categories listed in Stage I, of their armaments existing at the beginning of Stage II. Such Parties to the Treaty would during Stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by sixty-five per cent in order that such Parties would accomplish the same total percentage of reduction by the end of Stage II as would be accomplished by those Parties to the Treaty which had reduced their armaments by thirty per cent in Stage I.

##### 2. Additional Armaments Subject to Reduction

- a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration respecting their inventories existing at the beginning of Stage II of the additional



types of armaments in the categories listed in subparagraph b. below, and would during Stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by fifty per cent.

b. All types of armaments within further agreed categories would be subject to reduction in Stage II (the following list of categories is illustrative):

- (1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of up to 2,500 kilograms (declarations by types).
- (2) Specified types of unarmed military aircraft (declarations by types).
- (3) Missiles and free rockets having a range of less than 10 kilometers (declarations by types).
- (4) Mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of less than 100 mm. (declarations by types).
- (5) Specified types of unarmoured personnel carriers and transport vehicles (declarations by types).
- (6) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater which had not been included among the armaments listed in Stage I, and combatant ships with standard displacement of less than 400 tons (declarations by types).
- (7) Specified types of non-combatant naval vessels (declarations by types).
- (8) Specified types of small arms (declarations by types).

c. Specified categories of ammunition for armaments listed in Stage I, Section A, subparagraph 1.b., and in subparagraph b. above would be reduced to levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage II.

3. Method of reduction

The foregoing measures would be carried out and would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in Stage I, Section A, paragraph 2.

**4. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities**

- a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of armaments in the specified categories except for production, within agreed limits, of parts required for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments.
- b. The production of ammunition in specified categories would be reduced to agreed levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage II.
- c. The Parties to the Treaty would halt development and testing of new types of armaments. The flight testing of existing types of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.
- d. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

**5. Additional Measures**

- a. In the light of their examination during Stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting such weapons:
  - (1) The cessation of all production and field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.
  - (2) The reduction, by agreed categories, of stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction to levels fifty per cent below those existing at the beginning of Stage II.
  - (3) The dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of all facilities engaged in the production or field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.
- b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.



- c. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that retained levels of chemical and biological weapons did not exceed agreed levels and that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.

## B. Armed Forces

### 1. Reduction of Armed Forces

- a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures providing for reduction of force levels during Stage I would further reduce their force levels on the following basis:
  - (1) Force levels of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to levels fifty per cent below the levels agreed for the end of Stage I.
  - (2) Force levels of other Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures providing for the reduction of force levels during Stage I would be further reduced, on the basis of an agreed percentage, below the levels agreed for the end of Stage I to levels which would not in any case exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of Stage II.
- b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures providing for the reduction of armed forces during Stage I would reduce their force levels to agreed levels consistent with those to be reached by other parties which had reduced their force levels during Stage I as well as Stage II. In no case would such agreed levels exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of Stage II.
- c. Agreed levels of armed forces would include all personnel in the categories set forth in Section B, paragraph 2 of Stage I.



## 2. Method of Reduction

The further reduction of force levels would be carried out and would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in Section B, paragraph 3 of Stage I.

## 3. Additional Measures

Agreed limitations consistent with retained force levels would be placed on compulsory military training, and on refresher training for reserve forces of the Parties to the Treaty.

# C. Nuclear Weapons

## 1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In the light of their examination during Stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake to reduce in the following manner remaining nuclear weapons and fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons:

- a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the amounts, types, and nature of utilization of all their fissionable materials.
- b. The Parties to the Treaty would reduce the amounts and types of fissionable materials declared for use in nuclear weapons to minimum levels on the basis of agreed percentages. The foregoing reduction would be accomplished through the transfer of such materials to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. The purposes for which such materials would be used would be determined by the state to which the materials belonged, provided that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.
- c. The Parties to the Treaty would destroy the non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons from which fissionable materials had been removed to effect the foregoing reduction of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons.



- d. Production or refabrication of nuclear weapons from any remaining fissionable materials would be subject to agreed limitations.
- e. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
- f. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the verification annex to the Treaty, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.

## 2. Registration of Nuclear Weapons for Verification Purposes

To facilitate verification during Stage III that no nuclear weapons remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty, those Parties to the Treaty which possessed nuclear weapons would, during the last six months of Stage II, register and serialize their remaining nuclear weapons and would register remaining fissionable materials for use in such weapons. Such registration and serialization would be carried out with the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with procedures which would be set forth in the annex on verification.

## D. Military Bases and Facilities

### 1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses agreed military bases and facilities, wherever they might be located.

### 2. Method of Reduction

- a. The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measures and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
- b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures.



#### **E. Reduction of the Risk of War**

In the light of the examination by the International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War during Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Parties to the Treaty would also consider extending and improving the measures undertaken in Stage I for this purpose. The Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be undertaken during and after Stage II.

#### **F. The International Disarmament Organization**

The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II through an extension of the arrangements based upon the principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 of Stage I.

#### **G. Measures to Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping the Peace**

##### **1. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes**

- a. In light of the study of peaceful settlement of disputes conducted during Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to assure the just and peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.
- b. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to accept without reservation, pursuant to Article 36, Paragraph (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the compulsory jurisdiction of that Court to decide international legal disputes.

##### **2. Rules of International Conduct**

- a. The Parties to the Treaty would continue their support of the study by the subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization initiated in Stage I to study the codification and



progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of procedures whereby rules recommended by the subsidiary body and approved by the Control Council would be circulated to all Parties to the Treaty and would become effective three months thereafter unless a majority of the Parties to the Treaty signified their disapproval, and whereby the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by rules which had become effective in this way unless, within a period of one year from the effective date, they formally notified the International Disarmament Organization that they did not consider themselves so bound. Using such procedures, the Parties to the Treaty would adopt such rules of international conduct related to disarmament as might be necessary to begin Stage III.

- b. In the light of the study of indirect aggression and subversion conducted in Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements necessary to assure states against indirect aggression and subversion.

### 3. United Nations Peace Force

The United Nations Peace Force to be established as the result of the agreement reached during Stage I would come into being within the first year of Stage II and would be progressively strengthened during Stage II.

### 4. United Nations Peace Observation Corps

The Parties to the Treaty would conclude arrangement for the expansion of the activities of the United Nations Peace Observation Corps.

### 5. National Legislation

Those Parties to the Treaty which had not already done so would, in accordance with their constitutional processes, enact national legislation in support of the Treaty imposing legal obligations on individuals and organizations under their jurisdiction and providing appropriate penalties for noncompliance.

## H. Transition

1. Transition from Stage II to Stage III would take place at the end of Stage II, upon a determination that the following circumstances existed:



- a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage II had been carried out;
  - b. All preparations required for Stage III had been made; and
  - c. All states possessing armed forces and armaments had become Parties to the Treaty.
2. During the last three months of Stage II, the Control Council would review the situation respecting these circumstances with a view to determining at the end of Stage II whether they existed.
  3. If, at the end of Stage II, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of Stage II would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances still did not exist, the question would be placed before a special session of the Security Council; transition to Stage III would take place upon a determination by the Security Council that the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist.

### STAGE III

Stage III would begin upon the transition from Stage II and would be completed within an agreed period of time as promptly as possible.

During Stage III, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake;

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stages I and II;
2. To complete the process of general and complete disarmament in the manner outlined below;
3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage III and of continuing verification subsequent to the completion of Stage II; and



4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace during and following the achievement of general and complete disarmament through the additional measures outlined below.

#### A. Armaments

##### 1. Reduction of Armaments

Subject to agreed requirements for non-nuclear armaments of agreed types for national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all armaments remaining at their disposal at the end of Stage II.

##### 2. Method of Reduction

- a. The foregoing measure would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements that would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
- b. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that retained armaments were of the agreed types and did not exceed agreed levels.

##### 3. Limitations on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

- a. Subject to agreed arrangements in support of national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and subject to agreed arrangements in support of the United Nations Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would halt all applied research, development, production, and testing of armaments and would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses all other facilities for such purposes.
- b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
- c. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament



Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

## B. Armed Forces

### 1. Reduction of Armed Forces


To the end that upon completion of Stage III they would have at their disposal only those forces and organizational arrangements necessary for agreed forces to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and that they would be capable of providing agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would complete the reduction of their force levels, disband systems of reserve forces, cause to be disbanded organizational arrangements comprising and supporting their national military establishment, and terminate the employment of civilian personnel associated with the foregoing.

### 2. Method of Reduction

- a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
- b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that the only forces and organizational arrangements retained or subsequently established were those necessary for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and to protect the personal security of citizens and those for providing agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace Force.

### 3. Other Limitations

The Parties to the Treaty would halt all military conscription and would undertake to annul legislation concerning national military establishments or military service inconsistent with the foregoing measures.



### C. Nuclear Weapons

#### 1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In light of the steps taken in Stages I and II to halt the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons and to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal, would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful use all facilities for production of such weapons, and would transfer all materials remaining at their disposal for use in such weapons to purposes other than use in such weapons.

#### 2. Method of Reduction

- a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
- b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that no nuclear weapons or materials for use in such weapons remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty and that no such weapons or materials were produced at undeclared facilities.

### D. Military Bases and Facilities

#### 1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses the military bases and facilities remaining at their disposal, wherever they might be located, in an agreed sequence except for such agreed bases or facilities within the territory of the Parties to the Treaty for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.



## 2. Method of Reduction

- a. The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measure and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses during Stage III would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
- b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measure at declared locations and provide assurance that there were no undeclared military bases and facilities.

## E. Research and Development of Military Significance

### 1. Reporting Requirement

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting research and development of military significance subsequent to Stage III:

- a. The Parties to the Treaty would report to the International Disarmament Organization any basic scientific discovery and any technological invention having potential military significance.
- b. The Control Council would establish such expert study groups as might be required to examine the potential military significance of such discoveries and inventions and, if necessary, to recommend appropriate measures for their control. In the light of such expert study, the Parties to the Treaty would, where necessary, establish agreed arrangements providing for verification by the International Disarmament Organization that such discoveries and inventions were not utilized for military purposes. Such arrangements would become an annex to the Treaty.
- c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to appropriate arrangements for protection of the ownership rights of all discoveries and inventions reported to the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with subparagraph a. above.



## 2. International Co-operation

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support full international co-operation in all fields of scientific research and development, and to engage in free exchange of scientific and technical information and free interchange of views among scientific and technical personnel.

## F. Reduction of the Risk of War

### 1. Improved Measures

In the light of the Stage II examination by the International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such extensions and improvements of existing arrangements and such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be taken during and after Stage III.

### 2. Application of Measures to Continuing Forces

The Parties to the Treaty would apply to national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens those applicable measures concerning the reduction of the risk of war that had been applied to national armed forces in Stages I and II.

## G. International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity (1) to verify the measures undertaken in Stage III through an extension of arrangements based upon the principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 of Stage I so that by the end of Stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty and (2) to provide continuing verification of disarmament after the completion of Stage III.



## H. Measures to Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping the Peace

### 1. Peaceful Change and Settlement of Disputes

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to provide a basis for peaceful change in a disarmed world and to continue the just and peaceful settlement of all international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.

### 2. Rules of International Conduct

The Parties to the Treaty would continue the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament in the manner provided in Stage II and by any other agreed procedure.

### 3. United Nations Peace Force

The Parties to the Treaty would progressively strengthen the United Nations Peace Force established in Stage II until it had sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no state could challenge it.

## I. Completion of Stage III

1. At the end of the time period agreed for Stage III, the Control Council would review the situation with a view to determining whether all undertakings to be carried out in Stage III had been carried out.
2. In the event that one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that such undertakings had not been carried out, the agreed period of Stage III would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended for a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of completing any uncompleted undertakings. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that such undertakings still had not been carried out, the question would be placed before a special session of the Security Council, which would determine whether Stage III had been completed.



3. After the completion of Stage III, the obligations undertaken in Stages I, II and III would continue.

#### GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL STAGES

1. Subsequent Modifications or Amendments of the Treaty

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to specific procedures for considering amendments or modifications of the Treaty which were believed desirable by a Party to the Treaty in the light of experience in the early period of implementation of the Treaty. Such procedures would include provision for a conference on revision of the Treaty after a specified period of time.

2. Interim Agreement

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such specific arrangements, including the establishment of a Preparatory Commission, as were necessary between the signing and entry into force of the Treaty to ensure the initiation of Stage I immediately upon the entry into force of the Treaty, and to provide an interim forum for the exchange of views and information on topics relating to the Treaty and to the achievement of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

3. Parties to the Treaty, Ratification, Accession and Entry into Force of the Treaty

- a. The Treaty would be open to signature and ratification, or accession by all members of the United Nations or its specialized agencies.
- b. Any other state which desired to become a Party to the Treaty could accede to the Treaty with the approval of the Conference on recommendation of the Control Council.
- c. The Treaty would come into force when it had been ratified by \_\_\_\_\_ states, including the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and an agreed number of the following states: \_\_\_\_\_.
- d. In order to assure the achievement of the fundamental purpose of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the Treaty would specify that the accession



of certain militarily significant states would be essential for the continued effectiveness of the Treaty or for the coming into force of particular measures or stages.

- e. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to exert every effort to induce other states or authorities to accede to the Treaty.
- f. The Treaty would be subject to ratification or acceptance in accordance with constitutional processes.
- g. A Depository Government would be agreed upon which would have all of the duties normally incumbent upon a Depository. Alternatively, the United Nations would be the Depository.

4. Finance

- a. In order to meet the financial obligations of the International Disarmament Organization, the Parties to the Treaty would bear the International Disarmament Organizations expenses as provided in the budget approved by the General Conference and in accordance with a scale of apportionment approved by the General Conference.
- b. The General Conference would exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the International Disarmament Organization.

5. Authentic Texts

The text of the Treaty would consist of equally authentic versions in English, French, Russian, Chinese and Spanish.



## U. S. FIVE-POINT PROGRAM

On January 21, 1964, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee resumed its discussions in Geneva.

Of immediate interest to the delegates was a message from the President of the United States. President Johnson's message outlined five major proposals designed, as he later told an American radio and television audience, "...to take further steps toward peace, enforceable steps which can endanger no one's safety and will enlarge everyone's security." In summary, these five steps were proposed:

1. Discussion of means of prohibiting the threat or use of force to change boundaries, or to extend control or sovereignty
2. Verified freeze in the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles
3. Verified agreement to halt all production of fissionable materials for weapons use.
4. System of observation posts and other methods for reducing the danger of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack.
5. Measures to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now controlling them.

### TEXT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MESSAGE

"There is only one item on the agenda of this Conference—it is the leading item on the agenda of mankind—and that one item is peace.

Already this Conference has led to more concrete and effective results than any disarmament Conference in modern history. Your efforts and deliberations laid the groundwork for the nuclear test ban treaty—for the communications link between Washington and Moscow—and for the U. N. General Assembly action against nuclear weapons in space.

Today your search begins anew in a climate of hope. Last year's genuine gains have given us new momentum. Recent Soviet and American announcements of reduction in military spending, even though modest, have



brightened the atmosphere further. Let us pray that the tide has turned—that further and more far-reaching agreements lie ahead—and that future generations will mark 1964 as the year the world turned for all time away from the horrors of war and constructed new bulwarks of peace.

Specifically, this nation now proposes five major types of potential agreement:

1) First, as Chairman Khrushchev and I have observed, the use of force for the solution of territorial disputes is not in the interest of any people or country. In consultation with our allies, we will be prepared to discuss means of prohibiting the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly—whether by aggression, subversion, or the clandestine supply of arms—to change boundaries or demarcation lines; to interfere with access to territory or to extend control or administration over territory by displacing established authorities.

2) Second, while we continue our efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, we must first endeavor to halt further increases in strategic armaments now. The United States, the Soviet Union and their respective allies should agree to explore a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. For our part, we are convinced that the security of all nations can be safeguarded within the scope of such an agreement and that this initial measure preventing the further expansion of the deadly and costly arms race will open the path to reductions in all types of forces from present levels.

3) Third, in this same spirit of early action, the United States believes that a verified agreement to halt all production of fissionable materials for weapons use would be a major contribution to world peace. Moreover, while we seek agreement on this measure, the U.S. is willing to achieve prompt reductions through both sides closing comparable production facilities on a plant by plant basis, with mutual inspection. We have started in this direction—we hope the Soviet Union will do the same—and we are prepared to accept appropriate international verification of the reactor shut-down already scheduled in our country.

4) Fourth, we must further reduce the danger of war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack. In consultation with our allies, we will be prepared to discuss proposals for creating a system of observation posts as a move in this direction.

5) Fifth, and finally, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations and not now controlling them, let us agree:



(a) that nuclear weapons not be transferred into the national control of states which do not now control them, and that all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safeguards;

(b) that the major nuclear powers accept in an increasing number of their peaceful nuclear activities the same inspection they recommend for other states; and

(c) on the banning of all nuclear weapons tests under effective verification and control.

Each of these proposed steps is important to peace. No one of them is impossible of agreement. The best way to begin disarming is to begin—and the United States is ready to conclude firm agreements in these areas and to consider any other reasonable proposal. We shall at all times pursue a just and lasting peace—and with God's help, we shall achieve it."

#### ELABORATION OF THE POINTS

Subsequent to the presentation of President Johnson's five points, statements by the U. S. representatives at the Geneva conference described in some detail the President's proposals directed toward early action to reduce the nuclear war threat through the control of weapons of mass destruction. Excerpts from these statements are presented to provide some of the details.

On January 31, 1964, Mr. William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) said with respect to the verified freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles:

"The best place to begin is with strategic nuclear vehicles. We have singled them out for three reasons. We believe first attention should be directed to the long-range weapons of greatest destructiveness. We believe a freeze on these weapons can be achieved with effective inspection requirements which would be less than those required for a general and complete disarmament program limiting all major armaments across the board. Finally, we believe we should focus on these weapons because they are among the most expensive to develop and produce.

The Soviet Union has long urged that we begin disarming with nuclear delivery vehicles. Moreover, in several statements Premier Khrushchev has made the point that long-range rockets with nuclear tips are the most destructive weapons. He did so, for example, in speeches on 14 January 1960 to the Supreme Soviet, to a Moscow election rally on 16 March 1962, and to the Moscow Congress for General Disarmament and Peace on 10 July 1962.



There have been claims by both sides to superiority in strategic nuclear forces. Regardless of which side is ahead, these are the weapons which appear most threatening to all countries.

We suggest that the specifics of the freeze be explored by allies on both sides before detailed negotiations are undertaken. For our part, of course, we would give weight to the general reaction which delegations may wish to express here in the near future. To assist in their consideration, we suggest that the following be explored:

First, the freeze should, we believe, include strategic missiles and aircraft. The categories of weapons affected should be defined along lines of range and weight. For this measure, the categories suggested in stage I of the United States outline of 18 April 1962 should be adjusted, we think, for several reasons. For instance, there have been changes in technology since those earlier categories were proposed. Moreover, the freeze would include only strategic categories; and it could be implemented before agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Secondly, the United States believes the freeze should also include anti-ballistic-missile systems. A freeze on strategic delivery systems without a freeze on antimissile systems would be destabilizing and therefore unacceptable.

Thirdly, the immediate objective of the freeze on numbers should be to maintain the quantities of strategic nuclear vehicles held by the East and the West at constant levels. As we see it, the agreement should provide for a suitable number of missile tests without warheads to insure that missile systems continue to be reliable over a period of time. For this and related purposes, it should also provide for production of replacements on a one-for-one basis: one missile produced for one destroyed. This should not, of course, permit any increase by either side in the constant level which it is the purpose of the agreement to maintain.

Fourthly, the objective of the freeze on characteristics should be, the United States believes, to prevent the development and deployment of strategic vehicles of a significantly new type. Like the freeze on numbers, this should apply to defensive as well as offensive vehicles. The significance of this provision might well be greater than that of the freeze on numbers. It would halt the race to produce better strategic vehicles to carry bigger warheads. It would mean an end to the qualitative, as well as to the quantitative, strategic arms race.

Fifthly, as I have already indicated, we have singled out strategic vehicles partly because we believe that the verification requirements would be less onerous than for a production freeze on the entire range of major



armaments included within our general and complete disarmament plan. One possible means of verifying the freeze would be to monitor significant existing production and testing facilities which each side would declare, and to provide for a specified number of spot checks to guard against possible undeclared facilities.

This is an example of the kind of verification requirement we have in mind. Additional problems would remain. However, we believe verification can be effective without being burdensome. We would hope that a system acceptable to all concerned could be worked out.

The freeze we wish to explore would have important advantages for all states. It would curb a key area of the arms race; it would inhibit development of costly, new, and more destructive weapon systems; it would be an accomplishment far beyond any "confidence building" measure in significance, yet one that could be achieved in a reasonable period of time; it would lay a firm basis for the achievement of the balanced reductions contemplated in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles; it would tend to reduce any fears which may exist that either side could achieve a decisive first-strike capability; it would permit significant reduction of military expenditures; it would help to reduce tensions and accelerate the forward movement toward general disarmament."

Mr. Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director of ACDA, speaking about verified freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles on April 16, 1964 gave details concerning the numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear vehicles proposed for consideration, production of new types of armaments, replacement, testing, and verification.

"On the instructions of President Johnson, I should now like to present further details concerning the elements of the strategic nuclear vehicle freeze. These details should answer a number of the questions which have been asked in the Committee about this measure. We also hope that they will serve as a stimulus for further exploration of the freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles by the conference.

Under the agreement which the United States proposes to explore, the numbers and characteristics of the following strategic nuclear vehicles would be frozen:

First, ground-based surface-to-surface missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometers or greater, together with their associated launching facilities; and sea-based surface-to-surface missiles having a range of 100 kilometers or greater, together with their associated launchers;



Second, strategic bombers having an empty weight of 40,000 kilogram or greater, together with any associated air-to-surface missiles having a range of 100 kilometers or greater;

Third, ground-based surface-to-surface missiles having a range of between 1,000 kilometers and 5,000 kilometers, together with their associated launching facilities;

Fourth, strategic bombers having an empty weight of between 25,000 kilograms and 40,000 kilograms, together with any associated air-to-surface missiles having a range of 100 kilometers or greater;

Fifth, strategic anti-missile-missile systems, together with their associated launching facilities. In connection with this type of armament, further technical discussions will be required in order to formulate a workable and acceptable definition of "anti-missile-missile systems."

Let me turn now to the limitations on production and testing.

The production of new types of armaments that fall within the listing I have outlined would be prohibited. The production of all existing types of armaments within this listing, and of specified major subassemblies of these armaments, would be halted, except for production required to cover the maintenance of the vehicles, their accidental loss, and the expenditure of missiles within agreed annual quotas for confidence and training firings.

Replacement would be on a one-for-one basis of the same type. Production for authorized replacements would not be permitted to exceed agreed annual numbers which would, in effect, amount to a small percentage of the inventories of armaments existing in the hands of the respective sides at the effective date of the freeze agreement. Verification of inventories would not be involved. The agreed replacement numbers would be subject to periodic review.

With respect to replacement of armaments no longer in production, the parties would seek to agree upon acceptable substitutes from among weapons in production. In the absence of such an agreement on items out of production the party concerned could reopen production lines for one-for-one replacement.

Control over the number of missile launchers is an essential element of the program. Limitations would also be imposed on the construction and improvement of launchers and launching facilities, commensurate with the spirit of the production limitations.



Production of boosters for use in space programs would be permitted even though such vehicles are equivalent to the boosters used for armaments, but would be limited to the quantity needed to meet the announced use of the boosters for such space programs.

Limitations on testing would be applied under the program. Certain types of tests and firings would, however, be permitted. Confidence and training firings of existing affected missiles would be limited to an agreed annual number for each type of missile, subject to periodic review, as I indicated earlier. Tests of new missiles and aircraft systems would be permitted to continue, subject to verification, as far as required for allowed space and civil air programs and for development of nonstrategic types of weapons not affected by the freeze. Limitation on research and development testing would be the subject of technical discussions.

How would the freeze be verified? As a point of departure, the parties to the agreement would have to make a complete declaration of all production and testing facilities relevant to the agreement. Declarations would be made after the conclusion but before the implementation of the agreement. Included would be facilities producing—or recently utilized in producing—completed armaments and specified major subassemblies of armaments affected by the freeze. Facilities producing, or recently involved in the production of, vehicles for space or aeronautical programs and their major subassemblies, equivalent to the boosters used for affected armaments, would also be included. All installations used for space launchings and sites to be used for all allowed missile firings would also be declared. Declarations would have to be kept up to date if new facilities were used.

The verification arrangements which we have in mind for the freeze would concentrate on monitoring critical production steps, replacements, and launchings. A verification system sufficient to provide adequate assurance of compliance would of course be required. Such a system could include the following:

- (1) continuing inspection of declared facilities;
- (2) a specified number of inspections per year to check undeclared locations for possible prohibited activities such as armament production or launching-site construction;
- (3) the stationing of observers to verify all space launchings and all allowed missile firings in order that stated requirements for replacement missiles could be verified and the launching of prohibited types of missiles detected;



(4) observation of the destruction of—or, in the case of accidents, other confirmation of—vehicles and launchers being replaced.

Further details of the verification system required will be developed on the basis of further study. It is clear, however, that the verification system for the measure which we are now exploring would be less extensive than that required for general and complete disarmament. It would not involve verification of the levels or the deployment of existing armaments."

With respect to "... a verified agreement to halt all production of fissionable materials for weapons use..." Mr. Foster, on February 13, 1964 said, in part, "I should like now to develop more precisely the United States proposals.

Regarding the cutoff, the United States is willing to agree to either a complete halt in the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons or a reciprocal plant-by-plant shutdown. This approach seems to embrace the entire range of possible methods of bringing a cutoff into effect. We are prepared to halt production all at once or over a period of time. We would welcome an indication from the Soviet delegation of the sort of approach which they would find acceptable.

Regarding the transfer, the United States position is similarly flexible. The proposal originally put forward the United States called for the transfer to nonweapon uses of the same quantity of weapons-grade U-235 by both sides. We have, however, indicated our willingness to consider other ratios whereby the United States would transfer a larger amount than the Soviet Union.

This was reflected in an amendment of the United States treaty outline on 14 August 1963. At that time the United States delegation indicated an example of the kind of arrangement we might agree upon. This might be for the United States to transfer an amount such as 60,000 kilograms if the Soviet Union would agree to transfer 40,000 kilograms. We are still flexible on the question of amounts of weapons-grade U-235 to be removed from availability for nuclear weapons. We would welcome and give serious consideration to any reasonable Soviet counterproposal. ----

"Now I should like to consider some of the possible methods of verifying the cutoff. One of the reasons why the United States delegation believes that this proposal is promising is because the inspection required can be limited in scope.

For example, inspection of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons would not be necessary.



The extent of inspection initially required would depend on whether the Soviet Union preferred a complete halt in the production of fissionable materials for weapons or a reciprocal plant-by-plant shutdown.

If a complete production cutoff were agreed upon, the International Atomic Energy Agency might monitor declared facilities for the production of fissionable material.

Those facilities declared to have been shut down would be inspected to make sure that no production of fissionable materials was taking place. Other declared facilities might continue to produce fissionable materials for peaceful purposes. These facilities and the produced materials would be monitored to insure that no such product was diverted to the fabrication of nuclear weapons.

Each side would also need to have assurance that the other was not engaging in clandestine production at undeclared facilities. We believe that inspection to guard against this possibility could be carried out on a reciprocal basis. We also believe that a reciprocal system could be devised that would not be onerous.

If, on the other hand, production were halted on a plant-by-plant basis by the United States and the Soviet Union, inspection would be even more limited at the outset. Only the plant or plants actually shut down would be inspected. The possibilities of International Atomic Energy Agency inspection of a plant-by-plant shutdown appear promising to us also, and we believe they should be carefully explored."

An elaboration by Mr. Foster, on February 6, 1964, on the point "... to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now controlling them..." included the following text.

"There are constructive steps which we believe the nuclear states can take toward the objective of preventing the dissemination of national nuclear weapon capabilities; and there are steps which nonnuclear states can take in the same field that will increase their own security in the nuclear age.

The United States proposes the following actions:

First: The United States will, in private discussions, seek agreement with the Soviet Union on the terms of a declaration based on the Irish resolution. That would contain undertakings regarding nondissemination and nonacquisition of nuclear weapons. Such a declaration should, we believe, be subject to accession by both nuclear and nonnuclear powers.



As an immediate step, to facilitate progress in these discussions, the United States, for its part, does not intend to take any actions inconsistent with the terms of the Irish resolution. That is the declared policy of the United States.

Second: The United States proposes an exploration of the possibilities of agreement on the application of effective safeguards to transfers of fissionable materials, equipment, or information, for peaceful purposes. We believe that safeguards of this kind would minimize the possibilities of the development of additional nuclear weapon capabilities under national control as a result of such transfers. The kind of agreement we wish to consider would provide that transfers for peaceful purposes would take place only under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or similar arrangements.

Third: The United States reaffirms, as a contribution to the objective of restricting dissemination of nuclear weapons, its proposal for a verified halt in the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, and, in association with such a halt, the United States also reaffirms its proposal for the transfer by the United States and the Soviet Union of agreed quantities of weapons-grade U-235 to nonweapons uses.

If such a production cutoff can be agreed as a separate measure, prior to agreement on Stage I of general and complete disarmament and establishment of an international disarmament organization, the possibility of verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency should be explored. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency might verify the halt in production of fissionable materials for use in weapons at existing production facilities. That might be done on a temporary or permanent basis as agreed in consultation with that organization. Inspection to provide assurance that fissionable materials for weapon use were not produced at clandestine facilities could be conducted on a reciprocal basis pending establishment of the international disarmament organization.

Fourth: We have already stated that the United States intends to reduce its production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons. President Johnson has announced that the United States is shutting down four plutonium reactors and cutting back production of U-235. This should provide a good opportunity for the Soviet Union to follow the principle of mutual example. We urge the Soviet Union to make a similar reduction of its production facilities. We are prepared to agree with the Soviet Union to the plant-by-plant shutdown of additional nuclear production facilities on a verified and reciprocal basis.



Fifth: The United States is prepared to permit international inspection of one of the weapon material production reactors scheduled to be shut down in our country. Possibly this could be done by the International Atomic Energy Agency. This offer by the United States is intended to provide an example and a precedent. We hope that the Soviet Union will reciprocate, but the offer stands whether or not it is reciprocated."



## NUCLEAR FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

Various statements and proposals on nuclear free zones have been advocated for many of the major geographical areas of the world. The most often repeated statements have been those concerned with the following specific areas: Central Europe, Latin America, the Mediterranean, Africa, and the Pacific Ocean area.

### SUMMARIES OF THE PROPOSALS

#### Central Europe

The earliest and most comprehensive proposal on the denuclearization of Central Europe was made by the People's Republic of Poland in October 1957. Commonly referred to as the Rapacki Plan, the Polish government formally submitted the proposal to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 28, 1962.

The disarmament provisions of the proposal are divided into two principal stages. Stage One contains restrictions on nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and bases. Stage Two eliminates nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In addition, Stage Two provides for reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments.

The control provisions of the Polish proposal identify an international inspectorate but do not specify the extent and scope of its responsibilities. Aerial and ground inspection would be one of the functions of the inspectorate.

The nuclear free zone described in the Rapacki Plan would include the national territories of the People's Republic of Poland, Czechoslovakia Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The principle of the Rapacki Plan was subsequently endorsed by Sweden and the Soviet Union. The United States has expressed interest and suggested discussion but has withheld any fundamental acceptance.

#### Latin America

The shortest and most positive statement on denuclearization of Latin America was the Five-Power Declaration on April 29, 1963.



The Declaration was signed by the Presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico. It is basically a policy statement and has not, as yet, been introduced in treaty form at Geneva, though its general theme has been elaborated upon before the UN General Assembly by some of the countries concerned.

In the Declaration, the five Latin American republics expressed their desire to enter into a multilateral agreement which would prohibit the manufacturing, receiving, storing, testing, or launching of nuclear weapons by any country in Latin America.

The two superpowers have indicated support of the Declaration's principles and aims. It was formally denounced by Cuba before the First Committee of the General Assembly because its intent was not broad enough to include U.S. military bases in the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and Guantanamo.

#### Mediterranean

The basic ideas on a nuclear free zone in the Mediterranean area stem from a continuing dialogue, since 1962, between the U.S. and USSR. Most of the discussion has centered around the advantages and disadvantages of such a zone and neither side has detected enough potential or merit in each other's statements to submit a formal treaty or proposal on the subject.

#### Africa

At the conclusion of the African Summit Conference, at Addis Ababa in May of 1963, the African representatives drafted a resolution on general and complete disarmament for consideration by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. A number of provisions of this resolution advocated the principle of a denuclearized African zone. The African states specifically urged (1) a prohibition on manufacturing and testing of all nuclear weapons, (2) promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and (3) destruction of all existing nuclear weapons.

The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee has discussed the African resolution, but has not adopted a formal position on it.

#### Pacific Ocean Area

Nuclear free zones in the "Asian and Pacific Ocean regions" have been advanced by Communist China. Both of Communist China's statements



(one in July and the other in August, 1963) were contained within general statements criticizing the adoption of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

In order to achieve a denuclearized state, Communist China recommended a program based on the following steps:

1. Disband all military bases
2. Establish a nuclear free zone in Asia and Pacific areas (This zone would include the national territories of the U.S., USSR, China, and Japan),
3. Prohibit importing or exporting nuclear materials or technology necessary to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and
4. Cancel all present and future nuclear weapons tests

The proposal has not received serious consideration from any state or international body concerned with disarmament—even the USSR denounced it.

#### TEXTS OF AND STATEMENTS ON THE NUCLEAR FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

##### Rapacki Plan

On March 28, 1962 Poland submitted the "Rapacki Plan for Denuclearized and Limited Armaments Zone in Europe" to the Committee of the Whole of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. The text of this proposal follows.

"Considering that simultaneously with the formulation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament the Eighteen Nation Committee on disarmament is to consider proposals for measures and arrangements designed to reduce international tension, to increase mutual trust between States and thus to facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament,

and that one of the most important of such measures is the establishment of denuclearized and limited armaments zones,

The Delegation of the People's Republic of Poland, in agreement with the delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic submits for consideration by the Committee a proposal for the establishment of a denuclearized and limited armaments zone in Europe.



## **I. Purpose**

The purpose of the Polish proposal is to eliminate nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them and to reduce armed forces and conventional armaments within a limited area in which these measures could help to reduce tension and substantially to limit the danger of conflict.

## **II. Territory**

In principle, the zone should include the following States: the People's Republic of Poland, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The agreement concerning the zone will be open for accession by other European States.

## **III. Rights and duties of States within the zone and of other States**

Rights and duties connected with establishment of the zone should be exercised and carried out in the following two stages:

### **Stage One**

Freezing of nuclear weapons and rockets and prohibition of the establishment of new bases.

#### **(a) Rights and duties of States within the zone**

1. The manufacture and preparations for the manufacture of any type of nuclear weapon or vehicle for the delivery of such a weapon in the territory of States within the zone shall be prohibited.
2. The introduction into their territory by States within the zone of any type of nuclear weapon or vehicle for the delivery of such a weapon shall be prohibited.
3. Authorization by States within the zone of the establishment of new bases or facilities for the stockpiling or use of nuclear weapons or of vehicles for their delivery shall be prohibited.

#### **(b) Rights and duties of other States**

1. All States possessing nuclear weapons and vehicles for their delivery shall be prohibited from transferring them to States within the zone.
2. All States possessing nuclear weapons and vehicles for their delivery shall be prohibited from introducing further quantities of such weapons or vehicles into the territory of the zone.
3. The establishment in the territory of the zone of new bases or facilities for the stockpiling or use of nuclear weapons or of vehicles for their delivery shall be prohibited.



## Stage Two

Elimination of nuclear weapons and rockets and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments.

(a) Rights and duties of States within the zone

1. Elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles from the armaments of States within the zone.

2. Reduction of the armed forces of States within the zone to an agreed level, linked with an appropriate reduction in conventional armaments.

(b) Rights and obligations of other States

1. Withdrawal from the territory of the zone of all types of nuclear weapons, all facilities for their stockpiling and use, all vehicles for the delivery of such weapons placed permanently or temporarily in that territory by other States, and all installations for the use of such vehicles.

2. Reduction to an agreed level of the armed forces of States outside the zone stationed in the territory of the zone, linked with an appropriate reduction in their conventional armaments.

## IV. Control

1. In order to ensure the efficacy of the disarmament measures set out in section III of this memorandum, provision will be made for a system of strict international control and inspection on the ground and in the air, including the establishment of appropriate control posts.

2. A special control body will be set up to supervise the discharge of the duties proposed.

The composition, competence and working procedure of this body will be decided by agreement between the States concerned.

The States signatories to the agreement on the establishment of a denuclearized zone will undertake to submit to control by this body and to grant it all the facilities and assistance it may need for the performance of its task.

3. The States signatories to the agreement on the establishment of a denuclearized zone will determine the extent of control and the measures for applying it in each of the two stages.

## V. Guarantee

In order to guarantee the inviolability of the status of the denuclearized zone, the Powers possessing nuclear weapons will undertake:

(a) to abstain from any measures which might directly or indirectly impair the status of the zone;

(b) not to use nuclear weapons against the territory of the zone.



\* \* \*

Taking the foregoing into consideration, the delegation of the People's Republic of Poland proposes that:

1. The Eighteen Nation Committee should request the States concerned to take immediate measures to give effect to the proposal concerning the establishment of a denuclearized and limited armaments zone.
2. The Committee should request . . . to enter into appropriate negotiations with the States concerned in the establishment of the zone and to submit a report on those negotiations by . . . 1962 at the latest.
3. The Committee should also request the General Assembly of the United Nations to adopt an appropriate resolution concerning the establishment of a denuclearized and limited armaments zone in Europe."

A U. S. Department of State press release on April 3, 1962 presented a statement on the Rapacki Plan and the partial disarmament proposals and said, in part:

"The principal objections of the United States to the Rapacki Plan, which purports to be a confidence-building measure, have been, and remain: (1) that the measures envisaged do not address themselves to the nuclear weapons located in the Soviet Union, the use of which against Western Europe has been repeatedly threatened by Soviet spokesmen; (2) that the plan would therefore result in a serious military imbalance; (3) that consequently, while creating an illusion of progress, it would in reality endanger the peace of the world rather than contribute to maintaining it. The dangers to peace resulting from such an imbalance under present conditions have been clearly and repeatedly demonstrated by events within memory of all."

#### Latin America

The text of the Five-Power Declaration on the Denuclearization of Latin America, released on April 29, 1963 reads as follows:

"The Presidents of the Republics of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico, . . .

Deeply concerned about the present turn of events in the international situation, which is conducive to the spread of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, in virtue of their unchanging peace-loving tradition, the Latin American States should unite their efforts in order to turn Latin America into a denuclearized zone, thus helping to reduce the dangers that threaten world peace,

Wishing to preserve their countries from the tragic consequences attendant upon a nuclear war, and



Spurred by the hope that the conclusion of a Latin American regional agreement will contribute to the adoption of a contractual instrument of world-wide application,

In the name of their peoples and Governments have agreed as follows:

1. To announce forthwith that their Governments are prepared to sign a multilateral Latin American agreement whereby their countries would undertake not to manufacture, receive, store or test nuclear weapons or nuclear launching devices;
2. To bring this Declaration to the attention of the Heads of State of the other Latin American Republics, expressing the hope that their Governments will accede to it through such procedure as they consider appropriate;
3. To co-operate with one another and with such other Latin American Republics as accede to this Declaration, in order that Latin America may be recognized as a denuclearized zone as soon as possible."

On November 11, 1963, in a statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly on Denuclearization of Latin America, Senor Bernardes, Brazilian Representative, said in part:

"I should like now to comment on certain specific points raised in regard to the idea of making Latin America an atom-free area.

In Geneva and in the present session of the General Assembly, it has been stated that the creation of denuclearized zones ought to meet satisfactorily the following criteria: first, the area contemplated must be outside the zone of direct great-Power confrontation and must not disturb the existing global power balance; secondly, the decision to denuclearize a given area must be freely taken by all the countries belonging to this area; and, thirdly, the denuclearization agreement must include adequate measures for verification and control. We believe that the denuclearization of Latin America can fully satisfy these criteria.

To begin with, I should like to stress the fact that Latin America is not an area of direct great-Power confrontation and that its denuclearization would in no way disturb the present world balance of power. The Western coalition, and the United States in particular, has never used Latin American territory for the purpose of installing missile bases. There has never arisen the need to station in Latin American countries the components of a tactical or a strategical nuclear air force. On the contrary, it appears that the technological improvements brought about by the inter-continental ballistic missiles will progressively do away with the need for foreign bases. Furthermore, it looks as if the increasing need for invulnerability and the new techniques devised to achieve it will make unnecessary the utilization of foreign territory or foreign territorial waters for the purpose of defence and security. It follows that denuclearization in Latin America would in no way impair the security of the Western coalition and that of the United States in particular."



### Africa

The African Summit Conference Resolution on General and Complete Disarmament, submitted on May 25, 1963, reads as follows:

"The Summit Conference of Independent African States meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 22 May to 25 May 1963:

Having considered all aspects of the questions of general disarmament; Unanimously convinced of the imperious and urgent necessity of coordinating and intensifying their efforts to contribute to the achievement of a realistic disarmament programme through the signing, by all States concerned, of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control;

Have agreed unanimously to concert and co-ordinate their efforts and action in these various fields, and to this end have decided on the following measures:

1. To affirm and respect the principle of declaring Africa a Denuclearized Zone; to oppose all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, as well as the manufacture of nuclear weapons; and to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
2. The destruction of existing nuclear weapons;
3. To undertake to bring about, by means of negotiation, the end of military occupation of the African continent and the elimination of military bases and nuclear tests, which elimination constitutes a basic element of African Independence and Unity;
4. To appeal to the great Powers to:
  - (a) reduce conventional weapons;
  - (b) put an end to the arms race; and
  - (c) sign a general and complete disarmament agreement under strict and effective international control;
5. To appeal to the great Powers, in particular to the Soviet Union and the United States of America, to use their best endeavours to secure the objectives stated above."

### Pacific Ocean Area

Subsequent to the signing in Moscow of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Communist Chinese issued a statement which proposed steps with respect to disarmament and nuclear free zone establishment. The statement says, in part:

"The Chinese Government is firmly opposed to nuclear war and to a world war. It always stands for general disarmament and resolutely stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. The Chinese Government and people have never spared their



efforts in order to realize this aim step by step. As is known to the whole world, the Chinese Government long ago proposed, and has consistently stood for, the establishment of a zone free from nuclear weapons in the Asian and Pacific region, including the United States.

The Chinese Government holds that the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war are major questions affecting the destiny of the world, which should be discussed and decided on jointly by all the countries of the world, big and small. Manipulation of the destiny of more than 100 nonnuclear countries by a few nuclear powers will not be tolerated.

The Chinese Government holds that on such important issues as the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war, it is impermissible to adopt the method of deluding the people of the world. It should be affirmed unequivocally that nuclear weapons must be completely banned and thoroughly destroyed and that practical and effective measures must be taken so as to realize step by step the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, prevent nuclear war and safeguard world peace.

For these reasons, the Government of the People's Republic of China hereby proposes the following:

1. All countries in the world, both nuclear and nonnuclear, solemnly declare that they will prohibit and destroy nuclear weapons completely, thoroughly, totally, and resolutely. Concretely speaking, they will not use nuclear weapons, not export, nor import, nor manufacture, nor test, nor stockpile them; and they will destroy all the existing nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in the world, and disband all the existing establishments for the research, testing, and manufacture of nuclear weapons in the world.

2. In order to fulfill the above undertakings step by step, the following measures shall be adopted first:

- (a) Dismantle all military bases, including nuclear bases, on foreign soil, and withdraw from abroad all nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

- (b) Establish a nuclear weapon-free zone of the Asian and Pacific region, including the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan; a nuclear weapon-free zone of central Europe; a nuclear weapon-free zone of Africa; and a nuclear weapon-free zone of Latin America. The countries possessing nuclear weapons shall undertake due obligations with regard to each of the nuclear weapon-free zones.

- (c) Refrain from exporting and importing in any form nuclear weapons and technical data for their manufacture.

- (d) Cease all nuclear tests, including underground nuclear tests.

3. A conference of the government heads of all the countries of the world shall be convened to discuss the question of the complete prohibition



and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and the question of taking the above-mentioned four measures in order to realize step by step the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

The Chinese Government and people are deeply convinced that nuclear weapons can be prohibited, nuclear war can be prevented, and world peace can be preserved. We call upon the countries in the socialist camp and all the peace-loving countries and people of the world to unite and fight unswervingly to the end for the complete, thorough, total, and resolute prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and for the defense of world peace."



## OBSERVATION POSTS

The concept of observation posts has been proposed many times, although the proposals, in general, have been lacking in detailed specificity in the sense of the GCD and Nuclear Free Zone proposals. The fourth point of President Johnson's Five-Point program is, "... creating a system of observation posts..." which is included in the section covering the Five-Point program. In general, the proposals advanced for various forms of observation posts have been rejected for one or another reason, although considerable discussion and debate has been given to them.

### TEXT OF AND STATEMENTS ON OBSERVATION POSTS PROPOSALS


In a working paper, "Reduction of the Risk of War Through Accident, Miscalculation, or Failure of Communication," submitted by the United States to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on December 12, 1962, the following details on observation posts were included.

**"Purpose.** Advance notification constitutes a potentially useful measure undertaken separately or in conjunction with other measures. A closely related measure would, in effect, represent an extension of the advance notification concept through the establishment of systems of ground observation posts at major transportation centers. The posts comprising such systems could receive such information relative to military activities in their vicinity as the host state might wish to provide and could, under agreed arrangements, observe the flow of military traffic and the general level of military activity on a local basis, thereby clarifying reports made pursuant to advance notification procedures.

Not only the capability of supplementing advance notification through direct observation but also the willingness of host states to co-operate in the establishment and operation of observation post systems could contribute further to the building of confidence and the improvement of reassurance in the relations of the states or groups of states concerned.

**Elements of systems.** It would be impractical (as well as unnecessary from the standpoint of providing general reassurance) to attempt to establish observation posts at all transportation centers. It would be sufficient to place posts at such locations as certain principal ports, major railroad junctions, intersections of key highways, and possibly at certain significant airfields.

The complement of posts might vary as the result of differing conditions in the locations of interest, but relatively limited complements should be adequate. Members of post complements would enjoy such privileges and immunities and would have such travel rights as might be agreed.



Each post would be responsible for observing military movements within an agreed surrounding area. Over-all value of the posts would be enhanced if, on the occasion of military movements through nearby areas, host states would, at their discretion, afford opportunities for observation at the point nearest the post-city. Similarly, it might be useful to be able to conduct occasional visits to transportation centers where no posts were permanently located. In all cases, access would be limited to points appropriate for observation purposes.

To facilitate accomplishment of the missions of observation posts, host states should provide advance notification of movements passing through the post area.

Extent of geographic coverage. The potential usefulness of systems of observation posts is not confined to particular states or areas. In the broadest sense, such systems would be useful wherever significant military activities take place. The geographic coverage of particular systems, however, would, as a practical matter, be designed to reflect military relationship in a realistic manner.

Where neighbouring states might undertake to provide mutual reassurance through establishment of a system of observation posts, it is not unlikely that transportation centers near frontiers would offer suitable locations. Where groups of states might wish to undertake such a measure, appreciation of military realities would seem to make desirable the establishment of posts in each of the participating states since observation of areas from which forces might be projected would be of importance in addition to observation of more central locations."

The text continued with a discussion of "additional observation arrangements."

"Purpose. The establishment of systems of ground observation posts in fixed locations would represent a major improvement in existing conditions. However, it is apparent that the capabilities of such posts would be limited. Accordingly, it would seem useful to consider whether mutually acceptable arrangements for additional types of observation could be developed either to supplement systems of ground observation posts or as separate measures. As a general matter such arrangements could be useful either on an ad hoc or continuing basis and could provide highly effective and flexible means of rapidly identifying and clarifying military activities and events.

Elements of systems. Any and all of such observation techniques as the following offer substantial promise:

1. Aerial observation.
2. Mobile ground observation teams.
3. Over-lapping radars.



Each of these techniques offers a different approach to resolving the same problem: that of lessening the possibility of unexpected confrontations of military power and thereby lessening the risk of the outbreak of war. The details of arrangements for employing such techniques would be on an agreed basis and of a character designed to give equal assurance to all participating states.

Extent of geographic coverage. Where states or groups of states wished to employ techniques such as the foregoing, agreement would have to be reached on the geographic areas involved. Such areas might be identical for all techniques although this need not necessarily be the case. The problem can be approached on a pragmatic basis with due regard to the relationships of the states or groups of states concerned. "

In a statement on August 16, 1963 by the Acting Soviet Representative (Tsarapkin) to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on "Measures To Decrease International Tension," observation (or control) posts were discussed under the problem of preventing surprise attack. The statement included the following:

"The problem of preventing surprise attack, which has long been on the agenda of international life, is also of great importance in these days. We would recall that as far back as November 1958 the Soviet Union proposed the adoption of a number of concrete measures designed to prevent surprise attack. In those Soviet proposals control measures were combined with certain partial disarmament measures which could be carried out with some amendments in conformity with present-day conditions. It is quite obvious that the danger of surprise attack can be finally eliminated only in conditions of general and complete disarmament when the military machines of all States have been abolished. However, even before general and complete disarmament has been carried out—which is the object of our main efforts—it is possible and even necessary to adopt certain measures which would reduce the threat of surprise attack, would eliminate to a considerable extent the suspicions of States in regard to one another, and would thereby contribute towards the achievement of agreement on general and complete disarmament.

What does this require first of all? As the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, said in his speech of 19 July:

...we consider it appropriate to establish in certain areas of the Soviet Union and of other countries, ground control posts at airports, railway junctions, main roads and in major ports. Of course, all this must be done on a reciprocal basis.

In our opinion, the establishment of such control posts might be one of the most important means of reducing the danger of surprise attack. It can hardly be denied that even with the existence of nuclear missile weapons, preparations for a modern large-scale war are inevitably linked with the need



to concentrate large detachments of troops and a large quantity of armaments and military equipment in certain areas. In the event of war, only the irruption of substantial land forces can ensure control of the enemy's territory. That is why we propose the establishment of ground control posts to keep watch on the lines of the movement of troops, so that there should be no dangerous concentration of the large masses of troops without which surprise attack is impossible. Everyone understands that, in order to carry out a military invasion, it is necessary to assemble armed forces with effectives, armaments, military equipment and materiel and technical means and to group them appropriately along the lines of attack. It is obvious that such preparations, which require large scale movements of troops and military equipment by railway, road and air and through large ports, practically do not lend themselves to concealment, and the establishment of control post at these points would make it possible to detect any such preparations in good time.

Of course, the establishment of control posts cannot in itself guarantee the maintenance of peace; it would nevertheless be a definite measure aimed at preventing surprise attack, provided, of course, that it was combined with certain partial disarmament measures.

As I have just pointed out, that is precisely the way in which the question is stated in the Soviet proposals of 28 November 1958 for the prevention of surprise attack. Such a combination of measures is certainly necessary if we wish ground control posts to play the part of an effective measure for reducing the danger of surprise attack and relaxing tension. What would be the use of control posts if they were not combined with the implementation of other measures aimed at reducing the danger of the concentration of troops and armaments confronting one another? That would simply be control without disarmament, but such an approach to the solution of the problems before us would yield no positive results; it has been entirely discredited, and I do not think that anyone will insist on it today.


We must combine such a measure as the establishment of control posts with certain partial disarmament measures. Specific considerations in this regard are contained in the Soviet proposals of 28 November 1958. Life, however, does not stand still, and we are prepared to introduce the appropriate changes required by life itself into the series of measures listed in the aforesaid Soviet proposals. In particular, we agree to the establishment of control posts also at airfields, a measure to which the Soviet Union previously objected. On the other hand, the question of aerial photography, which was included in the Soviet proposals of 1958, no longer arises today. Certain other reasonable modifications could also be made in these proposals. But there are some measures which have not lost their urgency. The question of ensuring the security of the peoples of Europe, and, consequently, universal peace, is particularly acute at the present time. The proposal of the Soviet Union for the reduction of foreign troops located both on the territory

**NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC.**



**SPACE and INFORMATION SYSTEMS DIVISION**

of the German Democratic Republic and on the territory of Western Germany is aimed at creating conditions that would facilitate the achievement of this aim. It is well known that the Soviet Government is in favour of carrying out this measure as a first step towards the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Europe and considers that, at the present time, in view of the definite improvement in the international situation, favourable conditions have been created for reaching specific agreement on this question."



## EXCHANGE OF MILITARY MISSIONS

The exchange of military missions is contained in both the U.S. and the USSR general and complete disarmament proposals. In Stage I of the U.S. proposal, the exchange of military missions is proposed as a means for "Reduction of the Risk of War." It reads as follows:

"Specified Parties to the Treaty would undertake the exchange of military missions between states or groups of states in order to improve communications and understanding between them. Specific arrangements respecting such exchange would be agreed."

The Soviet Revised Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under Strict International Control, " of September 22, 1962, contained reference to exchange of military missions under Article 17a, "Measures to reduce the danger of outbreak of war." It reads:

"1. From the commencement of the first stage large-scale joint military movements or manoeuvres by armed forces of two or more States shall be prohibited.

The States parties to the Treaty agree to give advance notification of large-scale military movements or manoeuvres by their national armed forces within their national frontiers.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall exchange military missions between States or groups of States for the purpose of improving relations and mutual understanding between them.

3. The States parties to the Treaty agree to establish swift and reliable communication between their Heads of Government and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

4. The measures set forth in this article shall remain in effect after the first stage until the completion of general and complete disarmament."

In the U.S. working paper, "Reduction of the Risk of War Through Accident, Miscalculation, or Failure of Communication," submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee on December 12, 1962, an expansion of the proposal for exchange of military missions was presented. The text of the section entitled "Exchange of Military Missions" reads as follows.



**"Purpose.** The problem of reducing the risk of the outbreak of war does not, of course, arise simply from the unexpected character of certain military activities or lack of factual knowledge concerning them. In the first place, the state initiating an activity may have miscalculated the response that might be occasioned on the part of another state. In the second place, a state which views a particular activity with concern may be misinterpreting its true character. In both cases, each of the states involved will proceed not only on the basis of such factual information as may be available but also in the light of its own past experience, its assessment of over-all military relationships, and its military as well as political evaluation of the intentions of the other state.

Even with adequate factual information, there is no way of ensuring that these broader factors which govern calculations and interpretations will prove accurate guides in a specific situation. However, it appears reasonable to suppose that such factors may be more clearly accurate, or less so, to the extent that they are formed on the basis of extensive or narrow contacts between the states or groups of states involved. In this regard, it may be of some significance that direct contacts between the military establishments of many states and groups of states, are, generally speaking, relatively narrow. The exchange of military missions suggests itself as a possible approach to this aspect of the problem.

**General character of exchanges.** The exchange of military missions is conceived as taking place between the central military headquarters of states or groups of states. Each mission would be headed by an officer of high rank. A number of additional officers, possibly of specialized competence, and the necessary supporting personnel would complete the mission. Members of the mission would be fully accredited and would enjoy such privileges and immunities and would have such travel rights as might be agreed.

Within the framework of the agreed arrangements, the mission would carry out formal and continuing liaison with the military headquarters of the host state or group. Functions of the mission might include such activities as the following:

1. Receipt of such information or views on military matters as the host state or group might wish to make available.
2. Observation of such specific military activities or events as the host state or group, at its discretion or under agreed arrangements, might make accessible.
3. Consultation on military matters of common concern.
4. Participation, upon request, in efforts to clarify ambiguous situations where lack of authentic information might prove disquieting either to the host or the sponsoring state or group.



5. Reporting of the foregoing to the sponsoring state or group and representation of its views on military matters in contacts with the host headquarters.

Although the foregoing functions are of considerable importance, it would be hoped that in practice the opportunity for continuing contact between competent and responsible military officials would itself prove to be of substantial value to those involved and to the states or groups they would represent."



### III. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENT—1945-1964

A chronology of arms control, diplomatic, political, military and technological events, spanning the years 1945 through 1964, are contained herein.

NORTH AMERICAN AVIA

		1945												1946												1947												1948												1949											
		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC												
ARMS CONTROL		FOUR-POWER DECLARATION ON GENERAL SECURITY SIGNED IN MOSCOW BY U.S., U.S.S.R., AND CHINA  THREE-POWER DECLARATION ON ATOMIC ENERGY ISSUED AT WASHINGTON D.C., SIGNED BY U.S., U.S. AND CANADA  U.S. BECAME CO-PROTECTOR OF UNITED NATIONS ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION												U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY CREATED THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) BY UNANIMOUS RESOLUTION  BERNARD BARUCH PRESENTED U.S. PLAN FOR CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY TO U.N. - AEC  U.S. ADVOCATED INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR CONTROLLING PRODUCTION AND USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS												U.N. TRIANGLE ASSEMBLY UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED U.S. PROPOSAL FOR CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY AND REGULATION AND RESTRICTION OF WEAPONS												U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL ESTABLISHED COMMISSION FOR THE REGULATION OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS  U.S. MADE ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS FOR THE CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY BEFORE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL																							
DIPLOMATIC, POLITICAL, MILITARY		YALTA CONFERENCE (ROOSEVELT, CHURCHILL, STALIN)  PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT DIED  LEAGUE OF NATIONS TRANSFERRED ASSETS TO U.S. AND BUSINESS TO U.S.  U.N. CONFERENCE OPENED IN SAN FRANCISCO, U.N. CHARTER ADOPTED  NAZIS/GERMANY SURRENDERED UNCONDITIONALLY												POTSDAM CONFERENCE (TRUMAN, CHURCHILL - ATTLEE)  ATOMIC BOMB DROPPED ON HIROSHIMA  ATOMIC BOMB DROPPED ON NAGASAKI  UNCONDITIONAL JAPANESE SURRENDER AROUND U.S. BOMBING  U.S. FORCES REPLACES JAPANESE IN KOREA SOUTH OF 38th PARALLEL  GENERAL DOUGLAS MAC ARTHUR ASSUMED COMMAND OF OCCUPIED JAPAN												FIRST WORLD WAR II PLACE TREATY SIGNED BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN  FOURTH INTERNATIONAL BANC CONFERENCE  U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF U.N. OPENED IN LONDON												U.S. CONGRESS PASSED ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL ACT (HAWKESBURY BILL)  PRICE REDUCES PROVIDED TO GERMANY'S REPARATIONS ALIEN (U.S. \$1.25 BILLION PROVIDED IN REPARATIONS)  PRESIDENT TRUMAN FORMALLY DECLARED AN END TO U.S. HOSTILITIES												U.S. CONGRESS PASSED ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL ACT (HAWKESBURY BILL)  PRICE REDUCES PROVIDED TO GERMANY'S REPARATIONS ALIEN (U.S. \$1.25 BILLION PROVIDED IN REPARATIONS)  PRESIDENT TRUMAN FORMALLY DECLARED AN END TO U.S. HOSTILITIES											
TECHNOLOGICAL		FIRST ATOMIC BOMB PRODUCED AT LOS ALAMOS, N.M., EXPLODED AT ALAMOGORDO, N.M.												U.S. ARMY SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHED BALLS BLAST OFF OF LAUNCH SPACE																																															

[illegible]

# NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION

1949													1950																																																			
JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY																																				
<p>▲ FRANCE PROPOSED VARIATION OF UN SECURITY (SEE U. N. SEC. 4) TO PLAN A WORLD-WIDE CENSUS OF MAIN-ARMED WEAPONS AND ARMED FORCES</p> <p>▲ UN-SEC. 4 SPENDING ITS POWER INDEPENDENTLY</p> <p>▲ SOVIET UNION VETED FRENCH PROPOSAL ON WORLD-WIDE CENSUS</p> <p>▲ UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SUPPORTED MAJORITY PLAN FOR ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL</p> <p>▲ UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTED "ESSENTIALS OF PEACE" RESOLUTION (PLEDGED UN MEMBERS TO SEEK PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND TO SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION OF ARMS CONTROL)</p> <p>▲ UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY APPROVED THE PROPOSALS FORMULATED BY COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENT</p>													<p>▲ COMMUNISTS-SPONSORED WORLD CONGRESS OF PARTISANS OF PEACE AT ST. LOUIS, SWEDEN ADOPTED "ST. LOUIS RESOLUTION", (PROHIBITED USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AND ATOMIC BOMB)</p> <p>▲ FRANCE, UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES ANNOUNCED TRIPARTITE DECLARATION FOR SECURITY IN FAR EAST (UPHOLD ARMISTICE BETWEEN ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL)</p> <p>▲ PRESIDENT TRUMAN RECOMMENDED BROADEN APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT (CO-ORDINATE UN-SEC. 4 AND COMMISSION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENT)</p> <p>▲ UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTED "UNITING FOR PEACE" RESOLUTION</p> <p>▲ UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTED "PEACE THROUGH PEACE" RESOLUTION</p>													<p>▲ PRESIDENT TRUMAN ENDED SENATOR RALPH BARNETT'S PROPOSAL FOR PROGRESSIVE DISARMAMENT UNDER UN-SEC. 4</p> <p>▲ UNITED STATES CONGRESS PASSED RESOLUTION URGING UN TO ADOP ARMS AND STRATEGIC MATERIAL EMBARGO AGAINST COMMUNIST CHINA</p> <p>▲ UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTED AN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST COMMUNIST CHINA</p>																																						
ARMS CONTROL																																																																
<p>▲ CHINESE COMMUNISTS OCCUPIED TIENTSIN</p> <p>▲ CHINESE NATIONALISTS SURRENDER PEIPING</p> <p>▲ U. S. CONGRESS APPROVED THE EXPORT CONTROL ACT, PRESIDENT TO REGULATE EXPORT OF STRATEGIC MATERIALS</p> <p>▲ NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY SIGNED IN WASHINGTON D. C. BY U. S., CANADA, AND 16 WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS</p> <p>▲ REPUBLIC OF THE SEVERE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN</p> <p>▲ CHINESE COMMUNISTS CROSSED THE YANGTZE AND CAPTURED NANKING</p>													<p>▲ U. S. WHITE PAPER ON CHINA, U. S. DISCONTINUED AID TO NATIONALISTS CHINA</p> <p>▲ WESTERN POWERS ENDED MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY AND PROMULGATED A CIVILIAN OCCUPATION STATUTE</p> <p>▲ CHINESE COMMUNISTS TOOK YUNNAN AND KUNMING AS NATIONALIST FORCES FLED TO SCAMOSA, CHINESE REDS CONTROL MANCHANG</p>													<p>▲ HUNGARY ORDERED TO CLOSE REMAINING CONSULATE OFFICE IN U. S.</p> <p>▲ GREAT BRITAIN RECOGNIZED RED CHINA DAY AFTER SEVERING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH NATIONALISTS CHINA</p> <p>▲ U. S. RECALLED ALL CONSULAR OFFICIALS FROM RED CHINA</p> <p>▲ USSR REPRESENTATION WITHDREW FROM THE UN-SEC</p> <p>▲ INDIA PROCLAIMED INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC, AT NEW DELHI, DR. RAJENDRA PRASAD, PRESIDENT</p> <p>▲ PRESIDENT TRUMAN AUTHORIZED AEC TO PRODUCE HYDROGEN BOMB</p> <p>▲ DR. REAUS RUCHS READED QUINITY IN ENGLAND TO ESPIONAGE</p> <p>▲ REPUBLIC OF KOREA INVADIED BY NORTH KOREAN COMMUNISTS</p> <p>▲ UN SECURITY COUNCIL ORDERED END TO HOSTILITIES AND NORTH KOREAN WITHDRAWAL</p> <p>▲ PRESIDENT TRUMAN ORDERED U. S. AID TO SOUTH KOREA</p>													<p>▲ PRESIDENT TRUMAN ORDERED SEIZURE OF ALL U. S. RAILROADS TO PREVENT STRIKE</p> <p>▲ SUCCESSFUL INCHON LANDING BY UN FORCES</p> <p>▲ INTERNAL SECURITY ACT PASSED BY U. S. FORCES PROVIDED FOR THE REGISTRATION AND INTERNMENT OF COMMUNISTS DURING NATIONAL EMERGENCIES</p> <p>▲ UN FORCES CAPTURED PYONGYANG</p> <p>▲ PUERTO RICANS ATTEMPTED TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT TRUMAN</p> <p>▲ CHINESE COMMUNISTS ATTACKED UN FORCES IN KOREA</p> <p>▲ U. S. BANNED SHIPMENTS TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND ALLIATE PORTS TRADING WITH RED CHINESE</p> <p>▲ U. S. SUPREME COURT UPHOLD THE FIFTH AMENDMENT</p>													<p>▲ PRESIDENT TRUMAN BELIEVED GENE DOLGUS AS MORE AUTHOR OF UN COMMAND IN KOREA</p> <p>▲ "THE KOREA LIBERATION" OF THE ANNOUNCED BY COMMUNIST CHINA, CHINESE COMMUNISTS BEGAN TO STATION TROOPS IN TIENT</p>												
DIPLOMATIC, POLITICAL, MILITARY																																																																
<p>▲ PRESIDENT TRUMAN ANNOUNCED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD EXPLODED AN ATOMIC DEVICE, END OF U. S. A-BOMB MONOPOLY</p>																																																																
TECHNOLOGICAL																																																																

A

Chronicle



# A

[illegible]

[illegible]



1961													1962																														
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC													JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC																														
ARMS CONTROL	U.S. DISARMAMENT ADMINISTRATION ANNOUNCED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL OF EXPERTS  PRESIDENT KENNEDY ANNOUNCED THE APPOINTMENT OF JOHN J. MCCLOY AS DISARMAMENT ADVISER  COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTER'S CONFERENCE REPORTED THAT DISARMAMENT WAS WORLD'S MOST PRESSING PROBLEM  CONFERENCE ON DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS RECONVENED IN GENEVA  AT WORLD PEACE CONF. IN CHINA DECLARED SUPPORT FOR SOVIET'S PROPOSAL ON GENERAL DISARMAMENT  U.S. AND USSR INTRODUCED A COMPLETE DRAFT TREATY AT GENEVA  UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTED RESOLUTION SUPPORTING U.S. AND USSR AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF DISARMAMENT  U.S. AND USSR HELD BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON DISARMAMENT  PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER MCCLOY FORMALLY RECOMMENDED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SEPARATE DISARMAMENT AGENCY													U.S. AND USSR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON DISARMAMENT WERE RESUMED IN MOSCOW  U.S. AMBASSADOR DEAN INTRODUCED NEW PROPOSALS AT THE GENEVA TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS  PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND PRIME MINISTER MACLELLAN URGED PRIME MINISTER KHRUSHCHEV NOT TO CONDUCT ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TEST  PRESIDENT KENNEDY PRESENTED NEW U.S. PROGRAM FOR GCD TO UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, U.S. FORMALLY PRESENTED GCD PROPOSAL  PRESIDENT KENNEDY SIGNED BILL FORMALLY ESTABLISHING THE ACDA AS AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY  UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY PASSED RESOLUTION CALLING FOR RESUMPTION OF TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS  GENEVA TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS WERE RESUMED  UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY PASSED TWO RESOLUTIONS OPPOSING TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS  U.S. AND USSR AGREED ON THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT COMMISSION FROM 10 TO 18 NATIONS													THE SOVIET UNION SUBMITTED AN AMENDED VERSION OF THEIR DRAFT TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT TO THE 18 NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE  THE U.S. SUBMITTED AN AMENDED VERSION OF THEIR TREATY ORIGINALLY SUBMITTED IN SEP. 1961 ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT TO THE 18 NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE  THE SOVIET UNION SUBMITTED FURTHER REVISIONS TO THEIR DRAFT TREATY ON GCD													U.S. AND USSR BILATERAL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS HELD IN NEW YORK  UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS IN NEVADA WERE SUSPENDED BY PRES. KENNEDY  USSR BROKE OFF BILATERAL NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TALKS WITH U.S.  SOVIETS WITHDREW 4,000 TROOPS FROM CUBA  SOVIETS ACCEPTED U.S. PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A "HOT LINE"  AMBASSADOR HARMAN MADE A VISIT TO MOSCOW TO DISCUSS PEACE CONDITIONS IN LAOS  PRES. KENNEDY AND PRIME MINISTER MACLELLAN URGED SOVIETS TO CONTINUE TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS  AMBASSADOR HARMAN NAMED TO NEGOTIATE TEST BAN TREATY IN MOSCOW  U.S. AND SOVIET UNION ANNOUNCED AGREEMENT ON "HOT LINE"			
	U.S. SEVERED DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR RELATIONS WITH CUBA  PATRICIA LUMUMBA, OUSTED PRIME MINISTER OF THE CONGO, WAS MURDERED IN KATANGA  PRESIDENT KENNEDY, BY EXECUTIVE ORDER, CREATED THE U.S. PEACE CORPS  CUBAN EXILES, ATTEMPTED TO OVERTHROW THE REGIME OF FIDEL CASTRO. IT WAS CRUSHED BY CASTRO'S FORCES  FRENCH GENERAL'S GROUP ATTEMPTED A REBELLION IN ALGERIA AGAINST PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S POLICIES  PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND SOVIET PRIME MINISTER KHRUSHCHEV MET IN CONFERENCE IN VIENNA													EAST GERMANY CLOSED THE BORDER BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BERLIN BY THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WALL  UN SECRETARY GENERAL, DAG HAMMARSKJOLD WAS KILLED IN PLANE CRASH IN NORTH INDONESIA  SYRIA DISCLOSED POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH U.S.  INDIA INVADED AND SEIZED THE PORTUGUESE ENCLAVES OF GOA, DAMAO, AND DIU ON INDIA'S WEST COAST													TRUCE AGREEMENT ENDED THE SEVEN YEAR MOSLEM REVOLT AGAINST FRENCH RULE IN ALGERIA  U.S. SUPREME COURT RULING OPPOSED THE SIGHTING OF PLAYERS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS  SOVIETS BROKE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI OVER THE ENTRANCE OF NEGRO JAMES H. REEB  THE 21ST ECUMENICAL COUNCIL OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH WAS OPENED IN ROME BY PONTIFF JOHN XXIII  SOVIET OFFENSIVE BUILDUP IN CUBA WAS REVEALED TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC; PRESIDENT DEMANDS A WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET MISSILES; U.S. NAVY IMPOSED A QUARANTINE ACROSS SEAS LANE'S SERVING CUBA  HUNGARIANS CLASHED WITH SOVIET TROOPS OUTSIDE OF BUDAPEST AND IN THE COUNTRYSIDE													GENERAL LYMAN L. LEMMON, JR. TOOK COMMAND OF NATO FIRST GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  U.S. REAFFIRMED SUPPORT FOR ROYALIST GOVERNMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA  U.S. AND SAUDI ARABIA RESUMED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS  MAJOR AIR FORCE OFFICERS OVERTHREW GOVERNMENT IN U.S., U.S. RECOGNIZED NEW GOVERNMENT  PRO-VASSAL MILITARY OFFICERS SEIZED CONTROL OF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT  RUSSIA ELECTED TO UN MEMBER BROUGHT TOTAL MEMBERSHIP TO 118  PRESIDENT KENNEDY ANNOUNCED MILITARY SUPPORT OF WESTERN EUROPE  PRESIDENT MET WITH A CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENT ON CUBA PROBLEM  CANADA AND U.S. AGREED ON JOINT DEFENSE POLICY  U.S. AND NATO RESUMED NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS  FRANCE WITHDREW NAVY FROM NATO'S ATLANTIC COMMAND  PRESIDENT KENNEDY DEPARTED FOR 18 DAY EUROPEAN TOUR			
	SOVIET UNION SUCCESSFULLY ORBITED MAJOR TYPE GAGALIN  FRANCE EXPLODED A NUCLEAR DEVICE IN THE SAHARA THE FOURTH SUCH DETONATION FOR THE FRENCH  U.S. ROCKETS COMMANDER ALAN SHEPARD INTO A SUB-ORBITAL FLIGHT FROM CAPE CANAVERAL													U.S. NAVY COMMISSIONED FIRST TWO SEAL TRANS FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONS  FIRST AIRCRAFT REGAN OPERATIONS FROM NUCLEAR ATTACK CARRIERS (CVAN) USS ENTERPRISE  LT. COL. JOHN GLINN, JR. SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED THREE ORBITS OF THE EARTH IN "FREEDSHIP"  THE SUBMARINE USS SAN HOUCTION LAUNCHED A POLARIS A-2 MISSILE SUBMERGED, THE U.S. RESUMED NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE ATMOSPHERE  U.S. ROCKETS MAJOR IV WAS LAUNCHED FROM CAPE CANAVERAL, U.S. 22 AND IMPACTED ON LUNAR SURFACE (APR 24)  LT. COL. AL. SCOTT CAPTAINED COMPLETED A THREE ORBIT MISSION IN MERCURY CAPSULE "AURORA"													TELSTAR LAUNCHED INTO ORBIT  USS BLAKE AND USS SEADRAGON RENDEZVOUSED UNDER THE POLAR ICE CAP  USSER ORBITED MAJOR ANDRIAN NIKOLAYEV AND LT. COL. DAVID POPOVICH INTO NEARLY IDENTICAL ORBITS  U.S. LAUNCHED MAJOR H FOR VENUS FLY-BY SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED ON DEC 16													TELSTAR I COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE DEACTIVATED BY RADAR SIGNALS FROM EARTH  U.S. AND USSR AGREED ON JOINT WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAM  FRANCE REVEALED PLANS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR TEST CENTER TO BE BUILT IN THE  SECOND COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE, TELSTAR II, SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHED FROM CAPE CANAVERAL  U.S. ASTRONAUT GORDON CO. MADE PERFECT PACIFIC LANDFALL AFTER 22 ORBIT MISSION  NASA ANNOUNCED COMPLETION OF MERCURY SPACE PROGRAM  SOVIETS ORBITED LT. COL. VAL. P. BYKOVSKY  FIRST WOMAN COSMONAUT, Y. TERESHKOVA ORBITED			
DIPLOMATIC, POLITICAL, MILITARY																																											
TECHNOLOGICAL																																											



1961												1962												1963																							
JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC												
<p>1770 P. THEIR AL AND TO THE E</p> <p>UNDE 7. RE ON GEN WELT TO T COMMITTEE</p> <p>THE SOVIET UNION SUBMITTED FURTHER BELIEVING IN THEIR DEALT TREATY ON QLO</p>												<p>U.S. AND USSR BILATERAL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS HELD IN NEW YORK</p> <p>UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS IN NEVADA WERE SUSPENDED BY PRES. KENNEDY</p> <p>USSR WROTE OFF BILATERAL NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TALKS WITH U.S.</p> <p>SOVIETS WITHDREW 8,500 TROOPS FROM CUBA</p> <p>SOVIETS ACCEPTED U.S. PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF WASHINGTON- MOSCOW "HOT LINE"</p> <p>AMBASSADOR HARMAN SENT TO MOSCOW TO DISCUSS PEACE CONVENTIONS IN LAOS</p> <p>PRES. KENNEDY AND PRIME MINISTER MAC MILLAN URGED SOVIETS TO CONTINUE TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS</p> <p>AMBASSADOR HARMAN NAMED TO NEGOTIATE TEST BAN TREATY IN MOSCOW</p> <p>U.S. AND SOVIET UNION SIGNED AGREEMENT ON "HOT LINE"</p>												<p>SENATE QUICKLY RECOMMENDED NON-ADJUDICATION OF TEST BAN TREATY</p> <p>PRES. KENNEDY RECOMMENDED IN SPEECH BEFORE UN THAT U.S. AND USSR PARTICIPATE IN JOINT EXPEDITION TO MOON</p> <p>SENATE APPROVED OF NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY</p> <p>EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION LINE ("HOT LINE") OPENED BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW</p> <p>SECRETARY MC NAMARA ANNOUNCED PLANS TO CLOSE OR REDUCE OPERATIONS AT 30 U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS</p>												<p>DISARMAMENT COMMISSION RECONVENED IN GENEVA</p> <p>U.S. REPRESENTATIVES PRESENTED THE TWO-POINT PROGRAM TO THE GENEVA COMMISSION</p> <p>USSR DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL PRESENTED TO THE GENEVA COMMISSION</p> <p>U.S. AND USSR SIMULTANEOUSLY ANNOUNCED PLANS TO CUT BACK PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS</p> <p>U.S. PRESENTED PLAN FOR UN PLAN KEEPING FORCE UNDER MILITARY CONTROL</p> <p>NATO-ALIGNED NATIONS LEGALLY MET IN CAMP - DISCUSSED ARMS CONTROL PROBLEMS (EXISTING AND OTHER ITEMS)</p>											
<p>THE SEVEN JANUARY</p> <p>NO V JAN</p> <p>BOTS BROKE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI OVER THE ENTRANCE OF NEGRO JAMES H. REEB</p> <p>THE 21ST ECUMENICAL COUNCIL OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH WAS OPENED IN ROME BY POPE JOHN XXIII</p> <p>SOVIET OFFENSIVE BUILDUP IN CUBA WAS BELIEVED TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. PRESIDENT DEMANDED A WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET MISSILES. U.S. NAVY IMPOSED A QUARANTINE ACROSS SEA LANE SERVING CUBA</p> <p>HUNGARIANS CLASHED WITH SOVIET TROOPS OUTSIDE OF BUDAPEST AND IN THE COUNTRY</p>												<p>GENERAL LYMAN L. LEMMONIER TOOK OVER COMMAND OF NATO FROM GENERAL HEMSTAD</p> <p>U.S. REAFFIRMED SUPPORT OF ROYALIST GOVERNMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA</p> <p>U.S. AND SAUDI ARABIA RESUMED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS</p> <p>MADE AIR FORCE OFFICERS OVER- THROW GOVERNMENT OF U.S. AND USSR RECOGNIZED NEW GOVERNMENT</p> <p>PRO-MASSER MILITARY OFFICERS SEIZED CONTROL OF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT</p> <p>IRVING EJECTED TO UN MEMBERSHIP (BROUGHT ROYAL MEMBERSHIP TO 11)</p> <p>PRESIDENT KENNEDY REAFFIRMED MILITARY SUPPORT OF WESTERN EUROPE</p> <p>PRESIDENT MET WITH A CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENTS ON CUBAN PROBLEM</p> <p>CANADA AND U.S. AGREED ON JOINT DEFENSE POLICY</p> <p>U.S. AND HAITI RESUMED NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS</p> <p>FRANCE WITHDREW NAVAL FORCES FROM NATO'S ATLANTIC COMMAND</p> <p>PRESIDENT KENNEDY DEPARTED FOR 10 DAY EUROPEAN TOUR</p>												<p>ECUADORIAN ARMY OUSTED PRESIDENT CARLOS AROSMENDE MONROY AND ASSUMED CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT</p> <p>STO LINA ANNOUNCED IT WOULD TAKE 10 TO 20 YEARS TO OVERTAKE THE GREAT POWERS IN AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY AND INDUSTRY</p> <p>U.S. PRESIDENT NASSER RENOUNCED AN AGREEMENT TO MERGE TOPT, HAGD, AND SYRIA INTO A NEW UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC</p> <p>CONFERENCE OF 30 AFRICAN STATES CLOSED AT DAKAR, SENEGAL, WITH AGREEMENT ON A FORMULA FOR A COMBINED APPROACH TO AFRICAN UNITY</p> <p>ISRAELI AND JORDANIAN FORCES ENGAGED IN VIOLENT BORDER CLASH</p> <p>300,000 ATTEND CIVIL RIGHTS DEMON- STRATION IN WASHINGTON, D. C.</p> <p>FORMATION OF MALAYSIA BECAME AN INDEPENDENT MEMBER OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH</p> <p>LIU SHAO CHANG SUCCEEDED CHENG KAI-SHANG AS WEST GERMAN CHANCELLOR</p> <p>UNION OF SOVIETS AND SYRIA DECLARED NUCLEAR OF A BATHIST STATE</p> <p>SOUTH VIETNAM GOVERNMENT OF DIEM WAS OVERTHROWN</p> <p>PRESIDENT KENNEDY ASSASSINATED IN DALLAS</p>												<p>GENERAL NGUYEN DINH DIEM TOOK OVER CONTROL OF SOUTH VIETNAM GOVERNMENT. SHANN OUSTED THE MILITARY JUNTA THAT OVERTHREW THE DIEM GOVERNMENT (IN NOV 1961)</p> <p>SOVIET UNION AND EAST GERMANY NEGOTIATED A FRIENDSHIP TREATY</p> <p>SECOND MALAYSIAN SUMMIT CONFERENCE MET IN KUALA LUMPUR. LEADERS AGREED TO PEACE AGREEMENT</p> <p>GENERAL M. D. TAYLOR REPLACED R. C. LODGE AS AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM</p> <p>UN MANDATE IN THE CONGO TERMINATED</p> <p>GHANA BECAME AFRICA'S 37TH INDEPENDENT STATE</p> <p>INAZ LONDAZ EJECTED PRESIDENT OF MEXICO (TOOK OFFICE IN DECEMBER)</p> <p>AFRICA'S L. MOKOBEA SUCCEEDED LUDWIG S. BIELCHIN AS PRESIDENT OF THE USSR</p> <p>FOURTH VIETNAM P.T. BOATS ATTACKED THE U.S. DESTROYER TURNER JOY</p> <p>U.S. OFFICER BANNED FROM ATOM RED P.T. DEPOT AND OIL SUPPLY DEPOT IN NORTH VIETNAM</p> <p>LAOS ANNOUNCED WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM NATO COMMAND</p> <p>GENERAL THANH UYEN AS PRESIDENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM</p> <p>SOVIET PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV JERROD AS LEADER OF SOVIET GOV. AND SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY</p> <p>U.S. WAS GIVEN ULTIMATUM TO PAY DELINQUENT PEACE KEEPING DUES OF FORFEIT MILITARY CREDIT IN VOTE</p>											
<p>HED FIRST CON- TAINERS SATIONS LADDER</p> <p>JUL D THREE "REINFORCEMENT"</p> <p>HOUSTON I WHILE FAMOUS ATOMIC BOMB</p> <p>WAS LAUNCHED APR 24 AND FALL 1961</p> <p>REPRESENTED MISSION IN SEA</p> <p>TELSTAR LAUNCHED INTO ORBIT</p> <p>USS SLATT AND USS BEAUGARON REMOVED UNDER THE POLAR ICE CAP</p> <p>USSR ORBITED MALE ANDRIAN HEROLATY AND LT. COL. DAVID FORNICH INTO NEARLY IDENTICAL ORBITS</p> <p>U.S. LAUNCHED MARINER II FOR VENUS FLY-BY (FLY-BY SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED) DEC 14</p>												<p>TELSTAR I COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE REACTIVATED BY RADIO SIGNALS FROM EARTH</p> <p>U.S. AND USSR AGREED ON JOINT WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAM</p> <p>FRANCE REVEALED PLANS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR TEST CENTER TO BE BUILT IN TANGI</p> <p>SECOND COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE, TELSTAR II, SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHED FROM CAPE CANAVERAL</p> <p>U.S. ASTRONAUT GORDON COOPER HAD PERFECT PACIFIC LANDING AFTER 21 ORBIT MISSION</p> <p>NASA ANNOUNCED COMPLETION OF MERCURY SPACE PROJECT</p> <p>SOVIETS ORBITED LT. COL. VALENTY P. BYROVSKY</p> <p>FIRST WOMAN COMMUNIST, VALENTINA TERESHKOVA ORBITED</p>												<p>AFGHANISTAN AND USSR SIGNED AGREEMENT FOR SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN CONSTRUCTION OF ATOMIC INSTALLATION IN AFGHANISTAN</p> <p>U.S. NUCLEAR POWERED MERCHANT SHIP SAVANNAH UNDERWAY FOR SEA TRIALS</p> <p>INSTALLATION OF POLARIS A-3 MISSILES IN FBM SUBMARINE S COMMENCED</p> <p>U.S. NUCLEAR POWERED MERCHANT SHIP SAVANNAH UNDERWAY FOR SEA TRIALS</p> <p>COMMUNIST CHINA EXPLORED NUCLEAR DEVICE NEAR LOPNOR - ESTIMATED 20 KT</p> <p>SUBOCEAN SYSTEM DETAILS ANNOUNCED - FOR LONG RANGE DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY SUBMARINES</p>																							





## IV. BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abshire, D. M. and R. V. Allen. National Security - Political, Military, and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead. Hoover Institution Publications. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger (1963).
- Anderson, Poul. Thermonuclear Warfare. New York: Monarch (1963).
- Baumol, W. J. Economic Theory and Operations Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall (1961).
- Beaton, Leonard, and John Maddox. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. New York: Praeger (1962).
- Bendit, Emile, and Kenneth Boulding, Editors. Disarmament and the Economy. New York: Harper and Row (1963).
- Brown, Neville. Strategic Mobility. London: Chatto and Windus, for the Institute for Strategic Studies (1963).
- Buchan, Alastaire. Arms and Stability in Europe. London: Institute for Strategic Studies (1964).
- Burns, Arthur Lee. Power Politics and the Growing Nuclear Club. Policy Memorandum No. 20. Princeton: Princeton University (1964).
- Campbell, R. W. Soviet Economic Power: Its Organization, Growth and Challenge. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin (1960).
- Cottrell, Alvin J., and James E. Dougherty. The Politics of the Atlantic Alliance. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, Inc. (1964).
- Davis, Morton. Verification of Disarmament by Inspection: A Game Theoretic Model. Princeton: Princeton University Press (3 Dec 1963).
- Dougherty, James E. "Zonal Arms Limitation in Europe," ORBIS. Volume VII (Fall 1963), pp. 478-517.
- Dougherty, James E. "Arms and the Western Conscience," Air Force and Space Digest (July 1964).



Economist Intelligence Unit, Ltd. The Economic Effects of Disarmament.  
Toronto: University of Toronto Press (1963).

Erler, Fritz. "The Alliance and the Future of Germany," Foreign Affairs Quarterly (April 1965), pp. 436-446.

"Exports Heading for High in '64, Commerce Unit Says," Wall Street Journal  
(6 July 1964).

Feld, Bernard T. "The Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (December 1964), pp. 2-6.

Ferguson, Allen H. Mechanics of Some Limited Disarmament Measures. A Simple Economic Treatment. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation  
(17 Nov 1960, Rev 23 Jan 1961).

Frye, Alton. Space Arms Control: Trends, Concepts, Prospects. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation (Feb 1964).

Gallois, Pierre M. "Force de Frappe," ATLAS (June 1963).

Garrison, Mark J., and Morris H. Crawford. "Soviet Trade with the Free World in 1961," Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, in United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 87th Congress, 2nd Session (1962), pp. 439-456.

Garthoff, Raymond L. Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger (1958).

Herman, Leon M. "The Political Goals of Soviet Foreign Aid," Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, in United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 87th Congress, 2nd Session (1962), pp. 475-485.

Hsieh, Alice Langley. "China, Russia, and the Bomb," New Leader 43 (19 October 1960).

Hsieh, Alice Langley. "The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue: 1963," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume VIII, No. 2 (1963), pp. 99-115.

Hsieh, Alice Langley. Chinese Strategy in the Nuclear Age. New York: Praeger (1963).

Huan, Claude. "The Soviet Submarine Force," Naval Review (1964).

Intelligence Digest. Ringroth Publication, London, England.



Intriligator, Michael D. Some Simple Models of Arms Races. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation (Apr 1964).

Johnson, John (ed). The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries. Princeton: Princeton University Press (1962).

Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress. Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, (1962).

Journal of Conflict Resolution. Michigan Center for the Study of Behavioral and Social Sciences, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Journal of the American Society of International Law, Washington D.C.

Journal of World Politics

Kahn, Herman. On Thermonuclear War. Princeton: Princeton University Press (1960).

Kahn, Herman. On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger (1965).

Kaufmann, William W. The McNamara Strategy. New York: Harper and Row (1964).

Kintner, William R. and Stefan Possony. "NATO's Nuclear Crisis," ORBIS (Summer 1962).

Kissinger, Henry A. "Coalition Diplomacy in a Nuclear Age," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 4 (July 1964), pp. 525-545.

Kissinger, Henry A. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: Knopf (1958).

Leites, N. Styles in Negotiation: East and West on Arms Control, 1958-1961. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation (Nov 1961).

Levine, Robert A. The Arms Debate. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1963).

Liddell Hart, Capt. B.H. Deterrent or Defense? New York: Praeger (1959).

Liddell Hart, Capt. B.H. (ed.) The German Generals Talk. New York: Pocket Books (1959)

Liddell Hart, Capt. B.H. The Red Army. New York: Praeger (1960).



Loosbruck, John F. "The Margin of Deterrence," Air Force and Space Digest (April 1965), pp. 39-46.

Luce, R. D., and H. Raiffa. Games and Decisions. New York: Wiley (1957).

McNamara, Hon. Robt. S. Statements Before the House Armed Services Committee. 1963, 1964, 1965.

Miksche, F. O. "The Case for Nuclear Sharing," ORBIS (Fall 1961).

Miksche, Ferdinand Otto, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons and the Defense of Western Europe," Military Review, 44, (June 1964).

Military Review. U. S. Army Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Morgenstern, Oskar. "The N-Country Problem," Fortune (March 1961).

Morganthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations. New York: Alfred P. Knopf (1963).

Munk, Frank. Atlantic Dilemma: Partnership or Community. New York: Oceana Publications, Inc. (1964).

"Nontariff Restrictions Upon Trade," Seventh Annual Report of the Trade Agreements Program, Message from the President of the United States to the Congress, October 31, 1963. Reprinted in Congressional Record, Vol. 109, No. 180. 88th Congress, 1st Session (November 1963), pp. 20213-20215.

ORBIS - Journal of the Foreign Policy Research Institute Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Osgood, Robert Endicott. NATO: The Entangling Alliance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1962).

Ossenbech, F. J. (ed.). Open Space and Peace. Stanford: The Hoover Institution (1964).

Posuar, Wesley, et. al. (eds.). American Defense Policy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (1965).

Pournelle, J. E. "System Costs and Analysis," In Ossenbech, Open Space and Peace. Stanford: The Hoover Institution (1964).



Power, General Thomas S. with Albert A. Arnheim. Design for Survival. New York: Coward-McCann, Inc. (1965).

Problems of Communists. U.S. Dept of State.

Quade, E.S. (ed.). Analysis for Military Decisions. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation (1964).

Raymond, Jack. Power at the Pentagon. New York: Harper and Row (1964).

Richardson, Lewis F. Arms and Insecurity. Pittsburgh: The Boxwood Press (1960).

Richardson, Lewis F. Statistics of Deadly Quarrels. Pittsburgh: The Boxwood Press (1960).

Rosecrance, R. N. (editor). The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons. New York: Columbia University Press (1964).

Rothwell, Jack C. "Will Growth Stop the Gold Drain?" Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review (Nov. 1963). Reprinted in Congressional Record, Vol. 109, No. 196. 88th Congress, 1st Session (3 Dec. 1963), pp. 22008-22011.

Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. Princeton: Harvard University Press (1959).

Schilling, W.R., P. Y. Hammond, and G.H. Synder. Politics and Defense Budgets. New York: Columbia University Press (1962).

Schuman, F. Y. The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect. Baton Rouge: LSU Press (1962).

Snyden, Glenn H. "Balance of Power in the Missile Age," Journal of International Affairs, XIV, No. 1 (1960).

Snyder, Glenn. Deterrence and Defense. Princeton: Princeton University Press (1961).

Sma<sup>11</sup> Business and Foreign Trade. House Report No. 1303. Select Committee on Small Business. 88th Congress, 2nd Session (April 1964).

Sokolovskii, Marshal V. D. (editor). Soviet Military Strategy. (RAND Corporation Research Study) Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall (1963).



Spanier, John W. and Joseph L. Noguee. The Politics of Disarmament.  
New York: Frederick A. Praeger (1962).

Statistical Abstract of the United States 1963, 84th Annual Edition. United  
States Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Washington:  
U. S. Government Printing Office (1963).

Strausz-Hupe, Robert, Stefan Possony, and William Kintner. A Forward  
Strategy for America. A Foreign Policy Research Institute Book.  
New York: Harper and Brothers (1961).

The Journal of Survival. The Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

The Military Balance, 1963-64. London: Institute for Strategic Studies  
(1964).

The Soviet Economic Offensive in Western Europe. United States Congress,  
House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Relations. 88th  
Congress, 1st Session, 1963.

Thunberg, Penelope Hartland. "The Soviet Union in the World Economy," in  
Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power. U.S. Congress: Joint Economic  
Committee. 87th Congress, 2nd Session (1962).

"Unicorn, a Study of Unilateral Arms Control. Phase I Report, Part II  
Background Discussion." Bedford, Mass.: Raytheon Co. (Oct. 1962).

"Unilateral Arms Control (Unicorn) Phase I Report, Part I." Bedford, Mass.:  
Raytheon Co. (Sept. 1962).

U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Economic Impacts of  
Disarmament. Washington: U. S. Govt. Print. Off ACDA Publication  
No. 2 (June 1964).

U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Documents on Disarmament—  
1961. U. S. Government Printing Office (1962).

U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Documents on Disarmament—  
1962. Volume I—January-June. Volume II—July-December. U. S.  
Government Printing Office (1963).

U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Documents on Disarmament—  
1963. U. S. Government Printing Office (1964).

U. S. Dept. of the Air Force. United States Air Force Basic Doctrine,  
(14 August 1964).



U. S. Dept. of Agriculture. Man, Land, and Food. U. S. Government  
Printing Office: Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 11 (1962).

U. S. Dept. of State. Documents on Disarmament—1945-1959. U. S.  
Government Printing Office (1960).

U. S. Dept. of State. Documents on Disarmament — 1960. U. S. Government  
Printing Office (1961).

Van Slyck, Phillip. Peace: The Control of National Power. Boston:  
Beacon Press (1963).

von Hassel, Kai-Uwe. "Organizing Western Defense," Foreign Affairs  
Quarterly (Jan. 1965), pp. 209-216.

Wiener, A. J., and Kahn, Herman. Crises and Arms Control. Hudson  
Institute for DOD-ISA (HI-180-RR) A/D 432873 (1962).

Wilcox, Francis O. and H. Field Haviland, Jr. (editors). The Atlantic  
Community, Progress and Prospects. New York: Frederick A. Praeger,  
Inc. (1963).

Wohlstetter, Albert. "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N + 1 Country,"  
Foreign Affairs (April 1961).